Xi Jinping’s Visit to Lhasa Elevates Tibet in National Policymaking Agenda

Executive Summary:

• Xi Jinping’s third trip to the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) underscores its importance to his agenda at the national level. His Tibet policy emphasizes regional stability, economic development, ecological conservation, and border defense, but the top priority remains stability.
• The ceremony, which celebrated the TAR’s 60th anniversary, saw low public attendance, undermining the Party’s narrative of ethnic unity and “unwavering support” for the Party-state’s policies in the region.
• The sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism and culture serves to sever religious, cultural, and political links across borders, reinforcing the CCP’s control of lama reincarnation.

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping visited Lhasa on August 20–21, to participate in the celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR; 西藏自治区). Xi’s itinerary included attending a ceremony in Lhasa and a visit to the region’s party committee. His limited participation in the ceremony itself suggests that his visit may have been decided on relatively short notice. Xi nevertheless traveled with a powerful delegation, including senior Party leaders such as Wang Huning (王沪宁), the chairperson of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and fourth-ranked member of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC). [1] Wang and others remained in the TAR for two additional days after Xi departed on August 21 (Xinhua, August 21).

The backdrop to the visit was the Dalai Lama’s decision in July that Tibetans will be responsible for recognizing his successor, without interference from CCP authorities (Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, July 2). This decision has been denounced by officials, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson claiming that succession is “determined by the central government” (由中央政府确定的) and ambassadors warning that suggestions otherwise are “purely malicious misrepresentation and distortion” (纯属恶意篡改和歪曲) (MFA, March 11, June 2, July 1). Xi’s visit underlines the confidence among his advisors about the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) current policies for reinforcing control and legitimacy in the region. It also indicates Tibet’s importance to Xi’s agenda at the national level.

Tibet’s Rise Among National Priorities

Xi’s visit to Lhasa is a strong indication that Tibet now ranks higher in political salience under his leadership than in previous years and under previous leaders. The trip was Xi’s third to the TAR (and second as General Secretary), having visited in July 2011 and August 2021 for the 60th and 70th anniversaries, respectively, of the region’s “peaceful liberation” (和平解放) (Xinhua, July 23, 2021, August 24). [2] By comparison, his predecessors Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin each visited once during their tenures at the top of the Party.

Under Xi, Beijing has engaged directly in setting the policy agenda for the TAR, enhancing central oversight at the expense of provincial leadership. In his first speech to the Tibetan delegation at the “two sessions” (两会) as CCP General Secretary, Xi stated that “to govern the country, we must govern borders, and to govern borders, we must govern Tibet” (治国必治边，治边先稳藏) (National Ethnic Affairs Commission, October 17, 2022). This statement, a continuation of the rhetoric he had delivered in Lhasa in 2011, indicated a preoccupation with increasing security in the country’s borderlands (Xinhua, July 19, 2011).

Tibet’s salience to Xi is often underlined in official media pronouncements that he “personally” (亲自) steers Tibet-related work. This specific phrase has skyrocketed in frequency, particularly during Xi’s second term, and is usually associated with regional development initiatives and (domestic) united front work—areas that overlap significantly with Tibet work (Asia Society, June 25). This, along with state media characterizations of the position of Tibet work as “special and important” (特殊重要), suggest its importance to Xi. [3]

Reinforcing Security-driven Policies

Xi’s August visit reinforced Beijing’s security-driven economic and nationalist agenda in Tibet. Xi has defined policy objectives through a focus on “four big matters” (四件大事‌): stability (稳定), development (发展), ecological conservation (生态), and strengthening the border (强边)—in that order of priority (People’s Daily Online, August 22). Building on policies instigated in the wake of the 2008 protests across Tibetan areas, the Party under Xi has doubled down on policies aimed at strengthening internal security to fight secessionism (China Brief, May 13, 2008). This has involved heavy investment in the security apparatus, which roughly tripled between 2014 and 2023 (CSEP, July 2).

