Russian Opposition and Russian Resistance: The Landscape Before the Battle for Power

Russian Opposition and Russian Resistance: The Landscape Before the Battle for Power, by Ilya Ponomarev, the Chairman of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian Republic, is the first article in a series of analyses as part of “Promethean Liberation: Russia’s Emerging National and Regional Movements,” a new project from Jamestown Senior Fellow Janusz Bugajski.

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Executive Summary:

• The Russian opposition is currently fractured, dominated by ideologically diverse groups that lack a coherent strategy, shared goals, or political legitimacy. Many function more as protest movements than viable alternatives to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime.
• Several different organizations lead the opposition, including the Anti-Corruption Foundation (ACF), the Anti-War Committee (AWC), the Free Russia Forum (FRF), and the Congress of People’s Deputies (CPD), as well as moderate urbanist reformers, each pursuing distinct strategies.
• A new resistance movement has emerged, involving over 10,000 people—including fighters on Ukraine’s frontlines and guerrillas within Russia—who are actively challenging Putin’s regime through direct engagement, offering a new model of sacrifice for change.
• Initiatives, such as the CPD, are proactively crafting constitutional reforms and legislative frameworks to ensure that a democratic, decentralized, and rights-respecting Russia is prepared following a regime change.
• Western powers hesitate to support armed opposition groups, favoring moderate exiles, but embracing the full spectrum of the Russian opposition, especially those risking their lives in active resistance, would facilitate unity and democratic transition.

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Many people consider the “Russian opposition” to be impotent, and few believe that it can defeat Russian President Vladimir Putin and ultimately transform the country. It has reached the point where representatives of the armed part of the Russian opposition are beginning to say, “Do not call us the Russian opposition; we now are the Russian resistance.” This resistance exists and is growing, and already involves more than ten thousand people who are both on the frontlines of Russia’s war against Ukraine and are conducting guerrilla operations on the home front, behind the lines of Putin’s army.

The Mainstream Political Landscape

It is useful to examine and define the “Russian opposition.” After Boris Yeltsin carried out an unconstitutional coup in October 1993, followed by a highly dubious presidential election in July 1996, all major officially registered opposition parties became representatives of different factions of the ruling elite, becoming essentially their tools in manipulating society.[1] At this point, Russian democracy became “imitational.” It was still competitive, but not for voters or policies, but to gain the Kremlin’s attention and money for oligarchs.[2] After Putin came to power in 1999, as the elites consolidated under his rule, these parties homogenized to the point of indistinguishability. The result was the creation of the “non-systemic opposition”—poorly structured groups of opposition-minded citizens, typically functioning as fan clubs of individual charismatic leaders.[3] Most of the activities of the “non-systemic opposition” have so far essentially been demonstrations of disagreement with various actions of the authorities. They have never proposed a specific plan to change the situation in the country, were not part of a formulated strategy to fight for power, and did not express the will of particular social groups or classes. They were merely reacting to direct violations of the law and the Constitution by the ruling class, as well as its disregard for morality, ethical norms, and electoral rights.

The “non-systemic opposition” is not really a political opposition. In essence, it is a protest movement, not formalized into political forces with coherent programs of action. Occasionally, it raises the issue of campaigning for one candidate or another during elections, although this is often impossible in the current system. Most of the time, the “non-systemic opposition” acts as the shadow side of the power itself, uncompromisingly criticizing it and making various demands of it, but it cannot imagine itself in power. As the pressure from the authorities on dissenters increased, many of the latter, under the threat of arrest or other repercussions, were forced to leave the country, while few preferred to go to jail, following the example of Soviet-era dissidents. While abroad, they continued to do what they were expelled for—reflecting on the unlawful actions of the Russian authorities, speaking out in the media against the regime, and explaining why Putin was bad to their supporters, sympathetic Russians, and representatives of other countries. In the overwhelming majority of cases, they did not engage in the life of these countries, metaphorically taking Russia with them and continuing to live the life of a homeland that is no longer accessible to them. There has been no transition to meaningful actions that would create an alternative to the regime they despise. These new dissidents increasingly isolated themselves in their separate protest world, created various social clubs and opposition forums, and sometimes held safe public activities or rallies. At the same time, they sharply reject those compatriots who step outside this familiar and comfortable narrative.

