The Party’s One-Way Approach to People-to-People Exchanges

Executive Summary:

• The People’s Republic of China (PRC) frames people-to-people exchange programs as benign cultural and educational efforts, but in reality, they serve to advance the Chinese Communist Party’s agendas—such as the “community of common destiny for mankind”—and bolster the PRC’s geopolitical aims.
• While the United States typically encourages open, pluralistic participation in exchange programs, its PRC counterparts are vetted, trained, and guided by state-controlled narratives, creating an asymmetry that places U.S. institutions at a disadvantage.
• Programs like “100,000 Strong” and entities such as the China-United States Exchange Foundation (CUSEF) illustrate how PRC-linked individuals and organizations embed themselves in U.S.-PRC exchanges, promoting the Party’s message while maintaining a veneer of independence.
• The Party’s whole-society approach—integrating government, academia, business, and non-governmental organizations—underscores the political nature of these exchanges. Recognizing the coordinated, strategic intent behind them is crucial for a more balanced and transparent framework of engagement.

In a recent interview with the People’s Daily, the flagship newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Mayor of Steilacoom in Washington State, Dick Muri, said students from the town benefited from the “inviting 50,000 American youth to China for exchange and study over the next five years” initiative (‘未来5年邀请5万名美国青少年来华交流学习’倡议). He said that the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) should maintain cooperation and friendly relations because “we can have candid exchanges and discussions and learn from each other, and this will make us better and better” (我们可以进行坦诚的交流与讨论，相互学习，这会让我们变得越来越好) (People’s Daily, January 11). His comments reflect the PRC’s effective use of people-to-people exchanges to advance its agenda.

The PRC uses people-to-people exchanges to influence American perceptions to its benefit. The CCP manages all such exchanges via the united front system in ways that intentionally create asymmetries of understanding between the two countries. This does little to promote the interests of the United States or the Chinese people, but allows the Party to control how it is perceived overseas and, ultimately, to enhance its power globally.

Exchanges Aim to Reinforce CCP Power

The PRC uses people-to-people exchange programs to support its ambition of becoming a dominant force in international governance. These ambitions are articulated in concepts such as the “community for common destiny for mankind” (人类命运共同体) and are operationalized via engagements in areas such as culture, education, youth, technology, and sports. As outlined by then-Vice Minister of Education Tian Xuejun (田学军) in 2017, “We must encourage people from all countries to work together in building a community of common destiny for mankind through solid and effective people-to-people exchanges” (我们要通过扎实有效的人文交流，推动世界各国人民携手构建人类命运共同体) (China Education Daily, December 7, 2017). Similarly, Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) standing committee member and director of Institute for Global Cooperation and Understanding at Peking University (PKU) Jia Qingguo (贾庆国) argued in early 2024 that these exchanges are “the foundational work of promoting intergovernmental cooperation, improving global governance, and building a community of common destiny for mankind” (推动国家间合作、完善全球治理、实现人类命运共同体的基础工程) (PKU, January 9, 2024).

For the Party, people-to-people exchanges are a crucial means of shaping global perceptions in its favor. In October 2013, PRC President Xi Jinping equated these exchanges with propaganda work that aims to “let the idea of a community of common destiny take root” (让命运共同体意识 … 落地生根) (Xinhua, October 25, 2013). On multiple occasions, Xi has asserted that, through continuous and intensified people-to-people exchanges, “prejudice and misunderstanding [against the PRC] would disappear” (偏见和误解就会消于无形) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 29, 2014; Guangming Daily, February 26, 2020). Jia also has described such exchanges as “one of the most effective ways to eliminate barriers between nations and peoples” (消除国家间、人民间隔阂最有效的途径之一) (PKU, January 16, 2024). The Party endorses these specific forms of exchange because it controls them. They are not venues for genuine dialogue but rather tools to carefully manage international perceptions.

People-to-people exchanges are also a means for safeguarding the PRC’s legitimate rights and interests overseas, as described in the Report to the 18th Party Congress in 2012 (CCP Members Net, November 8, 2012). These interests, according to, Associate Professor at the School of Marxism at the Dalian University of Technology Chen Wei (陈维), encompass recognition of the PRC’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, national unity, and governance system (Aalborg Universitet, 2014; Dalian University of Technology, accessed March 6). Consequently, people-to-people exchanges function not only as cultural and diplomatic tools but also as mechanisms to reinforce and promote the adoption of the PRC’s stances on core issues.

