Strategic Snapshot: China’s AI Ambitions

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has articulated a desire to dominate the technologies of the future. Artificial intelligence (AI) is a particular focus, as the Politburo’s 20th collective study session made clear. At the meeting, Xi Jinping described AI as “a strategic technology leading a new round of scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation” (People’s Daily, April 27).

Advanced semiconductor technology and computing capacity are essential to further breakthroughs in AI. Beijing has therefore accelerated promotion of self-reliance in semiconductor design and production in the last decade, and especially since the imposition of export controls by the United States. The ambition to achieve self-reliance in chip production dates back much earlier, however, and was first incorporated as part of a national plan in 1986. Despite many struggles and some high-profile scandals and failures, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is making progress on several fronts. Notably, Huawei continues to thrive and innovate.

The arrival of DeepSeek’s R1 reasoning model in early 2025 indicates that the PRC maintains a strong capacity for innovation. The Party views DeepSeek’s success as an exposition of its own model of technological development. It rarely notes, however, that this model relies on partnering with overseas institutions, building on top of Western open-source technologies, and acquiring advanced technologies through illegal means, such as through theft, smuggling, and forced transfers.

The involvement of military institutions in AI research and development, as well as the Party’s determination to use AI tools to supplement its repressive apparatus of social governance, undermine its rhetoric that claims it will deploy AI to bring about a brighter future for humanity.

To read a PDF version of the Strategic Snapshot, click here.

Selected Jamestown Analysis on CCP Ambitions in Artificial Intelligence

Articles published in the first quarter of 2025 have focused on artificial intelligence (AI) firm DeepSeek. These examine its position within Beijing and Hangzhou’s AI ecosystem, where it has benefited from recognition and support from the government. They also look at its possible acquisition of illegally imported chips and the privacy and data security risks it poses. A final piece frames DeepSeek as a perfect tool for the Party-state’s approach to social governance and domestic repression.

Predicting the Next ‘DeepSeek Event’: Early Indicators Within the PRC’s AI Ecosystem

Matthew Johnson, China Brief Notes, February 11, 2025

Predicting artificial intelligence (AI) firm DeepSeek’s recent successes within a highly competitive AI ecosystem may have been possible by observing factors such as government recognition, proximity to top-tier national research institutions, and a complex network of corporate affiliates with proven technology expertise.
Indicators of ties to the Party-state include DeepSeek’s Beijing arm being named one of thirty “main drafting units” for a national data security standards plan in 2023 and the designation of DeepSeek affiliate High-Flyer Technology as a national “high-tech enterprise” in 2020 and 2023.
DeepSeek has built a strategic presence in Beijing, a leading hub for AI research, despite being headquartered in Hangzhou. This has fueled online speculation that it benefits from state support.
External validations of High-Flyer/DeepSeek’s growing capability marked DeepSeek as a sophisticated innovator well before the market-shifting release of its R1 open source model.

DeepSeek’s Background Raises Multiple Concerns

Matthew Gabriel Cazel Brazil, China Brief, February 14, 2025

DeepSeek and its parent company, High-Flyer, are embedded in the vibrant—and heavily state-subsidized—“Hangzhou Chengxi Science and Technology Innovation Corridor,” which aims to create a Chinese answer to Silicon Valley in the companies’ hometown.
DeepSeek claims that its models are not trained on GPUs illegally imported to the PRC, but data indicates that PRC firms could be acquiring banned chips rerouted via Singapore, though Singapore denies this.
DeepSeek’s operational code is open source, but it has released no training code, making it impossible to verify the hardware used to train its latest model.
Evidence of the app sending data packets back to the PRC and to PRC-owned servers, despite claims by DeepSeek to the contrary, adds to growing security concerns about the company and its products, as does the models’ censorship of topics sensitive to the Chinese Communist Party.