Main Tendencies Inside the Russian Opposition

From a political standpoint, the ranks of the opposition are publicly dominated by representatives of right-wing neoliberal views, many of whom lean toward the anti-communist White Movement of the 1918–1920 Civil War.[4] This does not add any optimism for their supporters—as the “Whites” were torn by internal contradictions and were defeated by the Bolsheviks. Many of their descendants now firmly support Putin in his attempts to restore the Russian empire.[5] The political spectrum within the Russian opposition, however, remains diverse. Before the war against Ukraine, it was divided into three large tendencies: leftists, nationalists, and neoliberals. Each of these groups, in turn, could be divided into two. The leftists included both the social-democracy-leaning statists, who were nostalgic for the Soviet Union and wanted to return to the past, and the left-liberals and progressives, who wanted to build a modern decentralized society based on direct democracy and grassroots self-government of citizens.

Among the nationalists, one can distinguish the imperialists from the ethno-nationalists. The imperialists found their perks in the existence of the Soviet Union, but perceived it not as a workers’ state but as a continuation of the Russian Empire. It is these people who are now fighting as volunteers in the Russian army in Ukraine. They include such characters as Igor Girkin and Aleksandr Dugin, a well-known representative of modern Russian fascism.[6] [7] Ethno-nationalists, on the contrary, are supporters of building a nation-state, and their ideal is “Russia for Russians.” That is, they usually do not oppose the republics of the Northern Caucasus leaving the Russian Federation, and they tend to support Ukraine under the premise that “Russia is for the Russians, and Ukraine is for the Ukrainians.” It is from this milieu that the largest number of fighters emerged to support Ukraine since the very first days of the war in 2014. Many of them fought as part of the Azov Battalion and as part of other units—totaling approximately 5,000 people.[8] About 1,500 of them were granted Ukrainian citizenship by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.[9]

Neoliberals were also divided into two subgroups. On the one hand, there were the moderates who built their successful careers in the 1990s. For them, under Yeltsin, conditions were not ideal, but it was a system within which they felt comfortable. They perceived Putin as an accident, a deviation, or a mistake and believed that if Russia returned to what Yeltsin or even Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev had envisioned, everything would be fine. Some of these neoliberals are still working for Putin, evidently to preserve the market economy, holding positions in the economic agencies of the government and thus providing funding for the war, which they consider to be an unfortunate mistake. These are the “system liberals.”[10]

Another part of this group left the country and set the tone in exile through the main liberal media outlets, including Dozhd TV Channel, Meduza Portal, Novaya Gazeta, and splinter groups of Ekho Moskvy Radio.[11]

Other liberals tend to take a more radical position. They recognize that Putin’s regime and Yeltsin’s regime are inextricably linked, that a liberal society has never really been built in Russia, with only a brief attempt, which Gorbachev hesitantly began, and the first wave of democrats even more hesitantly continued after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. All hopes were dashed, however, with the attack on the parliament in 1993, the outbreak of the Russo-Chechen war in 1994, the fraudulent privatization in 1995, and Yeltsin’s falsified election in 1996.[12] These people also view liberal democracy and market capitalism as their ideal outcome, but they do not believe that there was any movement in this direction in Russia during the 1990s. Among others, many of the late political activist Alexei Navalny’s supporters belong to this tendency.

Russian Opposition During the War Against Ukraine

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 dramatically simplified the political picture. The main issue around which the Russian opposition revolves is its position on the war. While the entire opposition probably has a negative stance toward the war, there are important nuances. Some consider this war to be their own—they believe that they should unambiguously side with Ukraine and fight for its victory, with which the collapse of Putinism will be inextricably linked. Other people have an abstract pacifist attitude and say that they should not oppose their own people. They believe that opposition to the war will harm their future political careers in a liberated Russia, and therefore, they should just wait for the moment when Putin’s regime collapses as a result of the struggle with Ukraine or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, or simply under the weight of its own problems. Then it will be possible to return and build a normal country. A large number of people are trying to grasp at every straw, but only to remain in the safer paradigm of waiting for someone else’s victory to continue participating in utopian evolutionary change rather than realistic revolutionary change within the country.

Sham presidential elections took place in Russia on March 17, 2024, as if there was no war. Many of the opposition filled out their ballots abroad. People selected candidates who were proposed by the regime and did not intend to change anything within the prevailing system. To be fair, many people came to the polling stations with the sole purpose of demonstrating that in Russia, there is still a significant number of citizens who disagree with the war unleashed by Putin and do not want to see him as president. Such citizens are grasping for any action that gives them hope that they are not entirely cut off from public life and that they can take some safe action to bring about change in the country. Fortunately, there are such people, but unfortunately, an action that could really bring change has not yet been offered to them. More active methods of struggle tend to frighten and repel them, but they will continue to look, and many of those who remain in Russia will be on the streets during future revolutionary events.