The Party’s Cross-Sectoral Approach to Exchanges

The Party takes a whole-of-society approach to building people-to-people exchanges, obviating the need for direction from the center. A December 2017 document, “Several Opinions on Strengthening and Improving Sino-Foreign People-to-People Exchanges” (关于加强和改进中外人文交流工作的若干意见), calls for establishing “a system and mechanism for broad social participation, fully mobilizing the enthusiasm of both central and local governments as well as that of the government and society” (全社会广泛参与的体制机制，充分调动中央与地方、政府与社会的积极性) (Xinhua, December 21, 2017). It instructs the Party’s concept of people-to-people exchange to be taught to Chinese students studying overseas, volunteers, and Chinese enterprises, and to “integrate these exchanges into the daily interactions between Chinese and foreign citizens” (将人文交流寓于中外民众日常交往中) (Xinhua, December 21, 2017).

Exchanges span multiple channels across various sectors, all aimed at embedding the Party’s agenda. In 2018, then-State Councilor Liu Yandong (刘延东) delivered a speech to the People-to-People Exchange Work Discussion Forum (中外人文交流工作座谈会) in which he argued for advancing the concept of people-to-people exchange in academia, culture, business, media, and think tanks (Xinhua, February 8, 2018). This argument has been reiterated elsewhere. For instance, a researcher at the National Academy of Development and Strategy at Renmin University and editor of the university’s journal has stated that think tanks should “give full play to the role of ideological guidance and value orientation” (发挥思想引领与价值导向作用) in people-to-people exchanges (Chongyang Institute For Financial Studies of Renmin University, December 28, 2020). Similarly, the National 13th Five-Year Plan Outline for Cultural Development and Reform (国家“十三五”时期文化发展改革规划纲要) stated that exchanges should help “shape a dynamic and prominent image of contemporary China on the global stage” (使当代中国形象在世界上不断树立和闪亮起来) (Xinhua, May 7, 2017). Meanwhile, Tian Xuejun has said that educational exchanges will “actively lead [foreign students] to understand and befriend China” (积极引导他们知华、友华) (China Education Daily, December 7, 2017).

The Party also encourages integrating people-to-people exchanges with government-led efforts. In October 2011, the Central Party Committee published a “Decision” (决定) on “Several Major Issues Concerning Deepening Cultural System Reform and Promoting the Great Development and Prosperity of Socialist Culture” (关于深化文化体制改革推动社会主义文化大发展大繁荣若干重大问题). This called for establishing an exchange mechanism that “integrates government-led and civil exchanges, leveraging the role of non-public cultural enterprises and cultural non-profit organizations in international cultural exchanges, and supporting overseas Chinese in actively promoting Sino-foreign cultural and people-to-people exchanges” (把政府交流和民间交流结合起来，发挥非公有制文化企业、文化非营利机构在对外文化交流中的作用，支持海外侨胞积极开展中外人文交流) (Xinhua, October 25, 2011). A set of recommendations building on the December 2017 “Opinions” referenced above encouraged “specialized and internationalized social organizations and civil forces to participate in the operation of specific people-to-people exchange projects” (专业化、国际化的社会组织和民间力量参与人文交流具体项目运作) (Xinhua, December 21, 2017).

United Front Workers Manage Exchanges

Two case studies provide useful examples of how the Party manipulates exchanges and initiatives so that they conform to CCP preferences, often without the knowledge or acceptance of their foreign interlocutors and participants. One is a former high-level dialogue mechanism, while the other focuses on academic exchanges.

Case Study 1: The High-Level Consultation on People-to-People Exchange

Because the Party effectively manages all people-to-people exchanges, these exchanges produce an intentional asymmetry in understanding between the United States and the PRC. This is evident in the U.S.-China High-Level Consultation on People-to-People Exchange (CPE; 中美人文交流高层磋商机制), which was officially established in May 2010 and laid the foundation for U.S.-PRC people-to-people exchanges for nearly a decade until such exchanges halted in 2018. Starting as an agreement between Liu Yandong and then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to explore new areas in U.S.-PRC relations and deepen cultural and people-to-people exchanges between the two countries, it was rebranded in April 2017 as the “U.S. China Strategic Cultural and Social Dialogue” (中美社会和人文对话). [1] In this new guise, it was co-chaired on the U.S. side by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, but Liu Yandong remained in command for the PRC (Center for Sino-Foreign People-to-People Exchange, December 3, 2018; U.S. Department of Transportation, September 28, 2017). Liu is a politburo member with a strong united front portfolio. He was the former head of the Central United Front Work Department and CPPCC Vice Chair, which signals the Party’s intent to use the platform for political influence (Xinhua, March 16, 2013).

