Warsaw Views Trump–Nawrocki Meeting with Cautious Optimism

Executive Summary:

• U.S. President Donald Trump and Polish President Karol Nawrocki met at the White House on September 3, garnering much attention in Poland since the country views its alliance with the United States as the cornerstone of its security policy.
• Nawrocki, then a Polish presidential candidate, used a May White House visit to underscore his ability to cultivate ties with the Trump administration and highlight strained interpersonal relations between Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Trump. 
• At the September 3 White House meeting, Trump pledged not to reduce U.S. troops in Poland, sparking political enthusiasm tempered by some skepticism about cost, the possibility of U.S. reversals, and dependence on the United States for Polish security.
• Warsaw continues to seek permanent U.S. forces, technology transfers, and possible nuclear sharing to bolster its role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastern defense.

On September 3, U.S. President Donald Trump and Polish President Karol Nawrocki held a meeting in Washington, D.C. In Poland, the meeting was the subject of intense political and analytical debate for several weeks before the event. Relations with the United States, referred to as transatlantic relations in Poland, are one of the fundamental priorities of Polish foreign policy. All governments in Poland since 1991, regardless of political orientation, have sought to cultivate a close relationship with the United States. The importance of the United States for Polish security acquired particular salience after Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, when the expansionist nature of Russian foreign policy became indisputable and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—with the United States as a principal member—engaged in a policy of credible deterrence on its eastern flank for the first time since the alliance’s post-Cold War enlargement. Poland perceives its alliance with the United States as the cornerstone of its security policy (Polish Ministry of National Defense, March 27).

The United States also holds a special place in Poland’s social sphere. Large segments of Polish society have long held favorable views of the American people, and politicians and Polish people retain a post-Solidarity and at times romanticized vision of the United States as the leader of the free world and guarantor of the international liberal order (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, March 2024). For these reasons alone, the United States enjoys significant “political and social capital” in Poland and exerts a profound influence on Polish domestic politics.

Despite deep political polarization in Poland, particularly between the two dominant parties—Law and Justice (PiS) and Civic Coalition (KO, formerly Civic Platform)—since roughly 2007, issues of security and relations with the United States have not been at the center of Polish political conflict. This situation, however, changed with the inauguration of Nawrocki as President of Poland on August 6. Nawrocki—a conservative who ran as an independent with the backing of the right-wing  PiS party—has adopted a more assertive stance toward the government of Prime Minister Donald Tusk, a member of the center-right, KO party, than his predecessor Andrzej Duda, a member of PiS. Relations with the United States, and especially with Trump, became part of the 2025 Polish presidential campaign when Trump invited then-candidate Nawrocki to the White House in May, extending what some in Poland perceived as support for Nawrocki’s candidacy (White House, May 2). Nawrocki’s campaign used the visit to underscore his ability to cultivate ties with the Trump administration and highlight the strained interpersonal relations between Tusk and Trump. The strained relationship stems in part from Tusk’s 2023 speculation, which he has since distanced himself from, that Trump could have been connected with Russian intelligence services (Onet, November 7, 2024). 

Polish politicians pursuing foreign endorsements is not new. Figures from both rival parties have sought such support. For instance, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen openly expressed her support for Tusk ahead of Polish parliamentary elections in 2023. Nawrocki’s September 3 visit to the White House, however, departed significantly from this pattern in that both Nawrocki and Tusk used it as a tool of domestic political competition. The coalition government, headed by Tusk, questioned Nawrocki’s competence and downplayed the significance of the visit. Nawrocki excluded representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from his delegation. 

On August 15, at Trump’s request, Nawrocki replaced Tusk in an online meeting concerning the war in Ukraine (IEŚ Lublin, August 14). Even though Trump has yet to meet with Tusk, representatives of Tusk’s government continue to meet with their U.S. counterparts. For example, Polish National Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz has met with U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, and Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski has met with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 2; Department of Defense, May 27). These ongoing contacts indicate that the Trump administration is not closing itself off from the KO government. Nevertheless, within Poland’s analytical community, there is a widespread conviction that Poland’s international partners use Poland’s domestic political divisions to advance their own agendas.