Just before the “elections,” a tragic event took place. The brightest Russian political activist and journalist, Alexei Navalny, was murdered in a prison camp.[13] A new round of internal struggle within the oppositionists then began. The faction associated with Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation (ACF) (the same wing that denounced the Yeltsin-Gorbachev legacy) launched an offensive against the “moderates,” who are usually associated with Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Garry Kasparov, and other representatives of the opposition that rose in the 1990s.[14] There is currently an active fight for which point of view will prevail in the liberal camp. There is no doubt that this acute conflict is directly connected with Navalny’s death. The amount of attention from Western leaders to his wife, Yuliya Navalnaya, the main face of Russian liberals at the moment, prompted her team to attempt to enforce her hegemony on the entire liberal flank instead of engaging in negotiations with other opposition members to build a joint coalition.[15] There are great doubts about whether this policy will succeed.

There are several competing centers of the Russian opposition, with leaders around whom political and media activity rotates. First, there is the center built around the ACF, created by Navalny and now led by Navalnaya, Mariya Pevchikh, and Leonid Volkov.[16] Largely because of Navalny’s personality, this group has always kept itself separate from others. It expresses radical neoliberal views but is no stranger to left populism stemming from the anticorruption agenda, which is used in attempts to reach beyond its traditional youth constituency. Due to its former media popularity and the attention of Western politicians, this group is not inclined toward any alliances, especially stressing its distance from those members of the opposition who were prominent in the 1990s. Its representatives believe that they are able to come to power completely independently, without entering into agreements with any other political forces. The Navalny group is least inclined to change the current political system and the Russian Constitution, claiming that its failure is primarily the result of treason by corrupted elites.

The other opposition center is the Anti-War Committee (AWC), created by Khodorkovsky and his organization, Open Russia.[17] Once Russia’s richest man and its most famous political prisoner, he is a very rational personality with a clear business mindset, which distinguishes him from others. Khodorkovsky does not like to do unnecessary (from his point of view) work to get ahead. A decade in a Russian prison has taught him to wait for the moment when the path of change will be determined: whether Ukraine wins or not, whether Russia will undergo gradual change, or whether the country will be transformed along a revolutionary path. Until this becomes clear to him, he will not take any active steps, let alone any actions that are perceived as controversial by potential supporters. In business parlance, he is a late-stage investor. Khodorkovsky is attempting to establish himself as a figure who dialogues with everyone, almost the “godfather of the opposition,” and to promote his central idea—the transformation of Russia from a presidential to a parliamentary republic. In general, he is reasonably successful, except with ACF supporters. He has significant wealth, and with his partner Leonid Nevzlin, his net worth is in the range of $1.5–2 billion, which Khodorkovsky preserved despite the state takeover of his main business asset—the oil giant Yukos. This is an important factor for a large number of Russian emigrants who were suddenly pushed out of Russia and found themselves penniless in the West.

The third opposition center is led by former chess champion Garry Kasparov, who unites people around the Free Russia Forum (FRF). This is the largest and most successful discussion platform for the Russian opposition. For a long time, it has also maintained a reputation as the most radical pro-Western group. Kasparov, who has been living in New York for a long time, prioritizes Russia’s integration into the international community over any purely domestic issues. This causes great irritation among other Russian opposition groups, especially the Navalnists, who reproach him for insufficient patriotism. Kasparov has also become one of the most vocal advocates for a Ukrainian victory. Until this happens, however, his priority is to become the main organizer and spokesman for the global Russian diaspora through the project of “virtual Taiwan”—a community of Russians who have been forced to leave the country and build a new state without being tied to any territory.[18] Kasparov calls on all people with opposition views who still reside in Russia to leave it immediately and join him.

