Ukraine Prioritizes Developing National Satellite Communications System

Executive Summary:

• Ukraine’s defense forces announced a Space Policy Directorate to develop a national satellite communication system as a key element of Command and Control and military technology development 
• The Ukrainian Armed Forces are in critical need of a robust satellite communications system, either domestically produced or in partnership with other providers, particularly European, to move away from reliance on Starlink.
• Russia is increasing the use of smuggled Starlink terminals in its armed forces and continues to develop its own similar systems that could be shared with its allies, such as the People’s Republic of China, North Korea, or Iran.

During the Space For Ukraine forum on March 29, Kateryna Chernohorenko, Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine (MoD) for Digitalization, announced that the ministry had created a Space Policy Directorate. This institution is to bring together public and private companies, as well as space scientists, to work with the Ukrainian military on developing technology. Ukrainian MoD also announced plans to become Ukraine’s main customer for space technology, products, and services. By 2030, Ukraine plans to have national satellites for defense and an air alert and space control system (Suspilne, March 29). According to Chernohorenko, the first priority is to develop a national satellite communication system as a key element of Command and Control and military technology development (Tyzhden, March 31). Following this development, on April 9, Ukraine and the European Union signed an agreement on several joint space projects, including participation in the Copernicus project and some components of the European Union’s Space Program (Ministry of Strategic Industries of Ukraine, April 9). Ukraine’s defense forces are in critical need of a robust satellite communications system, either domestically produced or in partnership with other providers, particularly European.

The announcement of the Space Policy Directorate came just weeks after the United States paused providing critical intelligence to Ukraine. The announcement was also made amid discussions about the possible disconnection of satellite internet service provided by Starlink, a produce of the U.S. space company SpaceX owned by Elon Musk, as leverage for a rare-earth minerals deal between Kyiv and Washington (Unian, February 22). The service is often seen as the most critical for the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) amid Russia’s war against Ukraine. Both experts and the Ukrainian military have repeatedly stated this. According to Yaroslav Honchar, head of the Aerorozvidka non-governmental organization (NGO), focused on aerial reconnaissance, Starlink provides a fast and stable communication channel where other means may be disabled or jammed by the enemy’s electronic warfare (EW) systems. Its performance directly affects the effectiveness of command, unit coordination, reconnaissance, targeting, fire adjustment, and even evacuating the wounded (DOU, February 27)

AFU’s critical vulnerability due to its dependence on a single provider, which could be switched off at any time, has also attracted attention (X/@Rooftop564, February 13; X/@BohdanKrotevych, March 9). As a result, there may be a complete disorganization of the Command and Control system (Fakty; X/@Shootnick_14, February 22). Such cases have already occurred when Starlink connectivity for Ukrainian terminals was suddenly lost during the maritime drone attack on Sevastopol in 2022 and the AFU’s operation in Russia’s Kursk oblast in 2024 (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 7, 2023; Espreso, February 24).

The Ukrainian military is thus searching for alternatives to Starlink. For example, Serhiy Flash, a well-known military expert in communications and electronic warfare, gave recommendations on what to do in case of the disappearance of the Starlink service, such as using LTE modems with external antennas (Facebook/Serhii.Flash, February 22). Andriy Kovalenko, head of the Center for Countering Disinformation at the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, noted that the Armed Forces already have “alternative things” that work at the front (Telegram/akovalenko1989; Unian, February 22). While Poland pays for most of Starlink’s services for the AFU, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski also wrote about a possible search for other suppliers (X/@sikorskiradek, March 9). European providers have also announced their readiness to replace U.S. intelligence and Musk’s service and fill the gap for the AFU (France 24, March 6). Four European satellite internet operators are considered the main candidates for replacement. They include Luxembourg’s SES, Spain’s Hisdesat, the United Kingdom’s Viasat, and the French-British Eutelsat/OneWeb (Financial Times, March 7; Militarnyi, March 9; Luxembourg Times, March 11). While theoretically possible, a complete replacement of Starlink with OneWeb would require significant financial outlays. In addition, the network built on OneWeb’s service will have a lower data transfer rate. It will be enough, however, to ensure communication with the command and control of the drones (Militarnyi, March 25).

Anatoliy Khrapchynsky, a former military officer and deputy head of the Ukrainian EW systems producer, says another alternative to Starlink could be the development of communication systems using the latest Ukrainian advancements. These include radio communication systems and fiber optic systems (ArmyInform, March 25). One of these developments, the Ukrainian radio station Himera, has already been tested in real combat conditions and is now entering the global market. A year ago, the company officially announced that it had obtained an exclusive supplier in the United States, Reticulate Micro (Facebook/HimeraUkraine, April 17, 2024).

Creating joint Ukrainian-European enterprises may be important for diversification. For example, Jan Hrochman, editor-in-chief of the Czech publication Armadni Novini, said that Ukraine and Czechia are working to create a joint constellation of optical reconnaissance satellites called Suzirya. In October 2022, the governments of Czechia and Ukraine reached a political agreement to create a defense cluster, within which this project was initiated. This cluster will be based on TROLL satellites, developed by the Czech company TRL Space, which will be joined by promising Czech-Ukrainian satellites in the future (Militarnyi, March 20; TRL Space, accessed April 10).

The Russian Federation is also making progress in this arena. First, there is growing evidence of the use of Starlink terminals by the Russian military on the battlefield, including evidence from the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence and numerous photos and videos (BBC Ukraine Service, February 9, 2024). These terminals are likely smuggled illegally through third countries, such as the United Arab Emirates, with pre-activated accounts. This can take away one of the UAF’s largest advantages on the front and would require active work on the part of Starlink’s management to track and block such terminals as fast as possible.

Since last year, Russia has also used Starlink terminals on Shahed-136 strike unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). This gives these UAVs additional tools for reconnaissance and targeting (Defense Express, September 25, 2024). This trend was recently confirmed by Colonel Yuriy Ihnat, a spokesman of the Ukrainian Air Force (Unian, March 11). The Russian army is acquiring new combat capabilities and testing the latest Western technological solutions to develop its products. In 2026, the Russian Federation plans to test its Starlink analog, a satellite communications system manufactured by Russia’s Bureau 1440 aerospace company. The first three low-orbit satellites of the Rassvet-1 mission were launched into Earth orbit in June 2023. In May 2024, Bureau 1440 reported the launch of three more satellites. The Bureau 1440 constellation plans to consist of 292 satellites, with a total of 383 satellites to be launched by the end of 2030 (Vedomosti, March 14). Although the data transmission speed may be lower than Starlink’s, the availability of such domestic technology could be a strategic advantage for Moscow. Later, this knowledge and technologies could be shared with the Kremlin’s allies such as North Korea, Iran, or the People’s Republic of China, which pose a threat to Europe and the United States in the event of a possible future conflict.

As technological innovation continues to develop globally, satellite communication systems will become increasingly important for international security and military operations. Ukraine’s initiative to develop and diversify its satellite communication technology through domestic innovation and international cooperation as a move away from reliance on Starlink and Russia’s progress in this sector highlights the critical importance of this technology in Ukraine’s fight against Russia.