DeepSeek, Unitree, and the Six Dragons: Hangzhou’s Plan to Shape Technology’s Future

Sunny Cheung & Ho, C., China Brief, March 19, 2025

Decades of policy support from provincial, city, and district governments underpin the successes of AI firm DeepSeek and five other tech companies domestic observers are referring to as “the six little dragons of Hangzhou.”
In 2019, Zhejiang Province (in which Hangzhou is located) became the first to implement a “chain leader system,” extending party-state control over supply chains through a structure that involves close coordination between senior local civil servants and industry association heads.
Buoyed by the firms’ recent successes in AI, robotics, gaming, and brain-computer interface technology, Hangzhou has signaled it will continue policy support in the medium term to maintain a leading role in new technologies.

DeepSeek: A Tool Tuned for Social Governance

Alex Colville, China Brief, April 25, 2025

The PRC government does not just envision its “AI+ initiative” as bolstering the national economy but aiding its plans for modernizing its social stability system.
DeepSeek has been designed, thanks to regulations, in a way that makes it a perfect tool to support the “public opinion guidance” system that aligns the public with state policy through propaganda.
Any adoption of DeepSeek’s model overseas has the potential to spread the PRC’s domestic social governance system abroad.

China Brief has covered the PRC’s development of semiconductor technology as part of its desire to dominate the entire value chain and pursue self-reliance. This includes the buildup of infrastructure and efforts to diffuse the technology throughout the country.

Semiconductor Scandal A Concerning Backdrop to Xi’s Pursuit of ‘Core Technologies’

Elizabeth Chen, China Brief, March 26, 2021

Beijing’s drive for self-reliance in semiconductor technology is hitting roadblocks, with U.S. export controls forcing Huawei to delay the release of its P50 smartphone series and sell smartphone brand “Honor,” and scandals besetting the chip sector.
In the first two months of 2021, more than 4,350 new semiconductor companies were created, but Xi’s renewed call to develop a resilient indigenous chip industry will require talent and time—both of which are currently lacking—to achieve success.
China’s pursuit of technological “self-reliance” (自力更生) in semiconductors began as early as 1986 with the launch of the “531 Development Plan,” but has been revitalized since 2014.

Chokepoint Consortium: Chinese Experts on Confronting American Pressure

Michael Laha, China Brief, December 1, 2023

In 2019, the National Natural Science Foundation of China awarded a grant to study “chokepoint” technologies. The funding went to a consortium of six lead scholars who managed dozens of researchers with expertise in innovation studies, and the results were read by some of China’s highest-level decision makers.
Research on chip technologies highlighted gaps in funding for research and development and talent acquisition. It also called for targeted collaboration between universities and enterprises.
One paper published by the researchers foreshadowed the creation of the Central Commission for Science and Technology established in early 2023.
Research also advocated using models developed in the United States and Japan to analyze chokepoints and help steer toward self-reliance.

PRC Pursues Chip Design Software Dominance

Michael Laha, China Brief, March 15, 2024

U.S.-China technology competition is no longer confined to only leading-edge semiconductors but is now moving to also include older so-called mature-node or legacy chips.
Central and local level Chinese industrial and innovation policies have long pursued a goal of achieving self-sufficiency in not just the most advanced chips now submitted to U.S. export controls but also to develop manufacturing capacity for legacy chips now the subject of a U.S. Department of Commerce survey.
To accomplish this, the PRC erected new R&D institutions and offered generous tax exemptions and subsidies to domestic companies.
PRC progress in mature-node Electronic Design Automation (EDA) software self-sufficiency is a more likely prospect for the foreseeable future. Domestic companies in the PRC are publicizing initial successes but have not achieved a fully localized ecosystem of EDA products.