The fourth group is the Congress of People’s Deputies (CPD), positioning itself as a shadow Russian parliament.[19] This is a unique formation that now includes more than 130 former members of parliament from various periods and levels from 36 regions of Russia, as well as all political parties that have ever been represented in the Russian State Duma. By relying on deputies elected by Russian citizens in internationally recognized elections, this is the only group of the Russian opposition that has a certain degree of verified legitimacy. The total number of votes that the people gathered in the Congress received in their elections reached approximately 8 million. In comparison, the largest elections that the opposition was able to organize were those to the Coordinating Council of the Opposition in 2012, in which about 81,000 people took part.[20]

The CPD, unlike Navalny’s, Khodorkovsky’s, and Kasparov’s organizations, is not engaged in political activism. It is building new legislation for a future Russia, designing a set of laws that will take effect the day after the regime changes, starting with the draft of a new Constitution and ending with basic legislation that regulates the economy, social sphere, education, science, and culture. That is everything that will determine the shape of the country the day after the revolution. Congress deputies are convinced that this should be done in advance because otherwise, there will again be a great risk that everything is done in a hurry and lead to the same discrediting of democratic ideas as happened in the 1990s when various crooks and business lobbyists used loopholes in the legislation to pursue their interests.

The fifth moderate oppositionist group includes former municipal deputies elected during the war against Ukraine and representatives of the urbanist movement. These people focus on “small deeds” of gradual improvements and support an evolutionary process of change. They support constructive dialogue with the authorities and participation in completely fictitious elections. This group includes both municipal deputies who have left Russia and those who remain, formally united in two cooperating structures—the Zemsky Congress, coordinated by Yuliya Galyamina from Moscow, and the Deputies of Peaceful Russia, based in Berlin.[21] In exile, the loudest voice of this group is Maksim Katz, a well-known blogger and political consultant who originated in Navalny’s structures but broke with his former colleagues and now actively criticizes them.[22] They are joined by well-known human rights activists Lev Ponomariov, the Memorial movement, and a few others. There is also a sixth notable grouping—the SLOVONOVO community of cultural bohemians, famous writers, artists, musicians, and performers who have been pushed out of the current authoritarian Russian society.[23] They are coordinated, assisted, and developed by gallerist Marat Guelman, a well-known representative of the Russian cultural community, who now lives in Germany.[24]

Emerging Armed Opposition—the Russian Resistance

The six aforementioned groups constitute the Russian political opposition. Three Russian units fighting on the frontlines as official autonomous parts of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, however, should be added to this list.[25] First, the largest of them is the Freedom of Russia Legion, followed by the Russian Volunteer Corps and the Siberian Battalion. They were formed in different ways, have different military specialties, and include people of various types, but they are united by one thing—readiness to bear and use arms to defend their values against Putinism. Regarding the Freedom of Russia Legion, which this author had the honor of representing politically in 2022–2024, it includes representatives from the most diverse political tendencies, including former supporters of Navalny, nationalists, leftists, and liberals. The units at the front are complemented by a fairly large internal Russian urban resistance movement, which is currently five to seven times larger than the number of people at the front.

In general, resistance inside Russia is organized in the form of various loose networks. Some of them have grown at the completely grassroots level, while others have been created in coordination with the three units fighting at the front in Ukraine, thus resembling De Gaulle’s movement, which started under the name of Free France and evolved into Fighting France. Their activities can be seen constantly in news reports about acts of sabotage on railroad trains carrying military cargo, attacks on infrastructure facilities inside Russia that have military significance, and even attacks on military bases inside the country. This movement is growing, and its members are real heroes. Paradoxically, it is safer to participate in armed resistance than in nonviolent protest in Russia. Of the current over 1,500 political prisoners in Russia, only about two hundred are people who were associated with the resistance, while the rest were involved in nonviolent actions.[26] This fact is easy to explain: those who engage in armed attacks usually do everything to avoid being caught and remain anonymous, while “ordinary” political activists are in full view of everyone. Thus, the Russian security services come for them quickly and send them to camps.

Finally, there is a growing number of national liberation movements in the regions and republics of the Russian Federation, which the Free Nations League and the Free Nations of Post-Russia Forum primarily coordinate.[27] Discussions about their views and actions in the Russian opposition are probably the toughest. The topic of a possible collapse of the Federation, actively sought by many Ukrainians, remains taboo for most Russians. Some believe that the country must be preserved within its internally recognized borders at all costs, regardless of anything, and quite aggressively attack anyone who disagrees, including physical threats to “deal with the separatists.” Others, while sympathetic to the struggle of national republics, believe that this topic is toxic for their relations with the West, which is obviously afraid of the collapse of the Russian Federation and nuclear proliferation, the People’s Republic of China’s strengthening position in Siberia, and chaos stemming from a possible internal war. Just as the West once did not support the collapse of the Soviet Union, its official circles now do not support even a hint of discussion about the self-determination of the peoples that comprise the Russian Federation.

