Understanding the PRC’s Selective Use of Military Hotlines

Executive Summary:

• The PRC’s strategic use of and reluctance to establish military hotlines reflect a calculated approach to escalation risk, which can be seen in crises ranging from the accidental bombing of its embassy in Belgrade in 1999 to the present day. There is a recognition that hotlines offer tactical benefits, but they are not viewed as a solution to the broader challenges in US-PRC relations.
• The PRC is largely skeptical of military hotlines, believing that they lack utility and could potentially undermine its national security. Defense scholars fear that the existence of a mechanism to de-escalate crises could embolden adversaries to take more risks, and doubt that hotlines can help mitigate long-term mistrust in bilateral relations.
• Beijing also perceived some benefits of military hotlines. These include enhancing safety and crisis management, enabling the political signaling of intentions, and improving the PRC’s reputation as a responsible power, as well as allowing it to control narratives and influence other states’ actions.

The strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific has become increasingly precarious with the potential for miscalculation between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). A recent call between Admiral Samuel Paparo, Commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, and General Wu Yanan (吴亚男), Commander of the PLA Southern Theater Command, marked a positive step toward reestablishing military communication after months of delay (USINDOPACOM, September 9; Xinhua, September 10). This development comes after a long period of strained ties, during which the PRC repeatedly resisted broader military-to-military dialogue, including through established hotlines. Reliable lines of communication are essential to mitigate the risks of serious incidents in the region. A collision between a PRC fighter and a US reconnaissance plane, accidents during military exercises, or US support to an ally in a conflict with the PRC could quickly escalate without real-time dialogue between commanders. The absence of such communication would reduce opportunities for de-escalation and heighten the risk of broader global conflict.

The two sides have taken different approaches to military-to-military dialogue. US military leaders have consistently prioritized opening more channels of communication with PRC counterparts, reflecting the long-standing recognition of their importance across multiple presidential administrations. The PRC has instead demonstrated a pattern of avoiding communication during crises. After the accidental bombing of its embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the 2001 mid-air collision over Hainan Island, the PRC delayed and then refused engagement with US officials. More recently, the PRC has repeatedly avoided using its established hotline with the Philippines, even in situations where communication could mitigate the risk of escalation. This pattern is not universal, however. For instance, the PRC has agreed to establish a military hotline between the Vietnamese Navy and the PLA Southern Theater Command.

The PRC’s strategic use of and reluctance to establish military hotlines reflect a calculated approach to escalation risk. This has implications for US defense planning that necessitate interpreting PRC engagement as an indicator of risk, proposing streamlined and context-specific hotline agreements, and considering innovations like involving PLA political commissars to enhance crisis management.

Existing PRC Hotlines

The PRC has developed a hierarchical system of military hotlines to manage communications and address crises with various nations. These hotlines are categorized into four main levels: presidential, ministerial, service-level, and battalion/brigade. Theater-level hotlines are aspirational and without precedent. Each type of hotline offers unique advantages and faces specific challenges, reflecting the complexities of international military and diplomatic interactions.

At the presidential level, direct communication with top political leadership bypasses intermediary approvals, although it is often encumbered by bureaucratic delays and significant political signaling or politicization. The ministerial-level hotlines are limited by the lack of direct political authority on the PRC side. This is because the current Minister of National Defense, Dong Jun (董军), is not a member of the Central Military Commission. As such, his role consists largely of military diplomacy, with no real decision-making power. In contrast, service-level hotlines with the PLA Navy and Coast Guard, established with the Philippines and Vietnam, offer awareness of facts on the ground but are encumbered by bureaucratic elements including the dual command system. The above hotlines are generally the most susceptible to political signaling. The battalion/brigade level, with connections such as those with India, provides detailed on-the-ground information during active conflicts but is typically established on an ad hoc basis. There is no record of any combatant or theater commander-level hotline, and it remains largely theoretical in authoritative PRC literature. Moreover, this lack of precedent presents an additional challenge to establishing such a mechanism.

Table 1: Matrix of PRC Military Hotlines

(Source: Author Research)

Beijing Perceives Benefits and Costs to Military Hotlines

Perceived Benefits

From Beijing’s perspective, military hotlines present several strategic benefits, which are weighed carefully against perceived costs. The PRC first considers the potential for increased safety and communication, particularly at lower echelons where active conflicts may already be occurring. PRC scholars also view hotlines as mechanisms for deepening bilateral relations, positioning them as tools for fostering closer ties with other nations. Additionally, hotlines play an important role in political signaling. The deliberate use—or non-use—of these communication channels can convey Beijing’s satisfaction or displeasure with particular actions or policies, making them a versatile instrument in the PRC’s broader diplomatic and strategic toolkit.