PRC exchange participants at this dialogue often were affiliated with party-controlled organs or were screened for “political literacy” (政治素养) and selected if they had “correct” political thoughts (Hubei University, March 21, 2024; East China Normal University, March 2). Before traveling overseas, participants received briefings and warnings. For example, in the summer of 2017, the School of Statistics at Beijing Normal University held a pre-departure training for those visiting George Washington University. During the training, the school’s party branch secretary framed the program from a state perspective, covering foreign policy, discipline, and strict ideological guidelines, and emphasizing national security awareness (School of Statistics at Beijing Normal University, June 5, 2017). In contrast, American participants typically represented diverse viewpoints, including those critical of U.S. policies, and came from universities and nongovernmental organizations that operate independently of the government.

The Party also embedded united front-linked individuals within U.S.-based initiatives to shape their direction and influence their outcomes. One example is the “100,000 Strong” (十万强) initiative, which sent 100,000 Americans to the PRC and was an important education program under the CPE framework. Hillary Clinton announced the “100,000 Strong Foundation” in 2013, transitioning the initiative into a nonprofit and nongovernmental effort. Its co-founder Florence Fang (方李邦琴), however, was connected to the PRC’s united front system (People’s Daily, January 26, 2013). In 2008, she served as an honorary advisor and director of the All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots (中华全国台湾同胞联谊会), and in 2009, she was named an executive director of the China Overseas Exchange Association (中国海外交流协会) and an overseas advisor to the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese (中华全国归国华侨联合会). These federations and associations are important national-level united front organizations (Florence Fang Family Foundation, accessed March 6). Although high-level exchanges were interrupted in late 2018, similar exchanges have continued to operate at lower levels of engagement.

Case Study 2: The China-United States Exchange Foundation

The China-United States Exchange Foundation (CUSEF) is an example of an organization that markets itself as an independent nonprofit but that in practice supports the Party’s agenda. Established in 2008 by CPPCC vice chair Tung Chee-Hwa (董建华), CUSEF claims to be an “independent platform” that is committed to promoting bilateral relations between the PRC and the United States (CUSEF, July 2024). Its operations in the PRC are overseen by the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC; 中国人民对外友好协会), a united front organization (China Brief, June 21, 2024; CUSEF, accessed September 30, 2024). The so-called “private donors” listed in its most recent annual report include at least 17 individuals who have been CPPCC members and are connected to the PRC’s united front system (CUSEF, July 2024).

CUSEF remains active in fostering PRC-U.S. connections, despite a number of reports highlighting the organization’s ties to the Party’s united front system. Its education program specifically targets top U.S. universities in international relations and public policy, such as Columbia SIPA, Johns Hopkins SAIS, The University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy, and the Harvard Kennedy School (CUSEF, accessed March 6). Through events with officials from the united front system such as the International Department of the CPC Central Committee, CPAFFC, and other party-state agencies, CUSEF facilitates dialogues that align with Beijing’s messaging, providing curated narratives with the aim of shaping the views of future U.S. policymakers and scholars while obscuring the Party’s influence behind a facade of independent academic and cultural exchange (CUSEF, January 21).

Conclusion

The PRC’s people-to-people exchange initiatives are not merely cultural or educational engagements but are deeply embedded in the Party’s strategy to achieve its broader goals. They function to shape global perceptions, reinforce Party narratives, and advance the PRC’s geopolitical ambitions under the guise of mutual understanding. The asymmetry in these exchanges places other countries’ institutions and individuals, who often approach such interactions with genuine openness, at a disadvantage to their PRC counterparts, who operate within a state-controlled framework. By leveraging governmental, academic, and civil society channels, the PRC ensures that its messaging is carefully curated and aligned with its long-term objectives. Recognizing the political nature of these exchanges is essential for developing a more balanced and informed approach to engagement, one that prioritizes transparency and mitigates the risk of influence operations masked as cultural diplomacy.

Notes

[1] This dialogue has multiple translations: At the U.S. State Department event, it was called the “U.S.-China Social and Cultural Dialogue.” However, PRC state media translated it as both the “China-US Social and People-to-People Dialogue” and the “China-US Social and Cultural Dialogue” (Youtube/CGTN America, September 28, 2017; Xinhua, September 29, 2017; CGTN, September 2017).