The CPD, which has adopted a resolution that it will unconditionally respect the right of peoples to self-determination, is a special case in point, which is why Russian regionalists and representatives of national liberation movements regularly attend it. The position of the Congress is simple: there is no need to push anyone to secede from Russia, but it is a crime to hold anyone inside by force. Russia’s strength lies in its regions, particularly in grassroots self-government. Any actions aimed at suppressing diverse regional identities, cultures, languages, and overall regional self-determination will play a negative role and may lead not to the strengthening of the future Russian Republic but to its weakening.

Nevertheless, there is quite an active discussion on this topic, and the position of the international community plays an important role. Numerous questions regarding this position remain: What standards will be used to approach the future of Russia? Will it be treated like any other country, and will the rights of its people be treated like the rights of people living in other countries? Or will they encourage anti-democratic, imperialist tendencies in certain Russian opposition groups in the name of important geopolitical concerns, primarily related to Russia’s nuclear status, just as Putin was once encouraged to tame the people of Chechnya? At the same time, supporting Ukraine’s armed struggle can be considered correct not only from a moral perspective—in times of war, the defender always deserves support—but also from a pragmatic perspective. The likelihood that there will be a very significant number of former state, private, and criminal armed groups left on Russian territory after the collapse of Putin’s regime is extremely high. For this reason alone, the new government must have the ability to defend itself independently of the former compromised security apparatus.

Financial Crisis, Political Infighting, and Strategic Paralysis

By 2025, the Russian opposition had plunged into a deep financial crisis triggered by the collapse of USAID-backed funding.[28] The FRF and the ACF were among the hardest hit, launching an aggressive competition for dwindling European funds.[29] The FRF halted its meetings entirely. Many media projects were either downsized or shut down altogether. Only two structures remained financially resilient: the AWC and the CPD, led by Ilya Ponomarev. Unprecedented internal strife was also seen in 2024. ACF accused Nevzlin—Khodorkovsky’s lifelong business partner—of orchestrating an assassination attempt on Volkov, following the latter’s political attacks against Nevzlin’s ally.[30] Volkov himself came under scrutiny for failing to disclose receiving funds from sanctioned oligarch Mikhail Fridman, allegedly in exchange for lobbying efforts to remove him from sanctions lists.[31]

Katz, who received media backing from Khodorkovsky, accused ACF of collaborating with corrupt Russian bankers and providing false testimony in asylum cases.[32] In response, ACF denounced Katz for business dealings with Kremlin-linked tech firms and accused Khodorkovsky of participating in election fraud and suppressing democracy during the 1990s to secure business advantages. Further scandals erupted when Katz accused the Free Russia Foundation, the influential U.S.-based non-governmental organization, of using U.S. State Department funding to run ACF-linked internet troll farms, which allegedly targeted not only the Kremlin but also rival opposition figures. Nevzlin later attempted, unsuccessfully, to seize control of the CPD, igniting additional tension. The cumulative effect of these disputes was devastating for the opposition. Communications and support from the European Parliament, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), U.S. officials, Poland, and Ukraine were effectively frozen, as cooperation with the Russian opposition became potentially toxic for mainstream Western politicians.

Most factions of the Russian opposition—excluding the CPD—chose to openly support the Democratic Party’s 2024 campaign in the United States, intensifying their criticism of U.S. President Donald Trump. This alignment further complicated formal contacts with U.S. institutions and other allied governments, limiting the opposition’s access to decision-makers across the West.

Meanwhile, the looming uncertainty of a potential Russia-Ukraine peace deal cast a paralyzing shadow across opposition planning. Moderates such as Khodorkovsky retreated from public engagement, uncertain of how to proceed if hostilities ended. Radicals such as Kasparov, in contrast, have vocally criticized U.S. efforts at diplomacy, which have triggered accusations that they represent a “party of war.” Opposition figures skeptical of the armed resistance and its association with Ukrainian partners seized the opportunity to question the legitimacy of structures such as the CPD and prematurely declared their “political bankruptcy.” All opposition groups now confront a common dilemma: none can convincingly offer their followers a coherent and viable future strategy. This is especially detrimental to the CPD, which had positioned itself as a provisional governing body in a post-Putin transition. Without a clear horizon, the Russian opposition movement must pivot from short-term wartime relevance to an indefinite, uncertain long game.

