Shoigu’s Pyongyang Visits Suggest Turbulence in Putin’s Security Council

Executive Summary:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin tasked Secretary of the Russian Security Council Sergei Shoigu with strengthening the military-political alliance between Russia and the North Korea, sparking rumors of his potential appointment as Russia’s ambassador to Pyongyang.
• The prospect of personnel changes in the Security Council, which Putin has elevated to a significant role in shaping state policy on security and defense, reflects complex domestic political processes and struggles for influence among elites.
• Shoigu has managed to maintain his bureaucratic clout and Putin’s loyalty so far, but further personnel reshuffles would serve as an indicator of the growing influence of other elite factions.

Sergei Shoigu, Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, has been making increasingly frequent trips to North Korea. On June 17, less than a month after his previous visit, Shoigu traveled to Pyongyang to meet with the Supreme Leader of North Korea, Kim Jong-un, under Russian President Vladimir Putin’s directive (Interfax, June 17). During Shoigu’s June 4 trip to North Korea, Kim Jong-un assured him of continued support for Moscow in its war against Ukraine and discussed the participation of North Korean troops alongside Russian forces in Kursk oblast (Security Council of Russia, June 4).

This visit marked Shoigu’s third trip to Pyongyang in the past three months. In total, he has made at least five official visits to North Korea, the first of which occurred on July 25, 2023, while he was still Russia’s Minister of Defense (Interfax, July 26, 2023). Putin likely entrusted Shoigu with such sensitive diplomacy in building a military-political alliance with North Korea because he historically prefers to rely on trusted confidants for critical negotiations. This “diplomatic activity,” however, has fueled rumors in Russian media about the potential end of Shoigu’s tenure in the Security Council or even his appointment as ambassador to Pyongyang (Telegram/russicaRU, May 9, 12).

The prospect of personnel changes in the Security Council tied to Shoigu is part of the multilayered processes within Russia’s political system, involving the redistribution of spheres of influence and, possibly, shifts in the Kremlin’s strategy amid current challenges. Rumors in Russia’s tightly controlled media landscape, where outlets are aligned with various elite factions, rarely emerge by chance.

The role of the Security Council in Russia’s governing system plays an important role in these dynamics. This constitutional body advises the president on matters of national security, defense, and the military-industrial complex. In essence, it serves as a structure whose members assist the Russian president in navigating security and defense issues, though they do not directly shape policy. The Security Council gained significant political weight in the 21st century, becoming a coordinating hub for national security matters. Putin has elevated the Security Council’s role, as he often creates the appearance of collective decision-making for major state decisions. For instance, on February 21, 2022, the Security Council discussed recognizing the independence of the so-called Luhansk People’s Republic and Donetsk People’s Republic, with all members voicing support—a meeting that became a formal pretext for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine days later (Security Council of Russia, February 21, 2022).

The Security Council is composed of permanent members, who are typically high-ranking officials, and other members appointed by the president. The Secretary of the Security Council reports directly to Putin, oversees its operations, and manages its apparatus. In 2020, Putin created a new position of deputy chairman of the Security Council and appointed Dmitry Medvedev to it, illustrating the extent of presidential control (Interfax, January 15, 2020). In May 2024, Putin appointed Shoigu as Secretary of the Security Council, replacing Nikolai Patrushev, a former Federal Security Service (FSB) director and Putin confidant who held the post for 16 years (RBC, May 12, 2024). This appointment underscores the Security Council’s role as a platform for the influence of the security bloc, particularly for the FSB and the Ministry of Defense. Patrushev, who transitioned to an aide to the president on May 14, 2024, retains significant influence over Russia’s security policy (President of Russia, May 14, 2024).

Last year’s personnel reshuffles in the Kremlin demonstrated Putin’s continued interest in maintaining a balance between competing elite factions, many of whom have long been part of his inner circle. Despite Shoigu’s appointment to the Security Council initially appearing to be a demotion, he retained both Putin’s loyalty and his position among Russia’s bureaucratic heavyweights. Some Russian media, however, interpreted Shoigu’s May 9 absence from the Victory Day parade in Moscow as a signal of waning trust or impending personnel changes (Tsargrad, May 9; see EDM, May 12).

One possible explanation for Shoigu’s reduced public presence is his association with corruption scandals in the defense sector, including high-profile arrests of senior military officials in 2024. The Kremlin detained Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov, Head of the Defense Ministry’s Personnel Department Yuri Kuznetsov, Chief of the Main Communications Directorate Vadim Shamarin, and Head of the State Defense Procurement Department Vladimir Verteletsk on charges of bribery or abuse of power (see EDM, April 29, May 23, 2024). At least five generals from Shoigu’s team, among the highest ranks in the Defense Ministry, were arrested for illicit enrichment. It is hard to imagine such large-scale corruption schemes operating without the knowledge of the Minister of Defense.

Russian state media continue to portray Shoigu as an influential statesman, emphasizing his diplomatic activities. Putin appears unwilling to fully sideline the former Defense Minister. A clear signal of this was the extension of Shoigu’s military service contract for five years, until 2030 (RBC, May 12). Retirement is therefore not yet on the horizon for the Secretary of the Security Council, who, at least formally, retains his position. It appears that Putin has decided to keep Shoigu in the system, assigning him the role of strengthening ties with allies such as North Korea and Iran. During foreign trips, Shoigu promotes Russia’s image as a leader of a multipolar world, a key priority in Putin’s foreign policy (TASS, July 4, 2024, May 28).

While Shoigu is likely to remain Secretary of the Security Council in the short term, the current situation does not eliminate risks for him if Putin opts for personnel rotations to bolster other factions. New players could emerge, such as Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund and Special Presidential Envoy on Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation, who Putin sent to Washington in April to discuss the return of American businesses to Russia and collaboration in the Arctic (see EDM, April 7, 14). Dmitriev could gain momentum if the Kremlin prioritizes further engagement with the United States. Unexpected candidates also have the potential to arise if Putin reshuffles the security bloc. Putin’s unexpected choice of Andrei Belousov as Minister of Defense in 2024 exemplified this, signaling a shift toward economic and managerial approaches over traditional security bloc experience in defense leadership (see EDM, May 16).

Shoigu’s key achievement has been maintaining his bureaucratic weight and Putin’s loyalty despite massive corruption scandals in the defense sector. He will likely continue to take on roles assigned by Putin, whether in the Security Council or as a special envoy to North Korea. In Russia’s political system, Putin’s trust grants significant immunity, including protection from legal repercussions. Rumors of Shoigu’s resignation or retirement may be part of elite infighting aimed at weakening his position or diverting attention from other personnel or strategic decisions. Even if they seem innocuous at first, the very existence of such rumors about key political figures in Russia may signal political turbulence that could manifest at any moment.