The ‘Amshat’ and ‘Hamzat’: Turkey’s Militias Still Active in Syria

Executive Summary:

• The Sultan Suleiman Shah Division (“Amshat”) and Hamza Division (“Hamzat”) have resisted integration into Syria’s new military hierarchy post-Assad, maintaining direct financial and logistical ties to Turkey. The groups appear to be continuing to serve Ankara’s strategic interests, deploying them as a proxy force abroad.
• Both militias face allegations of having committed war crimes, including ethnic cleansing and sexual violence, and have been sanctioned by the United States and European Union. Despite denials, evidence shows they participated in massacres of Alawite and Druze civilians in March and July, respectively.

When Ahmad al-Sharaa’s Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) organization toppled Bashar al-Assad’s government in December 2024, international concern was drawn to the new Syrian government’s past affiliation with jihadism. Over the course of its civil war, Syria has not only been of great interest to jihadists but also to foreign powers. Both militant activities and foreign entanglements remain serious concerns for observers of the new al-Sharaa government, especially where they intersect.

Two entities prove excellent examples of this phenomenon: the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division and the Hamza Division (colloquially termed the “Amshat” and “Hamzat”, [Arabic: عمشات, حمزات/ ‘Amshāt, Ḥamzāt, lit: “the Amshas, the Hamzas” after their leaders]). These two groups have particularly strong ties to Turkey. The two militias have raised serious concerns over their past activities and the possibility that they could destabilize Syria’s security environment (Tafsela, March 18). Turkey has been especially involved in Syria’s affairs over the course of its recent conflict—both directly employing and indirectly funding Syrian proxy groups to serve Ankara’s interests in Syria (YouTube/AlJazeera Arabic قناة الجزيرة, August 8). Accused of abuses and acts of terrorism against Syrian civilians, the Hamzat and Amshat have not yet demonstrated loyalty to the emerging central authorities in Damascus, which have parallel interests to the Turkish government. Taken together, this situation raises concerns about the future stability of Syria.

Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in late 2024, there has been speculation over whether Turkish-backed militias would be absorbed into the new Syrian military hierarchy under Ahmed al-Sharaa. Recent developments suggest that this will not be the case.

There is evidence that Turkey is maintaining close ties with the forces it was closely affiliated with during the Syrian Civil War. A militia member reported a 50 percent salary increase following the al-Assad regime’s collapse, suggesting Turkey’s intention to maintain exclusive loyalty from its proxy forces, rather than let them be funded as part of the new Syrian Army. [1] Meanwhile, Turkish intelligence is said to have convened meetings with leaders of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) to reinforce their separation from the Syrian Ministry of Defense (Syria Direct, June 24). This was reportedly accompanied by the establishment of new Turkish military bases near Aleppo, deepening Ankara’s foothold in northern Syria (Syria Direct, June 24).

Unofficial testimonies further identify a Turkish liaison known as “Colonel Sami” overseeing the coordination of pro-Turkey forces. [2] In a closed-door meeting, he reportedly described the new Syrian government as “national,” while insisting that the Syrian National Army remains a “Turkish project,” signaling Ankara’s intent to preserve the militias as an independent force.

Origins and Turkish Patronage

The Sultan Suleiman Shah Division was established in 2018 by Muhammad al-Jassem, better known as Abu Amsha. The group was quickly integrated into the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). The group’s name—invoking Suleiman Shah, the grandfather of Osman I, founder of the Ottoman Empire—reflects its ideological alignment with Turkey’s current neo-Ottoman narrative (BBC Arabic, March 15).

Abu Amsha soon emerged as a prominent figure in Syrian rebel circles and across social media, gaining influence far beyond the battlefield. He became a popular symbol of Turkey and for supporters of Sunni identity in Syria and the wider region. Songs were even composed in his praise, attracting millions of listeners (YouTube/Dalo3a Maya – الدلوعة مايا, February 5). His image and name are commonly displayed on cars in Syria, where many regard him as an icon of Sunni strength.

