Russian Retribution For Daring Ukrainian Strike is Postponed, Perhaps Indefinitely

Executive Summary:

•  Ukraine’s June 1 strike on four Russian airbases exposed severe vulnerabilities in Russia’s air defenses, prompting patriotic outcries and demands for retaliation despite censorship and subdued official responses.
• Russia’s retaliatory strike on June 6, while labeled as retribution, matched previous attack intensities and was largely neutralized by Ukrainian defenses. Some Russian pundits admit that Russia does not have that many strong options for punishing Ukraine.
• Moscow’s restrained response may be influenced by fears of Western escalation, potential new sanctions, and ongoing diplomatic calculations involving the upcoming North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Group of Seven (G7) summits.

The scale and character of Russian retaliation in the aftermath of the daring Ukrainian attack on four Russian aviation bases on June 1 have yet to be revealed. Official reporting on the heavy losses of long-range bombers has been practically non-existent on the Russian side, and the explosions on several railroads have been loudly condemned as acts of “terrorism” (Vedomosti, June 4). Censorship has not prevented noisy “patriotic” bloggers from decrying poor anti-drone protection, a key element of strategic deterrence, and demanding a devastating retribution (TopWar.ru, June 3). Nobody has dared to criticize the Russian Federal Security Service’s (FSB) failure to prevent Ukraine’s Operation “Spiderweb,” which was prepared and executed by networks inside Russia. Even some in mainstream media, however, assert that Russia’s retaliation will be powerful and sudden (Nezavisimaya gazeta, June 5).

The Russian high command asserts that the massive combined missile and drone strike across Ukraine, particularly on Kyiv, on June 6, was delivered as retribution, while ignoring the subsequent  Ukrainian strikes on the Engels and Dyagilevo airbases (RIA Novosti; NV.ua, June 6). The intensity of Russia’s strike was not greater than that of several previous massive attacks, and Ukraine intercepted or electronically diverted most of the drone swarms and  38 out of 40 missiles (Meduza, June 6). It appears likely that the plan for this attack had been more ambitious. The regiment of Iskander missile launchers moving to a firing position in the Bryansk oblast, however, was hit by a preemptive Ukrainian strike (Radio Svoboda, June 5). Russian “war correspondents” speculate that the high precision of this hit indicates the first use of the long-range air-launched Taurus KEPD-350 missile supplied by Germany (Tsargrad, June 6).

Even the most jingoist pundits admit that Russia does not have that many strong options for punishing Ukraine for the destruction of irreplaceable strategic assets, while noting that the most modern Tu-160 bombers were spared (TopWar.ru, June 4). No discussion on resorting to nuclear strikes is allowed, and the academic “hawks,” who last year were brazenly advocating nuclear escalation for ensuring Russia’s victory, are presently content to debate such peaceful matters as the pivotal geopolitical importance of Siberia (RIAC, June 5). Russian President Vladimir Putin was eager to boast about the intermediate-range ballistic missile Oreshnik, tested by delivering a strike on Dnipro on November 21, 2024 with six “dummy” warheads, but he has been mum on it for several months, which might indicate technical problems with this experimental weapon system (see EDM, November 21, 2024, February 3; NV.ua, May 5; TopNews.ru, June 6). It remains to be seen whether Moscow would dare to stage a demonstrative strategic air patrol over the Barents and North seas on the eve of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in The Hague on June 24–25, to prove that its long-range aviation remains fully operational (RIA Novosti, May 20; RBC, June 6).

Concerns about international resonance might be another aspect of the explanation for the uncharacteristically moderate Russian response to the high-profile Ukrainian attack (Novaya Gazeta Europe; Global Times, June 2). The two main focal points of these concerns are the Western supply of arms to Ukraine and the imposition of new sanctions against Russia. Moscow seeks to avoid any surge in military aid to Ukraine, while the media is amplifying stories on the redirection of U.S. deliveries of special detonators for surface-to-air missiles to its own troops in the Middle East (Izvestiya, June 5). Russian experts are scrutinizing the workings of various coalitions for supplying particular weapon systems in the Ramstein format, noting that U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth was not present at the latest meeting of this group (RIAC, June 5).

Russian commentators highlight that U.S. President Donald Trump has called a bill from the U.S. Senate for Russian sanctions “harsh.” They also worry, however, that even symbolic new measures from the West could produce a heavy impact (RBC, June 7). The Russian economy has slowed down and is moving toward a recession accompanied by high inflation. The cut in the key interest rate by the Central Bank from 20 to 19 percent illuminates these worries but is unlikely to alter the negative trajectory (The Bell, June 2). The tightening of European sanctions against the Russian “shadow fleet” of tankers is translating into escalations of tensions in the Baltic Sea, where Sweden has taken the lead in enforcing monitoring, and Moscow is not ready for a surge in confrontation (Izvestiya, June 7).

Putin would not want to jeopardize his painstakingly cultivated connection with Trump by acting on his word on “bombing the hell out of [Ukraine]”—a phrase trumpeted by Russian pundits—knowing that the Europeans might try to persuade him to change the course at the Group of Seven (G7) summit on June 15–17 (Forbes.ru, June 6; Komsomol’skaya Pravda, June 7). Some experts emphasize the importance of continuing bilateral talks with Ukraine, despite the apparent deadlock, as a means to ensure Trump’s disengagement from the failed “peace deal” (Rossiiskaya gazeta, June 3). Moscow is eager to present itself as a valuable partner in a new deal, specifically, on the Iranian nuclear program, which appears to be a new priority for Trump (Kommersant, June 5). Moscow’s war against Ukraine, meanwhile, can continue as a slow-moving progress of Russian aggression while assuaging the West’s fears of a nuclear conflict (The Moscow Times, June 4).

Leaving the spectacular Ukrainian special operation unpunished is very much against Putin’s spiteful nature. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s forthcoming meeting with Trump at the margins of the G7 summit in Kananaskis, Canada, does not alleviate his anger. Putin cannot pretend that the sequence of missile strikes on Kyiv and bombings of Kharkiv and Sumy constitutes a sufficient retaliation, but is compelled to postpone whatever forceful action his generals can suggest until after the NATO summit, where Zelenskyy is again going to make his case. In other circumstances, serving revenge as a cold dish may be Putin’s tactic of choice, but Ukraine is now able to build on the attention from the daring attack—and perhaps to execute new surprises. Moscow’s best bet in erasing this setback is to increase the intensity of ground attacks, but the sustainability of this spare-no-troops strategy is far from certain. Sabotaging the peace talks is seen in the Kremlin as a diplomatic success, which may come with a much heavier strategic price tag than it has budgeted for.