The Party also has concentrated efforts on cultivating patriotism and socialist core values, promoting the Sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism, and controlling religious affairs by regulating the reincarnation of lamas and remaking cadre teams into a loyal and, increasingly, Han-led cadre force (Xinhua, August 29, 2020; Leibold, James & Devendra Kumar, May 27). [4] Additional policies have sought to enhance the Party’s control over state institutions and expand the capacity of foreign affairs offices in the region (Taotao Zhao & James Leibold, October 13, 2019; Center of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, March 2024). [5] These initiatives, while helping to strengthen control at home, are also aimed at “coordinating internal and external situations” (必须统筹国内国际两个大局). In other words, severing linkages between domestic audiences and Tibet’s government in exile, which is based in Dharamshala, India (Xinhua, August 19).

Deepening economic integration with neighboring inland provinces continues to be driven by central policies, including the massive central subsidies and the Tibet Aid Program (TAP, 对口援藏) (China Brief, November 15, 2024). Big-ticket infrastructure projects like the Lower Yarlung Zangbo Hydropower Project (雅下水电工程) and the Sichuan-Tibet Railway (川藏铁路), both of which Xi mentioned in his remarks to the TAR party committee and government, are frequently highlighted in official accounts of regional development (Xinhua, August 20). The hydropower project, also known as the Medog Hydropower Station (墨脱水电站), began construction in July after it was finally approved in December 2024, over four years after it was first announced. The project was framed in the announcement as a “security project” (安全工程), indicating that security remains the regime’s overriding preoccupation in the TAR (China Brief, January 31). This was underscored by Xi, who in August referred to social and political stability as the primary task (Xinhua, August 20).

Ceremony Signals Ethnic and National Unity

Genuine public support for the regime is likely to have been impacted by the official response to the Dalai Lama’s approach to the reincarnation issue. Thus, the anniversary celebrations were an opportunity to project unity between central and local leadership. The presence of retired Tibetan officials and other Tibetan elites at the ceremony was an occasion for propaganda organs to shape a narrative of ”unwavering support” (坚定信心) for the Party-state’s policies (Xinhua, August 21). However, low public attendance at the ceremony undermines this narrative.

The ceremony was attended by thousands of people, though the exact number is likely lower than official estimates. State outlets have claimed that 20,000 people attended, while this author estimates a maximum of 10,500, based on live footage of the event (YouTube/CGTN, August 21; Guangming Online, August 22). Moreover, among those who attended, at least a quarter appear to have consisted of personnel from the People’s Liberation Army, Public Security Bureau, People’s Armed Police, and students from local schools (see Figure 1). Along with other officials and state employees, total public participation may have accounted for fewer than half of attendees; among those attendees, it is not possible to discern how many were there voluntarily.

Figure 1: Ceremony to Celebrate the 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of the TAR

 (Source: YouTube/CCTV, August 20; Author highlights)

The symbolism on display nevertheless foregrounded “people-centric” (以人民为中心) policies and sanitized references to Tibetan culture. For example, TAR Governor Karma Tsetan (嘎玛泽登), who chaired the ceremony, wore a chuba (Tibetan traditional dress) while making a speech in the Tibetan language (YouTube/CCTV, August 21). Ethnic Tibetan cadres, such as provincial governors, often wear ethnic dress on ceremonial occasions (Xinhua, July 23, 2021, August 19, 2021). This is done as a show of cultural tolerance, but stands in contrast to Beijing’s restrictive language and cultural policies in the region (China Brief, May 14, 2024). Such decisions also are rooted in the CCP’s united front tactics, aiming to build political affiliations among the people in order to exert control through coercion and cooptation. [6]

Key Challenges

Beneath the fanfare of the 60th anniversary celebrations are fundamental challenges to Beijing’s governance of the TAR. As central government investment has poured into the region, corruption has emerged as a key problem. Since the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, dozens of senior cadres have been investigated. Most recently, these have included Wu Yingjie (吴英杰), TAR Party Secretary for 2016–2021, and Che Dalha (齐扎拉), TAR Chairman for 2017–2021 (International Campaign for Tibet, May 20). Wu is accused of siphoning renminbi (RMB) 343 million ($48 million) from official funds, including from engineering contracts (CCDI, July 16). His confidants, including his former deputy Jiang Jie (姜杰), have also been found guilty of financial crimes (People’s Daily, October 12, 2024). As infrastructure investment continues to increase, this problem appears unlikely to subside in the near term.

