Russian Strikes Near Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant Threaten Peace Process

Executive Summary:

• On July 4, Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) lost all off-site power supply due to nearby Russian drone strikes for the ninth time since Russia’s full-scale invasion.
• Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation and operator of Zaporizhzhia NPP since March 2024, has expressed readiness to cooperate with the United States on nuclear fuel at the plant, but it is waiting for Moscow to make the “political decision.”
• Moscow’s delay in this discussion and militarization of the plant continue to pose direct threats to nuclear safety and obstruct any meaningful opportunities to engage in potential peace talks.

On July 4, Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) lost all off-site power supply following nearby Russian drone and missile attacks. According to Ukraine’s national energy company, Ukrenergo, the 750 kilovolt (kV) Dniprovska power line, which provides off-site power to the Zaporizhzhia NPP, was damaged during Russian shelling (Ukrenergo, July 4).[1] Meanwhile, Rosatom, the Russian state-owned nuclear corporation and operator of the Zaporizhzhia NPP since March 2022, has expressed a willingness to engage in discussions with the United States over the situation at the plant, particularly regarding the state of U.S.-made nuclear fuel. The presence of fuel supplied by U.S.-based company Westinghouse, which is located inside one of the reactors, at the onsite storage facility, and in the spent fuel pools, is preventing Russia from restarting the reactors for electricity generation (Izvestiya, February 19; see EDM, May 2). Rosatom needs either an agreement with Westinghouse to resolve any intellectual property issues or the fuel needs to be removed so that Rosatom can operate the plant using fuel from its subsidiary, TVEL.

The loss of external power supply at the Zaporizhzhia NPP resulted in a three-hour and thirty-four-minute blackout, forcing the plant to rely on emergency diesel generators (the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), July 4). Despite the reactors at the plant having been in cold shutdown since 2024 and not producing electricity to the grid, they require constant cooling water for the reactor cores and the pools housing spent nuclear fuel. There was enough diesel fuel supply to operate these generators for up to 20 days, with additional fuel deliveries possible thereafter (Telegram/@ЗАЭС. Официально, July 4). Russia has not claimed responsibility for the damage to the power line, instead claiming that “reasons for the line shutdown are being investigated” (Zaporizhzhia NPP, July 4). This incident marked the ninth time that Zaporizhzhia NPP has experienced a complete loss of off-site power since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 (IAEA, July 4). It also followed another recent incident on June 27 when drone attacks damaged vehicles near the plant’s cooling pond and caused a fire on the ground (IAEA, July 1). 

Such acts of “nuclear terror,” as described by the Ukrainian Ministry of Energy, render a genuine peace agreement all the more unattainable (Ministry of Energy of Ukraine, July 4). Rafael Mariano Grossi, Director General of the IAEA, said the July 4 incident underlines “the extremely fragile nuclear safety situation at the site” (IAEA, July 4). Echoing this statement, United Nations Secretary General António Guterres said that the strikes “once again underlin[e] the ongoing risks to nuclear safety” (United Nations, July 5). 

The future of the Zaporizhzhia NPP is a critical component for any potential peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia. First, the legal status of the plant must be determined. Russia claims to have annexed Zaporizhzhia oblast and, de facto, the Zaporizhzhia NPP, whereas Ukraine claims that Russia has violated its sovereignty and territorial integrity and is, therefore, illegally occupying the plant. Second, a potential peace agreement must establish clear limits on the legality of military operations on or near the Zaporizhzhia NPP site, irrespective of who controls it. This is an essential determination to ensure nuclear safety and security. Third, the technical functioning of the reactors and the state of nuclear fuel on site remain unresolved issues that must be addressed in any potential peace agreements before Zaporizhzhia NPP becomes operational again, a goal which Rosatom is pursuing. 

Moscow has rejected all claims to Ukrainian sovereignty over Zaporizhzhia oblast and the NPP since Russian President Vladimir Putin announced its annexation along with Donetsk oblast, Luhansk oblast, and Kherson oblast into Russia in 2022 (President of Russia, September 30, 2022). Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in an interview with CBS News that any change in control of Zaporizhzhia NPP is “inconceivable” (CBS News, April 27). A peace agreement must establish the legal status of Zaporizhzhia NPP before it can also address issues of demilitarization and technical functioning.