Importance of Consolidated Opposition

It can be argued that if Russian opposition leaders do not value unity above their personal ambitions, then why should anyone else? Should one wait until the Russian elite appoints a successor or wait for a new leader to emerge if the regime collapses, as happened in 1991?

Representatives of the armed wing of the Russian opposition—the Russian resistance—gave their answer to this by acting already. Making strategic decisions, however, is always about a risk-reward calculation. To wait and do nothing means more deaths in Ukraine, a risk of escalating the war beyond Ukraine to the territory of NATO states, and resigning to the idea that somebody from Putin’s inner circle will succeed him. Many say that to act means to risk a suicidal nuclear conflict and a bloody civil war inside Russia. Indecisiveness, however, should not be covered by describing such scenarios. Every day, one can already see conflicts in Russia with burning refineries and derailed trains. Putin is not a nuclear jihadist, judging by his long tables in the Kremlin to protect him from an unfiltered disease.

A strong opposition will create internal problems for Putin and help divert him from external escapades. A strong opposition taking over in Moscow can end the war against Ukraine and any wars inside Russia, de-occupy territories, reintegrate Russia with the West, restore trade and foreign investments, and repay the damages of the war, which otherwise would be financed by Western taxpayers. A strong and united opposition, in the sense of a single organization or party, however, is hardly possible because activists often hold divergent views on the future of the country and sometimes different values. Attempts to create a few joint structures in the past demonstrated this. The best example was the left-right coalition The Other Russia, which included both supporters of Kasparov’s neoliberal United Civil Front (UCF) and members of Eduard Limonov’s National Bolshevik Party (NBP).[33] As a result, both the UCF and the NBP were annihilated, and most of their networks were lost. The most recent failure was the Coordination Council of the Opposition, established during protests in 2012 and consisting of 45 prominent opposition figures, which failed to adopt even the rules of its own activities in a year of work, and most of whose members simply went home.

A coalition of various forces with different views, which would coordinate activities using various methods of struggle, is quite possible. The creation of a coalition shadow government of the Russian Republic, recognized by the international community, is also possible.

This government would include representatives of both resistance fighters and the opposition movements supporting them, each of which contains professionally accomplished individuals capable of taking responsibility for the country’s fate during the transition period. It can take all necessary steps, coordinated with the states of the Rammstein coalition, to encourage Russians to fight against aggression. It should be stressed, however, that any union that denies cooperation with the armed part of the opposition can never become the real power in Russia.

How the West Can Help Consolidation

Western political circles consistently call for Russian oppositionists to unite before talking about Russia’s future. This creates even more intense competition between different political groups. Everyone wants to be in charge, to be the most visible, to be heard by Western politicians, to become the center of unification, and to receive an exclusive mandate. This is especially the case since politicians in emigration are mostly intellectuals, not workers, with a lot of free time, who often direct their energy into a struggle with each other.

On the other hand, the West does not notice or pretends not to see those who are fighting against aggression in Ukraine and on the home front, and who have little time for blogging and political intrigues. Western officials consider such people dangerous and unpredictable and believe any ties with them may backfire. This is why they are not invited to various events and are not called to join coalitions. The part of the opposition that has taken on the heavy burden of organizing real resistance and hastening the end of the war and the fall of Putinism scares traditional politicians due to their desire to completely reset Russian statehood and the methods they employ.

As a result of these factors, there is little assistance, but rather sabotage, in creating truly inclusive opposition alliances. Ultimately, attempts to create such coalitions fail because they lack the core of freedom fighters to make the whole structure meaningful and aimed at political action. The reason for this lies in the lack of understanding of the challenges to global security and human values posed by Putinism and its policies, which is encouraged by the indecisiveness of the free world. The faster this realization comes, the sooner the focus of attention will shift toward the most decisive and capable segments of the Russian opposition—its resistance movement. The most meaningful policy aimed at ending the war and preventing another Putin or someone even worse from emerging in Russia is to create discussion platforms and venues that will be open to all representatives of the Russian opposition without exception. Both the methods of struggle and concrete projects aimed at building a new Russian state must be discussed. Such mechanisms can help ensure that Russia will become part of the Western world and cease to exist as a tyranny, an empire, and a prison for individual citizens and entire nations.

