Taiwan’s ‘Great Recall’ a Historic Bid to Overturn the Opposition’s Legislative Majority

Executive Summary:

• In a historic first for any democracy at the national level, mass recall campaigns in Taiwan are seeking to overturn the opposition’s legislative majority that was elected in 2024.
• The recall campaigns are the latest battleground in an ongoing power struggle between the executive and legislative branches.
• Between 26 and 31 lawmakers from the Kuomintang (KMT) will face a recall vote. KMT-led recall campaigns against Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) lawmakers all failed amid widespread allegations of voter fraud.
• Both sides claim they must win to “save democracy,” with the KMT accused of promoting a “pro-CCP” agenda to “unconstitutionally” destabilize the government and the DPP accused of being “more communist than the communists, more fascist than the fascists.”
• Beijing would prefer the recalls to fail, while Washington would find a DPP-dominated legislature easier to work with.

Situated between the national elections in 2024 and the upcoming nationwide local elections slated for 2026, 2025 was not expected to be a major election year. But at large-scale political rallies, speakers and supporters engage in enthusiastic call-and-response of slogans and exhortations to pump up voter turnout. Scooters and trucks festooned in campaign materials tour the streets, and billboards and banners are up in districts around the country.

The press has dubbed it the “great recall” (大罷免). At stake is the control of the legislature. If the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) can win six extra seats, they will regain a majority. On July 26 and August 23, voters in districts around Taiwan will vote on whether to recall their local legislator. Out of 113 lawmakers, 26 are confirmed to be on the ballot, along with suspended Hsinchu City Mayor Ann Kao (高虹安), and another five might yet qualify for a recall (Focus Taiwan, June 20). This is roughly equivalent to one quarter of the entire legislature and potentially over one third of the 79 district and indigenous legislators who qualify to be recalled. [1]

Supporters of both the ruling party and the opposition launched campaigns against the majority of eligible legislators. Most failed to pass the required thresholds to advance beyond the first two stages of the process required to appear on a recall ballot. All of the lawmakers on the ballot are from the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), as every campaign against DPP legislators fell short. [2] Mayor Kao, formerly of the TPP, resigned from the party following her conviction on corruption charges and suspension as mayor, pending appeals. The TPP continues to back her and is campaigning to oppose her recall (Taiwan People’s Party, June 27).

Bluebird Movement Takes Flight Following Legislature Controversies

The recall campaigns are a result of a power struggle between branches of government: the legislature, which is under the control of the opposition KMT-TPP alliance; and the executive, which the ruling DPP controls. In the legislative elections, the DPP won over half a million more votes than the KMT in district elections and over 200,000 more votes in the proportional party list vote. This did not translate into victory over the KMT, however, which won 52 seats to the DPP’s 51. The KMT is also bolstered by two independents that caucus with the party, bringing them to 54 (Taiwan News, February 11, 2024). The TPP brought their eight seats into an alliance with the KMT, pushing their bloc above the 57 seats needed to form a majority.

After eight years of DPP control of both the executive and legislative branches, the newly opposition-controlled legislature began passing a series of laws intended to assert and boost legislative power, including slashing and freezing government budgets, refusing to approve nominations to the National Communication Commission that approves broadcast licenses, and targeting the Control Yuan, the government oversight branch in Taiwan’s five-branch of government system. They passed controversial amendments to the Act Governing the Legislative Yuan’s Power (立法院職權行使法) and the Criminal Code that would have given them broad investigative powers. Provisions included a “contempt of legislature” (藐視國會) provision that would have compelled officials to testify to investigative committees and the ability to impose punishments on those who failed to comply or lied to the committees.

The opposition touted these actions as necessary supervision and oversight powers after eight years of DPP “monopoly” on power. The DPP countered that it was an unconstitutional power grab and that the KMT intended to “paralyze” (癱瘓) the government. Physical confrontations erupted in the legislature, including fights over control of the podium, hospitalizations, and unusual antics likely never seen in any other legislature worldwide (Taipei Times, May 18, 2024). Protestors opposed to the KMT and TPP legislative actions formed near the legislature for daily rallies, at one point reportedly reaching 100,000 people. They gathered to “defend Taiwan’s democracy” and “oppose abuse of power by legislators” (Taipei Times, May 25, 2024). This movement came to be known as the “Bluebird Movement” (青鳥行動) [3].