The first perceived benefit of hotlines for Beijing is enhancing safety and crisis management, particularly at lower echelons. This is exemplified by the hotlines along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between the PLA and the Indian Armed Forces. The LAC, a 2,100-mile boundary that has seen multiple clashes, now features at least six hotlines at various flashpoints (The Times of India, August 1, 2021). These hotlines allow battalion and brigade-level commanders to communicate immediately during any “irritant” or minor conflict, enabling rapid de-escalation through direct dialogue (Deccan Herald, May 6, 2022).

This approach aligns with analysis of crisis management from PRC scholars. Hu Bo (胡波), Director of the Center for Maritime Strategy Studies at Peking University, notes, “Military communication between front-line units is already guaranteed by a series of international rules or bilateral agreements, and in case of an unexpected event, emergency communication can be established.” [1] The PRC view emphasizes that these brigade-level hotlines are particularly crucial once a crisis has already erupted, underscoring their role as reactive tools in maintaining stability.

The second set of perceived benefits relates to hotlines as political signaling tools. Establishing and using hotlines can serve as a mechanism for Beijing to bolster its international reputation and signal its intentions to other states. According to PRC scholars, one of the motivations behind initiating hotlines is to maintain a favorable international image. Hu Yumin (胡豫闽) and Ma Yingjie (马英杰) from the PLA National Defense University emphasize that “the initial proposals for such agreements were more about preserving self-image and gaining favorable international public opinion.” [2] This signaling function is further evident in the PRC’s approach to its relations with neighboring countries. For instance, the PRC has recently established a hotline with Vietnam, reflecting a desire to deepen bilateral ties as relations remain positive (Socialist Republic of Vietnam Government News, April 12). Conversely, when relations are strained, as is the case currently with the Philippines, the PRC has opted not to respond to calls on the established hotline, using non-engagement as a deliberate form of political signaling (RFI, August 13, 2023).

This strategic use of hotlines—or the refusal to engage via these channels—illustrates the PRC’s intent to control the narrative and influence the actions of other states. For example, after the accidental US bombing of the PRC embassy in Belgrade in 1999, the PRC did not respond to President Clinton’s attempts at communication, signaling its displeasure and asserting its authority. Similarly, following the 2001 mid-air collision over Hainan Island, the PRC delayed communication with US officials for over 12 hours. As Wang Xue (王雪) of Nanjing University’s South China Sea Research Center explains, “China deliberately refuses calls and delays communication to demonstrate resolve and exert pressure to prevent accidental escalation.” [3] This pattern of behavior underscores the broader strategic calculus in which hotlines are not merely tools for crisis management but also instruments of political leverage and signaling, particularly when Beijing seeks to assert its stance over a particular issue or project dissatisfaction.

Given these perceived benefits, some PRC scholars have supported proposals to expand communication channels with the United States. Hu Bo advocates for the establishment of a theater-level hotline between the PRC and the United States. [4] Likewise, Liu Mei (刘美), whose research is supported by funding from the National Social Science Fund, has called for a coast guard hotline between the two countries to manage maritime security in the South China Sea. [5] Establishing a theater-level hotline remains challenging due to the lack of precedent and existing civil-military challenges. Nevertheless, these recommendations reflect a recognition within PRC academic circles of the need for more robust and direct communication mechanisms to manage potential crises with the United States.

Perceived Costs

The primary obstacle to expanding current US-PRC hotlines is Beijing’s prevailing belief that these communication channels lack utility and could potentially undermine its national security. PRC scholars stress that crisis management between great powers is not just about preventing incidents, but also about strategic maneuvering. Hu Bo underscores this when he states, “Of course, major powers involved in crisis management always have dual purposes; preventing maritime incidents is only one aspect. The goal of limiting the adversary at the lowest cost and ensuring the freedom of one’s military actions is also a significant concern.” [6] Tong Zhao, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Beijing, concurs, asserting PRC leaders fear effective hotlines “could actually embolden perceived American military provocations,” especially “close range surveillance activities near China” (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 24).