Endnotes

[1] Trudolyubov, Maxim, Evgeny Romanovsky, Izabella Tabarovsky, and Rashad Shirinov. “Opposition Divided over History Leading to Putin.” Wilson Center, April 23, 2025. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/opposition-divided-over-history-leading-putin.

[2] Furman, Dmitrii, Keith Gessen, and Tony Wood. 2022. Imitation Democracy: The Development of Russia’s Post-Soviet Political System. Translated by Ian Dreiblatt. English language edition. London: Verso. Verso Books. https://www.versobooks.com/products/354-imitation-democracy?srsltid=AfmBOopY15C4nlaKWrp42J1oJaTHPwZTA693gpdQfwP9JH2pFbHW4WyM.

[3] Golosov, Grigorii. “Russian Opposition: Inside or Outside the System?” OpenDemocracy. September 1, 2011. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/russian-opposition-inside-or-outside-system/.

[4] Kostenko, Nika, Margarita Zavadskaya, Emil Kamalov and Ivetta Sergeeva. “The Russian Rhizome: A Social Portrait of New Immigrants.” Re:Russia. January 11, 2023. https://re-russia.net/en/expertise/045/.

[5] Fishman, Diana. “Compatriots 3. How Descendants of White Russian Emigres Became the Kremlin’s Key Agents of Influence in France.” The Insider. The Insider. February 21, 2023. https://theins.ru/en/politics/259554.

[6] RFE/RL’s Echo of the Caucasus. “Igor Girkin, Imprisoned Russian Nationalist, Plans to Join Troops Invading Ukraine.” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. RFE/RL. April 10, 2024. https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-girkin-strelkov-ukraine-invasion-prison/32899197.html.

[7] Ingram, Alan. 2001. “Alexander Dugin: Geopolitics and Neo-Fascism in Post-Soviet Russia.” Political Geography. Volume 20, Issue 8, November 2001, Pages 1029-1051. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0962629801000439.

[8] Puglisi, Rosaria, Bertrand de Franqueville, Ivan Gomza, Mollie Saltskog, Kacper Rekawek, Taras Tarasiuk, Petro Burkovskiy, and Przemysław Witkowski. 2024. In the Eye of the Storm Origins, Ideology, and Controversies of the Azov Brigade, 2014-2023. Edited by Christian Kaunert, Alex MacKenzie, and Adrien Nonjon. 1. Auflage. Hannover: ibidem. https://elibrary.utb.de/doi/book/10.24216/9783838277509; and “U.S. Lifts Ban on Providing Weapons and Training for Ukraine’s Controversial Azov Brigade.” PBS. Public Broadcasting Service. June 11, 2024. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-lifts-ban-on-providing-weapons-and-training-for-ukraines-controversial-azov-brigade.

[9] “Zelensky Grants Ukrainian Citizenship to Several Foreign Military Volunteers.” Information Agency. UNIAN. July 18, 2019. https://www.unian.info/war/10622892-zelensky-grants-ukrainian-citizenship-to-several-foreign-military-volunteers.html; Litnarovych, Vlad. “Ukraine’s Azov Brigade Officially Opens Its Ranks to Foreign Volunteers.” UNITED24 Media. December 24, 2024. https://united24media.com/latest-news/ukraines-azov-brigade-officially-opens-its-ranks-to-foreign-volunteers-4679.

[10] Matveev, Ilya. “How Russia’s Liberal Technocrats Became…Just Technocrats.” Jordan Russia Center. Accessed May 25, 2024. https://jordanrussiacenter.org/blog/how-russias-liberal-technocrats-becamejust-technocrats.

[11] TV Rain, Inc. Телеканал Дождь. https://tvrain.tv/; “Новости.” 2025. Meduza. https://meduza.io/; Новая Газета Европа. https://novayagazeta.eu/; Ekho Moskvy Radio splinter program Live Rain, https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCWAIvx2yYLK_xTYD4F2mUNw.

[12] “Russian Forces Enter Chechnya | December 11, 1994.” 2025. History.Com. A&E Television Networks. Updated March 2, 2025. https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/december-11/yeltsin-orders-russian-forces-into-chechnya; Rosalsky, Greg. “How ‘Shock Therapy’ Created Russian Oligarchs and Paved the Path for Putin.” NPR. NPR. March 22, 2022. https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2022/03/22/1087654279/how-shock-therapy-created-russian-oligarchs-and-paved-the-path-for-putin.