MIIT Overhypes Lithography Breakthrough

Sunny Cheung, China Brief, September 24, 2024

The PRC has announced breakthroughs in semiconductor manufacturing, specifically in Deep Ultraviolet (DUV) lithography, as part of its effort to achieve technological self-sufficiency amid U.S. sanctions.
The DUV machines showcased by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) still lag significantly behind global leaders like ASML, especially in terms of overlay precision and the ability to produce advanced chips.
Practical challenges persist in the PRC’s adoption and refining of DUV and Extreme Ultraviolet (EUV) lithography at scale. Low yield rates and high production costs due to having to rely on technological workarounds remain an obstacle.

Illuminating the Future: Developments in PRC Photonic Chip Production

Sunny Cheung, China Brief, July 12, 2024

In June, the first pilot production line for photonics microchips in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was launched at Shanghai Jiao Tong University’s Chip Hub for Integrated Photonics Xplore (CHIPX), as the country explores new approaches to chip design.
The PRC sees photonic technologies and chips as a potential to underpin many of the technological solutions, offering superior speed, energy efficiency, scalability, and higher bandwidth, paving the way for future technological advancements.
Xi Jinping, as shown in the PRC’s 14th Five-Year Plan and other national strategies, has emphasized photonics, leading to substantial investments aimed at reducing reliance on foreign semiconductor technology and achieving global leadership.
The PRC’s advancements by academic institutes and Huawei in photonic technology aim to revolutionize the nation and military with chips potentially 1000 times faster than their electronic counterparts. These developments carry significant national security implications, potentially reshaping the U.S.-China technological competition and export control policy. The situation warrants close monitoring.

Energy and AI Coordination in the ‘Eastern Data Western Computing’ Plan

Andrew Stokols, China Brief, February 28, 2025

The “Eastern Data Western Computing” plan is a multiagency strategy that coordinates cloud computing data centers and energy infrastructure across the People’s Republic of China. These are increasingly relevant with the rise of artificial intelligence.
This cloud infrastructure buildout likely will not rival that of the United States, but its coordination with renewable energy capacity means that the country’s digital infrastructure will be sustainable, based on a resilient energy system, and foster economic development opportunities in underinvested regions.
Early plans for building data centers in Western China were backed by Li Zhanshu, later Xi Jinping’s chief of staff, and key support from other influential officials likely were key to establishing Guizhou as a hub in the national system.
Many of the hubs’ locations are remote and have climates and geographic features that make them suitable for hosting data centers that can perform energy-intensive functions that do not necessarily require “real-time” computation and ultra-low latency.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has leveraged international talent and resources to support and indigenize its burgeoning semiconductor industry. This includes acquiring chips through both licit and illicit means, having its military universities partner with overseas institutions on AI research, and using middlemen to circumvent U.S. export controls.

PRC-UAE Collaboration and U.S. Technology Transfer Concerns in Abu Dhabi

Cheryl Yu, China Brief

Part 1, August 15, 2024

The Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence (MBZUAI) poses a high risk of technology transfer due to its deep connections to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and its collaborations with leading U.S. technology companies and universities.
MBZUAI—and thus PRC researchers—have access to chips that are currently under U.S. export controls to the PRC, such as NVIDIA A100 GPUs, and have received resources from the U.S. Department of Defense and Intelligence Community that are intended to support U.S. national interests.
MBZUAI’s president, founding members, trustees, and board members have connections to united front organizations involved with technology transfer or have received awards from PRC government entities.
Since its inception, MBZUAI has aligned with Beijing’s explicit policy goals for deepening AI cooperation to achieve its strategic ambitions.

Part 2, September 6, 2024

There are connections between the Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence in Abu Dhabi (MBZUAI) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and PLA-affiliated institutions. This includes research collaborations with scientists from those institutions, as well as a career pipeline between Abu Dhabi and the PRC
Research collaborations funded by the PRC have produced articles published in top journals on topics that have military applications, such as machine learning algorithms, network security, and Internet of Things technologies.
MBZUAI has access to technologies that are currently subject to U.S. export controls, such as NVIDIA A100 graphics processing units (GPUs). It is plausible that these are being used in research that assists in the development of PLA capabilities.