The Nawrocki delegation focused on the continued presence of U.S. troops in Poland during its September 3 White House meeting (President of Poland, September 3). The prospect of a review—and possible revision—of this policy, as well as the pending U.S. National Security Strategy and Strategic Posture Review, provoked considerable anxiety in Poland. Despite repeated assurances by former President Duda that the United States had no intention of reducing its military presence in Poland, Trump’s ambiguous policies and statements by Hegseth fueled Polish concerns. During the press-accessible portion of the Trump–Nawrocki meeting, the U.S. president, for the first time, explicitly declared that he did not intend to reduce the number of U.S. troops stationed in Poland, and could even consider increasing the contingent. Polish politicians received this announcement with unprecedented enthusiasm, but the analytical community remained divided. Some analysts shared the politicians’ optimism, while others openly questioned the potential costs of such an enlargement and the potential for U.S. policy changes going forward (X/@MStefan92, September 5). The initial enthusiasm was, however, tempered as the U.S. administration did not rhetorically back Poland or Estonia after Russian aircraft violated their airspace (Defence24.pl, September 12).

For several years, some Polish analysts have raised concerns that Poland’s reliance on the United States for security may amount to “self-vassalization,” and dependence on external powers for defense remains controversial (Zięba, Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy, 2019). Trump’s previous reversals on other issues generated Polish concerns that “nothing is done until it is done.” The image of the United States as a security guarantor and partner has also been affected by recent events and by what, from Warsaw’s perspective, was a weak response to Russia’s provocations. In the view of this analyst, the U.S. security promises outlined in the Nawrocki–Trump meeting must materialize to maintain U.S. credibility in Poland. This would also align with a carrot-and-stick strategy, in which Poland, as the leader of military build-up dynamics in Europe, would be rewarded with a special partnership status with the United States in return for aligning with Washington’s preferences and urging European allies to assume greater responsibility for their own security.

Further work on the shape of the U.S. military presence in Poland will be coordinated by Hegseth and the head of the National Security Bureau, Sławomir Cenckiewicz, rather than, as would have been customary, by the Polish Minister of Defense (President of Poland, September 3). The Nawrocki administration will cooperate with Kosiniak-Kamysz, the only member of Tusk’s government with whom the president’s office maintains working relations, partially because Kosiniak-Kamysz represents the Polish People’s Party, a coalition partner of Tusk’s, rather than his direct political camp (Defence24, September 4). Polish security analysts believe that the leadership of Hegseth, who they regard as a “restrainer” of U.S. involvement with Europe, suggests that promises of ongoing U.S. military presence in Poland should be approached with only moderate optimism (Wydarzenia, February 2).

Poland has the political will to act as a security provider within NATO as a pillar of deterrence on the Alliance’s eastern flank. There is a prevailing conviction in Poland, however, that the country cannot effectively deter Russia without U.S. support. Discussions about an expanded Polish role in regional security have included Polish requests for reinforcement of deterrence through strategic communication, the permanent stationing of U.S. troops on Polish territory, possible inclusion in nuclear sharing, and the transfer of military and civilian technologies (Polish National Security Bureau, September 4).

Trump’s invitation to Nawrocki to attend the next Group of 20 (G20) summit in the United States as a guest was another important outcome of their meeting. Although Poland recently became the world’s twentieth-largest economy, this does not automatically qualify it for G20 membership (Government of Poland, September 2). Trump’s invitation could, at this stage, be interpreted as a courtesy rather than a sign that Poland’s admission to the G20 is imminent—Poland also attended the 2017 G20 summit in Germany as a guest. In the view of this analyst, however, Warsaw would see U.S. support for Polish admission into the G20 as evidence of a materializing “special relationship,” which Trump himself mentioned during the meeting with Nawrocki (Biznes Alert, September 4). Notably, on September 15, Warsaw was also assured of support from the People’s Republic of China for Poland’s G20 membership (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 15).

Despite Poland’s growing military and economic capabilities, it still requires external support to become an effective actor on NATO’s eastern flank. Given European states’ evident reluctance to support the emergence of a strong Poland, the United States is viewed in Poland as the only actor capable of guaranteeing this outcome.