From Beijing’s perspective, military hotlines with the United States could enable greater US freedom of maneuver. The United States has conducted freedom of navigation operations (FONOP) in the South China Sea, challenging the PRC’s territorial claims. Beijing might fear that hotlines could allow the United States to push these operations closer to features claimed by the PRC, emboldened by the existence of a mechanism to de-escalate any resulting crises. Beijing may also view hotlines as a means for the United States to avoid severe repercussions if an incident occurs during airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations. From Beijing’s perspective, this safety net could lead to an increase in US ISR missions along the PRC coastline, with the hotline serving as a tool to quickly manage any incidents without halting or scaling back US operations. These examples demonstrate concern in Beijing that the United States might use these hotlines to secure freedom of maneuver while having a safeguard in place to manage and mitigate crises that are caused by perceived US provocations.

The PRC also remains skeptical of the utility of military hotlines, viewing them as insufficient for addressing deeper strategic issues and encumbered by significant bureaucratic and civil-military challenges. As Tong Zhao highlights, PRC military officials are generally reluctant to initiate discussions with US counterparts without explicit authorization from the political leadership (USIP, September 7, 2023; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 24). The procedural requirements for setting up the calls further complicate rapid communication. The process involves multiple stages: initial notification, agreement to discuss, scheduling, and finally, discussion. Each stage is constrained by bureaucratic approval and the requirement for a 48-hour response window. The only PRC hotline that functions for immediate crisis management (i.e., without the 48-hour protocol) is the PRC-India border hotline at the brigade and battalion level. This cumbersome protocol reflects broader inefficiencies in the hotline system and Beijing’s skepticism about their utility. It is possible that streamlining these procedures would enhance the effectiveness of hotlines in real-time crisis management and could even shift Beijing’s views on their utility.

Skepticism persists among PRC analysts about the long-term utility of hotlines, who argue that they do not address the deeper, more fundamental issues in bilateral relationships. Hu Yumin and Ma Yingjie assert that “such measures cannot ensure timely resolution of problems, nor can they address the deeper or more fundamental contradictions between both sides.” [8] In the context of US-PRC competition, Beijing perceives Washington’s intermediate strategic aim as achieving “competitive coexistence” and “containment” without outright conflict. [9] Thus, analysts are doubtful that hotlines can mitigate deeper mistrust. Consequently, while hotlines offer tactical benefits, they are not viewed as a solution to the broader challenges in US-PRC relations.

Conclusion

A cost-benefit analysis of Beijing’s perceived risks and costs of military hotlines suggests that the use of and reluctance to establish military hotlines reflect a calculated approach tied directly to its assessment of escalation risk. Beijing’s failure to respond to existing hotlines should therefore be seen as deliberate rather than the result of incompetence. In other words, when Beijing does not respond, it signals that PRC leaders do not see an immediate threat of escalation. Conversely, when they do engage, it indicates they take the situation seriously and fear potential escalation. This analysis underscores the critical importance of recognizing Beijing’s distinct approach to military hotlines, suggesting a need to reassess expectations surrounding their use. A deeper understanding of how the PRC perceives and uses these communication tools can help avoid misinterpretation and ensure more effective crisis management moving forward.

Notes

[1] Hu Bo, “Challenges and Ways to Improve Sino-US Maritime Crisis Management” [中美海上危机管理面临的困境与改善路径], American Studies [美国研究], vol. 5 (2021), 61-80.

[2] Hu Yumin and Ma Yingjie, “The New Strategic Relationship Between China and America and the Trust Between America and Russia in Nuclear Issues” [中美新型战略核关系与美俄核信任问题研究], Journal of Ocean University of the PRC, no. 3 (2017).

[3] Wang Xue, “Mode of Competition, Balance of Interest and Sino-US Maritime Crisis Management” [竞争模式、利益平衡度与 中美海上危机管控], Waijiao Pinglun [外交评论], no. 4 (2024), 52-83.

[4] Hu Bo, “Challenges and Ways to Improve Sino-US Maritime Crisis Management.”

[5] Liu Mei, “Demarcation of Marine Military Activities and “Gray Zone” Operations of the United States in the SouthChina Sea” [海上军事活动的界定与美国南海“灰色地带行动”], Journal of International Security Studies, vol. 39, no. 3 (2021), 102-160.

[6] Hu Bo, “Challenges and Ways to Improve Sino-US Maritime Crisis Management”

[7] Hu Yumin and Ma Yingjie, “The New Strategic Relationship Between China and America and the Trust Between America and Russia in Nuclear Issues”

[8] Ibid.

[9] Cha Hongyu, The US Biden administration’s crisis management strategy and prospects for China [美国拜登政府对华危机管控策略及前景], Contemporary International Relations, no. 6 (2024), 22-41.