Star Hostage: TSMC, China’s Drive to Conquer Taiwan, and the Race to Win AI Superiority

Matthew Brazil & Matthew Gabriel Cazel Brazil, China Brief, January 31, 2025

Talent flows uncovered between Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s (TSMC) operations in the PRC and several sanctioned PRC firms constitute risks to the company’s position at the leading edge of the global chip industry.
TSMC’s transition to encompass other parts of the value chain, ostensibly to avoid monopoly concerns, exacerbates these risks.
If TSMC cedes its dominance, the deterrent effect of Taiwan’s “silicon shield” would be greatly reduced. It could also affect Washington’s support for Taiwan.
The company has begun to diversify by setting up fabrication plants in the United States in an effort that has been encouraged by its main customers, including Western tech giants such as Apple and Nvidia.

Innovation Without Borders: The PRC’s Use of Offshore Bases

Cheryl Yu, China Brief, December 20, 2024

The PRC has set up a number of offshore innovation bases to acquire technologies in support of its ambitions for technological dominance and national rejuvenation.
“Offshore innovation bases” in the PRC, mostly located in special high-tech development zones, collaborate with leading U.S. universities, research and development centers, and united front organizations to attract overseas talents and experts to contribute to the country’s innovation and development.
One base in Beijing describes its aim as using its international collaborations to foster indigenous innovation “by exceeding the performance and cost-effectiveness of its competitors and breaking the United States’s monopoly” in targeted fields.

The Shapeshifting Evolution of Chinese Technology Acquisition

Matthew Brazil, China Brief, December 6, 2024

Smuggling, a critical tool of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to acquire technology to enhance its defense industrial base, is reemerging in the wake of the U.S. government’s technology controls.
Diversion—falsifying the end-user—is another common tactic that the Party has successfully used to acquire critical technology, including dual-use items that it would have been otherwise unable to obtain.
Talent attraction is an underrated part of technology acquisition that the CCP has promoted in academia as well as in the corporate sector to help advance its technology ambitions.
Foreign businesses have been willing to engage in technology transfer in return for potential access to the PRC market. This tradeoff frequently has not paid off for these firms.

Scientist at Forefront of U.S. Army Research to Lead PRC Strategic Chip Production Line

Sunny Cheung, China Brief Notes, August 8, 2024

Beijing continues to exploit U.S. policies to circumvent technology controls and to lower the scrutiny applied to its technology transfer activities.
Hong Kong as part of the Greater Bay Area—is tasked to focus on third-generation chip production to leapfrog U.S. and allied chokepoints in first-generation silicon chip production.
The PRC’s ability to attract U.S.-trained scientists and absorb research conducted at U.S. institutions highlights grave concerns about U.S. research security and the lack of regulations.

PRC Use of Middlemen to Circumvent U.S. Government Export Controls: The Case of Suzhou Rebes Electronic

Matthew Bruzzese, China Brief, July 12, 2024

The PRC has been relying on middlemen to obtain U.S. technology for military programs, including hypersonic weapons. These intermediaries provide a flimsy cover for direct sales to military end-users, with some even openly listing military clients on their websites.
Suzhou Rebes Electronic Technology, a PRC company, imports U.S.-made radio frequency and microwave components, selling them to PRC defense entities and research institutions. Their marketing materials explicitly emphasize the military applications of these components.
Simple measures, such as employing Mandarin-speaking analysts to monitor PRC companies’ public statements, could significantly enhance enforcement. Greater scrutiny and due diligence by U.S. companies regarding the end-users of their products is necessary to prevent unauthorized military use in the PRC.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is increasingly integrating AI into military applications. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has focused experts on AI-powered autonomous systems; military officers are leading research projects in emerging technologies; and AI continues to be used to develop wargaming simulations.