The Constitutional Court later ruled that key elements of the amendments to the Act Governing the Legislative Yuan’s Power were unconstitutional because they usurped powers the constitution grants to the Judicial Yuan and Control Yuan (Taipei Times, October 26, 2024). The KMT-TPP bloc criticized the court’s ruling, as well as another ruling limiting—but not eliminating—the death penalty. Every four years the president nominates seven or eight new candidates for the 15-member court, so the entire court had been appointed under former President Tsai and approved by the then–DPP majority legislature. The opposition claimed the court was biased and passed changes to the Constitutional Court Procedure Act in response. These restored a previous standard of two-thirds majority to rule laws unconstitutional and added a new provision requiring a quorum of 10 members to issue rulings (ConstitutionNet, December 13, 2024). They then rejected seven nominees President Lai had selected to fill newly vacant seats, making it impossible to form a new quorum and risking a constitutional crisis (Taipei Times, December 25, 2024). The president promulgated the law as legally required and nominated new candidates, but the legislature has yet to bring them up for review (Taiwan News, January 23).

The ‘Great Recall’ Moves From Grassroots Activism to Party Politics

In December 2024, Bluebird Movement activists and civic groups began organizing recall campaigns against KMT lawmakers over concerns that “power-abusive KMT legislators” were trying to deprive them of their democratic rights and “steal Taiwan’s democracy” (Taipei Times, December 25, 2024). Widespread budget cuts and freezes imposed by the legislature on the executive further raised the temperature over fears of cuts to defense, diplomatic operations, and other items deemed necessary for countering threats from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Taiwan Insight, March 17).

In a big boost to the recall efforts against the KMT, in January United Microelectronics Corporation founder and former chairman Robert Tsao (曹興誠) launched the “Anti-Communist Volunteers Taiwan Protection League” (反共護台志工聯盟) to oppose what he considered to be collusion by the KMT with the “real enemy,” the CCP (Taiwan News, January 23).

The DPP initially kept their distance from the recall campaigns, unsure of how the public might react to this highly unusual use of recall law, which was originally designed to give the public a mechanism to remove individual bad actors. No one anticipated it being used to target an entire party’s lawmakers. Soon after the first recall campaigns were announced, however, some in the party became openly supportive, most notably DPP caucus convener Ker Chien-ming (柯建銘) (Taiwan News, January 4). Over time, the party has become increasingly supportive, assisting with practical issues like booking billboards. However, it continues to leave control of the campaigns to civic groups (Focus Taiwan, June 21).

The KMT responded by spearheading recall campaigns of their own. These were beset with problems, however, starting with a lack of momentum and resources and growing to include allegations of fraudulent activity. Party membership rolls were used to generate forms and signatures were forged—including of thousands of people already deceased. One campaign leader found his campaigners had added his deceased mother to two lists with different signatures, and promptly resigned (PTS News, June 3).

Roughly 100 KMT officials and campaign staffers around the country are now under indictment for fraud. Some have confessed. Press coverage has focused on the arrest of the KMT Taipei chapter director, but Taichung may have seen the most arrests at 34 (Taipei Times, June 19, June 28). Local KMT government officials also allegedly accessed citizens’ private data illegally through the household registration system (Taipei Times, May 27). As the arrests spread, volunteers began leaving the campaigns. As a result, none of the KMT campaigns passed the second stage of the process.

Campaign Messaging Sees Rhetorical Escalation

Both sides have mobilized to boost voter turnout. (The elections must meet a threshold of 25 percent of eligible voters to be legitimate.) The pro-recall campaigners rely heavily on “painting red” (抹紅) the KMT by associating them with the CCP’s agenda. They suggest that efforts by the opposition to “paralyze” the government, stymie defense spending, and throw the Constitutional Court into crisis are part of the CCP’s plan to throw Taiwan’s politics into disarray. The KMT deny this, and there is no proof of them taking direct orders from the CCP. Possibly to blunt these allegations, they have largely unfrozen the defense budget (Domino Theory, June 27).

The KMT remains vulnerable to these accusations. They maintain the official “one China principle” (一個中國原則) that Taiwan is a province of China, and lawmakers frequently visit top CCP officials in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). For instance, former President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) of the KMT attended an event in June with Song Tao (宋濤), director of the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office, at which he stated: “My advocacy is that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait should pursue peaceful and democratic unification” (我的主張是兩岸要和平民主統一) (CNA, June 27).

The DPP is strategically harder to attack, as its positions on Taiwan sovereignty, identity, and the threat from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are more representative of mainstream voter sentiment (Focus Taiwan, April 25). The opposition strategy involves accusing the DPP of being autocratic and President Lai a dictator. This use of hyperbolic language is not new, but putting it front and center in messaging from the very top of the party is. KMT Chair Eric Chu (朱立倫) has doubled down on comparing Lai to Hitler, saying that Lai is “more communist than the communists, more fascist than the fascists” (比共產黨還共產黨，比法西斯還法西斯) (KMT, April 26; YouTube/TaiwanPlus News, May 8). Both the KMT and TPP accuse Lai and the DPP of “weaponizing the judicial system for political persecution” (Taiwan People’s Party, January 15). They allege that the arrest of TPP founder Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) on multiple corruption charges and investigations into the KMT recall campaigns for fraud are examples of this “persecution” The DPP deny this, and there is no proof backing these allegations.