As an intermittent solution to Zaporizhzhia NPP’s legal status, the United States has proposed U.S. ownership of Ukrainian NPPs as a potential security mechanism (The White House; YouTube/@The White House, March 19). According to sources familiar with the latest peace framework proposed to Kyiv by Washington during the Paris meeting in April, the Zaporizhzhia NPP would be considered Ukrainian territory and operated by the United States, with electricity supplied to both Ukraine and Russia (President of Ukraine, April 17; Axios, April 22). This is inherently a temporary solution. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has welcomed ideas for regaining control of the Zaporizhzhia NPP, as well as potential U.S. investment in the plant, but has otherwise rejected non-Ukrainian ownership (The New Voice of Ukraine; YouTube/@Social News, March 20; see EDM, May 2). He said that investment would be needed once Ukraine regains control of the NPP, including into “the right infrastructure, water supply, technical personnel, and many other steps necessary for the station to become profitable in 1.5–2 years” (RBC-Ukraine, March 20). Recent discussions between Ukrainian Energy Minister German Galushchenko and U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright included Zaporizhzhia NPP, but details have not been made publicly available (Ministry of Energy of Ukraine, June 30). 

Irrespective of legal ownership, the technical state of the reactors and nuclear fuel on site remains an essential point to address in any peace agreements. Moscow and Rosatom appear to diverge on this issue, particularly regarding the issue of nuclear fuel produced by U.S.-based company Westinghouse, which is currently located at Zaporizhzhia NPP. Four of the site’s six reactors have been running on Westinghouse fuel while Russia has been working to transition the reactors back to nuclear fuel supplied by TVEL (World Nuclear Association, accessed July 9). All six reactors are Russia’s design of pressurized water reactors (PWR) called VVERs, meaning water-water power reactors (водо-водяной энергетический реактор (ВВЭР), vodo-vodyanoi enyergeticheskiy reaktor).[2] They were originally intended, therefore, to only house Russian-made nuclear fuel. Prior to the full-scale invasion, Ukraine had been working for years to diversify its nuclear fuel supply away from Russia and had made significant progress at Zaporizhzhia NPP (Davis, August 2022; Westinghouse, accessed July 9). 

Rosatom has expressed willingness to negotiate in the immediate term with the United States to address whether the Westinghouse fuel may either be used by Russia to operate the reactors or whether it can be removed from the site and TVEL fuel used in its place. Until this is decided and implemented, Rosatom’s goal to make the reactors operational again essentially remains at a standstill. On June 10, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, in an interview with Russian media, said:

The long period during which attempts were made at this facility to ‘replace’ Russian-made fuel assemblies with American ones has caused a series of questions, including legal ones, to arise, such as what is to be done with the fresh American-made fuel located at this facility (Interfax, June 10). 

Ryabkov argued that developing a solution to this issue is not possible “without dialogue with the Americans,” which may or may not include a U.S. presence onsite at Zaporizhzhia NPP (Interfax, June 10). 

The Director General of Rosatom, Alexei Likhachev, has acknowledged that “we have been warned by our American partners that they are very concerned about intellectual property related specifically to American [nuclear] fuel … Obviously, certain consultations will be required” (Kommersant, May 8). In June, Likhachev asked Grossi to mediate between Russia and the United States to resolve this problem (TASS, June 6). In addition to the fuel already loaded into the reactors, additional fuel assemblies are taking up space in the storage facility and in the spent fuel pools (TASS, June 6). Rosatom has claimed since April that it is “ready to discuss formats of engagement with the United States on issues related to the Zaporizhzhia NPP” but is waiting for Moscow to make the “political decision” (Kommersant, April 30). The Kremlin has not commented on Rosatom’s statements.

Rosatom’s appeal for mediation and its readiness to find a technical solution to the status of the reactors and fuel at Zaporizhzhia NPP starkly contrast with the Kremlin’s latest military actions and drone strikes against the whole of Ukraine. While Rosatom’s openness to technical dialogue with the United States over nuclear fuel may appear to offer a diplomatic opening, Moscow continues to delay entering into negotiations and is instead heightening the intensity of attacks on Ukraine. This misalignment between Moscow and reality presents yet another major obstacle in achieving any meaningful negotiations or future settlements for peace.

Notes:

[1] Sometimes referred to as the Dniprovskaya power line. This article uses Dniprovska as used by Energoatom. 

[2] Pressurised water reactors (PWRs) are the most common type of reactor used globally today. In a PWR, the reactor core generates heat by the nuclear fission process and is cooled by high-pressure (~150-160 bar), high-temperature (~275 °C / ~527 °F) water (Davis, August 2022).