Autonomous Battlefield: PLA Lessons from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Sunny Cheung & Joe McReynolds, China Brief, March 28, 2025

The PLA is shifting toward flexible, AI-driven combat platforms, as exemplified by the new Jiutian drone, which can deploy drone swarms.
Chinese military experts’ main takeaways from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine include promoting AI integration in decision-making processes and precision targeting.
The main doctrinal development appears to be an emphasis on integrating drones—especially AI-driven drones—and autonomous systems into joint operational frameworks. Debates are ongoing over whether AI systems should serve primarily as core capabilities or supplementary tools.

Brain-Computer Interface Systems, Qiyuan Lab, and the PRC’s AI Push

Matthew Gabriel Cazel Brazil, China Brief, March 28, 2025

Beijing views brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) as “key and core” technologies, leading to substantial state investment for both civilian and military purposes.
Qiyuan Lab, an artificial intelligence (AI) laboratory in Beijing led by a PLA Major General and machine learning expert, has ramped up hiring for BCI research-related roles since 2023. Current Qiyuan employees mostly do not appear to indicate their employment status on recruitment sites, suggesting that some of their work may be sensitive.
Laboratories such as Zhejiang, Purple Mountain, and Pengcheng share similar objectives—recruiting top-tier talent for AI and BCI endeavors under programs such as the “Overseas Outstanding Youth Fund Project” and guided by the 2017 New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan.

PRC Adapts Meta’s Llama for Military and Security AI Applications

Sunny Cheung, China Brief, October 31, 2024

Researchers in the PRC have optimized Meta’s Llama model for military and security purposes.
ChatBIT, an adapted Llama model, appears to be successful in demonstrations in which it was used in military contexts such as intelligence, situational analysis, and mission support, outperforming other comparable models.
Open-source models like Llama are valuable for innovation, but their deployment to enhance the capabilities of foreign militaries raises concerns about dual-use applications. The customization of Llama by defense researchers in the PRC highlights gaps in enforcement for open-source usage restrictions, underscoring the need for stronger oversight to prevent strategic misuse.

Learning Without Fighting: New Developments in PLA Artificial Intelligence War-Gaming

Elsa Kania, China Brief, April 9, 2019

The PLA is looking to operationalize AI. Its introduction to war-gaming activities, which appears to be taking place at greater scope and scale than in the United States, can provide training and a means of studying and designing future intelligentized warfare.
The PLA’s ambitions to “lead the world” in AI were prominently highlighted in the launch of the New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (2017), which calls for using AI to support decision-making, war-gaming and research, and defense equipment.
In September 2017, the China Institute of Command and Control (CICC) co-sponsored the first national Artificial Intelligence and Wargaming Forum convened at NDU’s Joint Operations Academy, which debuted an AI system called “Prophet 1.0” (Xianzhi 1.0, 先知0).
In April 2018 the Chinese Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) convened an intelligent human-machine competition, which involved an “AI commander program” that confronted human players from the Chinese Academy of Sciences and Tsinghua University—and reportedly defeated them six to two.

Technological Entanglement? — Artificial Intelligence in the U.S.-China Relationship

Elsa Kania, China Brief, December 22, 2017

As AI emerges as a national priority at the high levels, the Chinese Party-State is seeking to ensure that the development of AI in China follows Chinese Communist Party (CCP) interests and imperatives.
In July, China’s State Council published the New Generation AI Development Plan, which declared, “AI has become a new focal point of international competition. AI is a strategic technology that will lead the future,” articulating China’s ambition to “lead the world” and become the “premier AI innovation center” by 2030.
The plan calls for communication and coordination among scientific research institutes, universities, enterprises, and military industry units to ensure that military and civilian resources will be shared. The official involvement of the Central Military-Civil Fusion Development Commission confirms PLA involvement and the inclusion of a focus on military applications of AI within this national agenda.
Collaboration between the U.S. and Chinese ‘private sectors’ could be exploited to support state or even military objectives.