Similarly, the Hamza Division emerged during the early years of the Syrian Civil War and came under Turkish patronage as the conflict evolved. Led by Saif al-Din Bulad, also known as “Saif Abu Bakr,” the group has controlled strategic northern towns like al-Bab, Jarabulus, and parts of Afrin (Enab Baladi, March 24).

Both factions became instrumental in Turkey’s fight against Kurdish forces, particularly the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Syria’s north, and were deployed in Operation Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch.

Documented Abuses and Sanctions

The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria has documented instances of ethnic targeting, summary executions, and sexual violence by the two groups, particularly against Kurdish and Alawite civilians (Human Rights Watch, February 29, 2024; Reuters, June 30). More recently, both factions were implicated in extrajudicial killings, widespread looting, and property seizures in Afrin and Manbij in December 2024 (INSIGHT, December 22, 2024). More recently, both the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division have been implicated in the Syrian coastal massacres in March (Reuters, June 30). For the latter, the EU imposed sanctions on the militias and their leaders, following the United States’ lead, which has sanctioned the Amshat and Hamzat since 2023 (U.S. Department of the Treasury, August 17, 2023; France24, May 28).

Dozens of videos appear to show the two groups participating in human rights violations, despite their public denials of involvement (YouTube/@almashhadmedia, March 12). Nevertheless, the Syrian Investigative Committee formed to examine the massacres of Alawites this year has not formally accused these Turkish-backed militias of being responsible for the atrocities, despite sustained pressure from European actors (France24, May 28). This reluctance raises questions about the extent of Damascus’ capacity—or willingness—to curb the activities of the two Turkish-backed groups or hold them accountable for their crimes.

Militias as Foreign Policy Tools

Turkey’s relationship with the two militias in question extends beyond Syria. The Amshat and Hamzat have been previously deployed as mercenaries in Libya and Azerbaijan (Revista de Presna [Spain], October 17, 2020). Their organizations appear to be tied to Turkish intelligence, and they could be used in future regional conflicts.

Turkey’s entrenchment of its influence among Syrian armed groups is further driven by Ankara’s deepening tensions with the country’s Kurdish forces. With the ongoing failure of agreements between Damascus and the SDF, especially in areas like Sheikh Maqsoud and al-Ashrafiya, Ankara appears intent on maintaining military assets in northern Syria as leverage against the country’s Kurdish militias (Arabi21, April 30).

Outlook: Integration or Isolation?

Despite some symbolic gestures—such as Abu Amsha himself assuming a high-ranking position in Hama—the broader picture indicates that Turkey-backed militias remain outside the control of the Damascus government (Enab Baladi, February 3). The lack of transparency in command structure, in addition to the continued financial and logistical ties to Ankara, suggests that these militias function more as Turkish assets than Syrian national forces.

The lifting of U.S. sanctions on Syria under President Trump’s administration may create an opening for Damascus to offer salaries and incentives to reabsorb these factions. However, significant barriers remain—not least Turkey’s entrenched presence and the militias’ historical dependence on Ankara for support.

Since the beginning of al-Sharaa’s presidency, large-scale violence has occurred against the Alawite and Druze minorities. Notably, while former members of the country’s new Security Forces did participate in uniform, many of the attacks were carried out by irregular or paramilitary forces. The Amshat and Hamzat participated in both the attacks against Alawites in Syria’s coastal region in March and the Druze in Suwayda in July (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, July 20). It could even be the case that, rather than attempting to integrate the pro-Turkish groups, the new government may be making a deliberate decision to keep them separate. Were this to be true, the Amshat, Hamzat, and similar forces would be free to act against enemies Damascus has an interest in seeing attacked while also giving the new government room to distance itself from any atrocities committed (Facebook/ردع العدوانk, accessed August 27). Regardless, the two Turkish-aligned militias appear to have been involved in the coastal massacre of Alawites in February and violence in Suwayda against the Druze in July. Similarly, the continued independence of Syria’s paramilitary groups allows foreign actors like Turkey to advance their own interests in the still-unstable country, potentially resulting in renewed violence. This will remain a problem until Damascus shows the desire and/or ability to integrate the armed groups into a unified national army.

Notes:

[1] Author interview with an anonymous source.

[2] Author interview with an anonymous source.