Russia’s Influence in Middle East Takes Hit From Israeli Strikes

Executive Summary:

• Israel’s unexpected missile offensive on Iran on June 13 caught Moscow off guard, disrupting its assumptions about U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations and raising suspicions of a concealed Western strategy to undercut Tehran’s military and nuclear ambitions.
• Moscow condemned Israel’s actions rhetorically but failed to offer substantive responses, and many passages in its statement read like descriptions of Russia’s own aggression against Ukraine.
• Russia’s strategic partnership with Iran and its loss of influence in Syria and Libya, along with ineffective oil price manipulation, highlight Russia’s vulnerability and declining global status.

Israel’s decision to launch a series of missile and bomb strikes on Iran on June 13 was a shocking surprise for Moscow, where the working assumption had been centered on the presumably protracted U.S.-Iranian talks on the limitations of the nuclear program (see EDM, May 5). The possibility of an independent Israeli decision appears inconceivable to the Russian leadership, so it likely concludes that the now-suspended talks in Oman were merely a cover-up for the real U.S. strategy of degrading Iranian offensive capabilities and undermining its nuclear ambitions (Kommersant, June 13). Nobody dares to suggest that Russian President Vladimir Putin unwittingly contributed to that supposed ruse by offering to mediate between Iran and the United States, and in the latest phone conversation with U.S. President Donald Trump, the Russian autocrat reiterated that offer and shared the content of his conversation with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, while condemning the Israeli strikes (President of Russia, June 13; RBC, June 14).

The official Russian reaction to the surge in air warfare is lengthy in its words of disapproval of Israel, but short on substance. The Russian-Iranian Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, signed after long deliberations on January 17, is never mentioned (Gazeta.ru, June 13). Ironically, many passages in the statement issued by the Russian Foreign Ministry, which decries the “unprovoked military strikes on sleeping peaceful cities” and “evil acts that destroy peace,” read like descriptions of Russia’s own aggression against Ukraine (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; RTVI.com, June 13). Moscow has also engaged in urgent consultations with Beijing aimed at issuing a collective statement from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization condemning the Israeli attack. It had to note, however, India’s refusal to put its signature on this document, as well as acknowledge disagreements on this matter among BRICS (a loose political-economic grouping originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and South Africa) member-states (Rossiiskaya gazeta; TASS, June 14).

Descriptions of the hostilities in the mainstream Russian media are tilted toward exaggerating Iran’s defiance and the strength of its retaliatory strikes (Izvestiya, June 14). In the small but noisy community of military bloggers, opinions betray astonishment with the precision and effectiveness of Israeli missile hits, particularly in decapitating the Iranian army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (TopWar.ru, June 13). Russian experts argue that the damage to the Iranian nuclear program is far from devastating, but cannot avoid comparisons with the protracted Russian air campaign, which cannot compel Ukraine to submission (Forbes.ru, June 14). The fact that all 200 Israeli planes that delivered the first strike returned safely to their bases makes a sharp contrast with the growing list of casualties in the Russian Air Force, which tries to keep well clear from Ukrainian air defenses, but still continues to lose planes (WarObozrevatel.com, May 27). In this regard, the loss of a modern Su-35 fighter in a duel with a Ukrainian F-16 was a fair fight, but Russia still experienced the destruction of a Su-25 close air support aircraft by its own wingman (24tv.ua, June 10; TopWar.ru, June 13).

Russian pundits are eager to speculate about Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s concerns regarding the waning of international attention to Russia’s war against Ukraine and the redirection of U.S. military resources toward Israel (Rossiiskaya gazeta, June 14). Only a few experts dare to ponder the acceleration of geopolitical transformation in the wider Middle East, driven primarily by Israel’s forceful actions, which inevitably result in a steady decline of Russia’s influence (RIAC, June 14). One major feature of this transformation is the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria in December 2024. Moscow still cannot fully internalize the consequences of canceling its investments in the survivability of this ally, clinging to its bases at Khmeimim and Tartus, even as their security perimeters become increasingly vulnerable (Carnegie Politika, June 12). Another ally, Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the Tobruk-based Libyan National Army, has become increasingly interested in cultivating connections with Türkiye. As a result, the hopes in Moscow for gaining a new naval base in the Mediterranean are set to be frustrated (see EDM, April 17; Republic.ru, May 28).

Assumptions about the potential benefits for Russia from the escalation of hostilities in the Middle East are primarily focused on the corresponding increase in oil prices. The actual increase in the benchmark Brent price, however, has not exceeded $75 per barrel, while hopes among Russian commentators are centered on $100 per barrel (Nezavisimaya gazeta, June 15). Commentators say that this limited impact is a part of Israel’s war plan, which, on this stage, precludes any strikes on major Iranian oil export terminals—except the depots around Tehran supplying domestic consumption—and even naval bases (Kommersant, June 15). The dynamics of global energy markets make it less essential to enforce a lower price ceiling on Russian oil exports. This issue is supposed to be discussed at the Group of Seven (G7) summit in Kananaskis, Canada (The Bell, June 14).

Zelenskyy has arrived at this summit, likely hoping for a meeting with Trump, which would lead to a collective decision on tightening sanctions against Russia and sustaining support for Ukraine (Nezavisimaya gazeta, June 15; Izvestiya, June 16). Western unity remains challenged, but Moscow commentators argue that Trump would have to drop the pretense of “neutrality” and side with Israel in the war with Iran, which would further diminish his interest in negotiating a Russia-Ukraine peace deal (Rossiiskaya gazeta, June 14). The interplay between Russia’s stagnant war against Ukraine and the fast-moving Iranian war is fluid and complex, but it is fraught with many risks for Russia and does not allow Putin to consider himself a beneficiary (The Insider, June 14; Kommersant, June 15).

Russia’s ambitions and claims for the status of a great power in the turbulent global arena are undercut by the long-expected and still shocking eruption of hostilities. This leaves it in the position of having a strategic partnership with the designated loser, Iran. The deliberations on a new Gulf war at the G7 summit are set to be complicated and controversial, but nobody is interested in Russian views and suggestions to mediate. These deliberations are certain to continue at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in The Hague later this month, where Zelenskyy will again be present, and Putin will be treated as a major part of the problem. Even for the PRC, which is exposed to serious risks for its ties with Iran, the partnership with Russia is at best irrelevant for managing the multiplying security problems. The unwinnable war of aggression keeps dragging Russia down, eliminating it from the ranks of responsible stakeholders in remaking the world order.