Potential Outcomes

A handful of recalls have been held annually at various levels of government in recent years as controversial and combative politicians have consistently drawn enough ire to motivate opponents to mobilize against them. In general, less polarizing politicians survive recalls, while attention focuses on more controversial ones. This could be a factor in the current set of elections.

The recall drawing the most attention and effort is of the powerful KMT caucus convener Fu Kun-chi (傅崐萁), widely known as the “King of Hualien” (花蓮王) on account of his and his wife’s dominance of that county’s politics. A convicted felon who is currently facing many legal challenges, Fu has been in charge of crafting the KMT’s legislative agenda and many view him as friendly to the PRC.

Polling has been inconsistent on whether the public approves of the recall campaigns. Broadly speaking, polls agree that turnout will be high, particularly on the DPP side. Predictions on how many will be successful also vary. While there is general consensus that some races are competitive, views diverge on the precise number of competitive races.

A successfully recalled politician must step down the day the results are announced, and a by-election must be held within three months. The recalled politician may not run in the by-election. If 12 of the current recalls are successful, the DPP will hold a legislative majority until at least the conclusion of the by-elections, from which it needs six wins to secure a lasting majority. This will be difficult. The by-elections will involve the entire electorate—not just the 25 percent required for the recalls to proceed. There is a reasonable chance new KMT candidates will step up to replace those recalled, just as it is possible the DPP may not be able to field strong candidates.

Conclusion

The “great recall” remains the KMT’s to lose. Much will come down to messaging and motivation. So far, both have been on the side of the DPP. The KMT nevertheless has a strong bench of political experience and talent. In the meantime, President Lai has kicked of a national tour, delivering “Ten Lectures on National Unity” (團結國家十講). Though nominally not related to the recalls, the subtext is that Taiwan needs to be unified to defend its sovereignty, promote a “whole of society” (全社會) defense posture, resist CCP efforts to divide the nation, and strengthen national security. Left unsaid—but understood by voters—is Lai’s desire for a unified DPP-led government to advance these goals. Public sentiment is behind this agenda, but the president nonetheless may find it a hard sell. Voters could choose to repeat their message from the 2024 election and opt for maintaining oversight by the opposition after eight years of DPP dominance of the executive and legislative branches of government.

The results of the “great recall” will have implications for both Beijing and Washington. Beijing hopes the recalls will fail, continuing infighting between the administration and the opposition-controlled legislature. Washington likely will view a unified DPP-dominated legislature backing the administration as easier to work with. However, unpleasant surprises from Washington could bolster the KMT, which advocates for a more “balanced approach” between Taiwan and Beijing; while poor choices by the CCP—which they have a history of making—would benefit the DPP.

Notes

[1] Five had enough signature petitions disqualified to push them below the minimum threshold to qualify, but under Taiwan election law they have a 10-day grace period to find enough new signatures to requalify for the threshold, and as of July 4, several campaigns have announced they have enough to requalify (Taiwan Ministry of Justice, updated February 18).

The recalls are held in three stages. The first and second qualification stages require eligible voters to fill out basic identification information and to provide a valid signature. The first stage requires one percent of the eligible electorate to sign off, followed by 10 percent in the second stage. The vetting of the information is very strict, down to the smallest details. For example, authorities can disqualify signatories for substituting Arabic numbers for traditional Chinese numerals (and vice versa) when the other is used on their identification, or  for misspellings. If a campaign successfully passes muster in the first two stages, the third stage is a recall vote, on which voters can mark “agree” or “disagree” to the recall.

[2] Taiwan’s thirty-four party-list lawmakers elected by proportional representation are exempt from recall petitions. These include all eight legislators from the KMT-allied Taiwan People’s Party (TPP).

[3] The name bluebird (青鳥) is a play on the name of one of the main streets they gathered to protest on in Taipei, Qingdao East Road. Concerned over alleged interference by Facebook’s recommendation algorithm, protestors slightly modified the second character in Qingdao (青島, the name of a city in the People’s Republic of China) to “bird” (鳥). Together, the two characters could be translated as “blue bird,” and the name stuck. Many began to associate the Formosan blue magpie—a bird sometimes used as a symbol of Taiwan—with the movement in related artwork. The character (青) can also be translated as “green” and some used that color in their English translations before “blue” became standardized. The character also has connotations of youth, which likely added to its appeal.