[13] “HRF Condemns the Murder of Russian Dissident Alexei Navalny.” Human Rights Foundation. February 16, 2024. https://hrf.org/latest/hrf-condemns-the-murder-of-russian-dissident-alexei-navalny/.

[14] The Bell. “Team Navalny Film about 1990s Oligarchs Divides Russia’s Opposition.” The Bell. The Bell. April 23, 2024. https://en.thebell.io/team-navalny-film-about-1990s-oligarchs-divides-russias-opposition/.

[15] Deutsche Welle. “Yulia Navalnaya Takes on Leading Role in Russia’s Opposition – DW – June 6, 2024.” Dw.Com. Deutsche Welle. June 6. https://www.dw.com/en/yulia-navalnaya-takes-on-leading-role-in-russias-opposition/a-69272303.

[16] Anticorruption Foundation, https://acf.international/.

[17] “What Is Open Russia?” Mikhail Khodorkovsky. July 2, 2015. https://khodorkovsky.com/what-is-open-russia/.

[18] Danilova, Maria. “Putin ‘Only Understands Force:’ Russian Chess Legend.” Barrons. Barrons. March 12, 2024. https://www.barrons.com/news/putin-only-understands-force-russian-chess-legend-f5eb7265.

[19] Congress of People’s Deputies, https://rosdep.org/.

[20] Wierzbowska-Miazga, Agata. “Russia: The Opposition’s Coordinating Council Has Been Chosen.” OSW Centre for Eastern Studies. April 19, 2018. https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2012-10-24/russia-oppositions-coordinating-council-has-been-chosen.

[21] Pavlova, Uliana. “Russian Congress Seeking Inspiration from Medieval History Is Quashed by Authorities.” The Moscow Times. May 26, 2021. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/05/26/russian-congress-seeking-inspiration-from-medieval-history-is-quashed-by-authorities-a74001; “Deputies of Peaceful Russia.” Inoteka.io. https://inoteka.io/en/ino/deputies-peaceful-russia.

[22] “Russian Political Activist Katz Jailed 8 Years in Absentia for Spreading ‘War Fakes.’” The Moscow Times. August 24, 2023. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/08/24/russian-political-activist-katz-jailed-8-years-in-absentia-for-spreading-war-fakes-a82237.

[23] “Lev Ponomarev.” Rights in Russia. September 10, 2020. https://www.rightsinrussia.org/lev-ponomarev/; “Russia’s Supreme Court approves liquidation of International Memorial.” Memorial Society. February 28, 2022. https://www.memo.ru/en-us/.

[24] “Marat Guelman.” Guelman Und Unbekannt. https://guelmanundunbekannt.com/guelman.

[25] Kyiv Post. “‘Irpin Declaration’ on the Cooperation of the Russian Opposition against Putin’s Regime.” Kyiv Post. September 1, 2022. https://www.kyivpost.com/post/5321.

[26] Gozman, Leonid. “Russia’s Political Prisoners Must Not Be Forgotten.” Atlantic Council. October 1, 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russias-political-prisoners-must-not-be-forgotten/.

[27] Free Nations League. https://freenationsleague.org/en/; Free Nations of Post-Russia Forum. https://www.freenationsrf.org/en.

[28] Center for Global Development. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/new-estimates-usaid-cuts.

[29] Free Russia Foundation. https://www.4freerussia.org/.

[30] “Poland Detains Two Men Suspected of Attack on Russian Opposition Figure in Lithuania.” Notes From Poland. April 19, 2024. https://notesfrompoland.com/2024/04/19/poland-detains-two-men-suspected-of-attack-on-russian-opposition-figure-in-lithuania/.

[31] “Mikhail Fridman – Putin’s Oligarchs.” Coda Story. February 5, 2024. https://www.codastory.com/instagarchs/mikhail-fridman/.

[32] The Bell. “Reputation Whitewashing’ Scandal Rocks Russian Opposition.” The Bell. October 9, 2024. https://en.thebell.io/reputation-whitewashing-scandal-rocks-russian-opposition/.

[33] The Other Russia. Accessed May 25. http://www.theotherrussia.org/; Manifesto of the United Civil Front, Wayback Machine. Accessed May 25, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20050610022403/http:/www.rufront.ru/; Yasmann, Victor. “Russia: National Bolsheviks, The Party of ‘Direct Action.” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. RFE/RL. April 29, 2008. https://www.rferl.org/a/1058689.html.