Xi’s instructions to local officials to prioritize developing grassroots party organizations as “fortresses” (战斗堡垒) are illustrative of the securitized approach to grassroots governance that has been particularly distinctive under Xi’s leadership. Unlike previous periods, the Party-state has invested heavily to boost the capacities of grassroots institutions with grid management, ideological control, and party building in villages, towns, and remote pastoral areas (Xinhua, August 20). As policymakers fear internal political fallout from how the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation is handled, grassroots control will gain prominence in the near term (China Net, August 12).

A third challenge is sustaining an acceptable rate of economic growth. In recent years, five-year plans and speeches by senior officials have emphasized that economic policies must move from “blood transfusion” (输血) to “blood production” (造血). In other words, they must help generate indigenous sources of growth and transition from overreliance on central transfers and subsidies (TAR Government, 2016). Two-way exchange (双向交流) between Tibet and inland provinces is one way to promote growth through commercializing ethnic Tibetan products such as medicines and handicrafts, tourism, and attracting private investment (Xinhua, August 20). Several recent initiatives have aimed at achieving these goals, such as the establishment of industrial and agricultural parks, economic and technological zones, and cooperatives for promoting commercialization and indigenous entrepreneurship (Xinhua, 23 July; China Brief, July 26). Currently, these projects rely on TAP funding, something that is unlikely to change given Tibet’s limited international trade profile (China Brief, 15 November, 2024; TAR Government, 12 January).

Conclusion

The Party leadership intended the August ceremony as a vehicle for reaching out to the Tibetan population. Instead, it revealed the Party’s ambitions to govern Tibet as a normal province of the PRC by gradually dismantling its distinctive character. This was captured in the symbolism of the event: The venue, a massive Chinese-style square in front of the Potala Palace, was adorned with CCP slogans and an inflated image of Xi, and the dais set up at its foot. The Potala Palace’s significance lies in it being the former residence of the exiled Dalai Lama, and as a symbol of Tibet’s distinctive history. Beijing’s impulses are clear in official media’s characterization of the Potala Palace as a symbol of “national integration” (民族交融画卷) and a “treasure of Chinese civilization” (中华文明瑰宝) (CCTV, August 19).

In Xi’s first and second terms, Hong Kong and Xinjiang received significant attention as restive border regions. In his third term, Tibet has emerged as an important issue on Xi’s national policy agenda and is likely to remain a priority in the next few years of his rule. Policies unveiled since the 20th Party Congress are likely to figure prominently and even be expanded in the forthcoming Eighth Tibet Work Forum and in the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030). [7]

Notes

[1] Other officials in attendance included Cai Qi (蔡奇), who leads the CCP’s central secretariat and is the fifth-ranked member of the PBSC; Li Ganjie (李干杰), the Head of the United Front Work Department; He Lifeng (何立峰) and Zhang Guoqing (张国清), the second- and third-ranked vice premiers of the State Council; and Wang Xiaohong (王小洪), the Minister of Public Security (CCTV, August 20).

[2] The Central Tibetan Administration, Tibet’s government in exile based in Dharamshala, India, refers to this event as the “Chinese invasion of Tibet.” Elsewhere it is referred to as the annexation of Tibet.

[3] The full phrase often repeated in media and official documents is “since the 18th CCP National Congress, General Secretary Xi Jinping has personally steered and planned Tibet’s work” (党的十八大以来，习近平总书记亲自为西藏工作把舵定向，谋篇布局) (TAR Government, August 10).

[4] Leibold, James & Devendra Kumar, “Vanishing Quotas: Tibetan Political Disenfranchisement in Xi Jinping’s New Era of Han-Centrism,” The China Journal, Vol. 94, July (2025): p. 1–29.

[5] Zhao, Taotao & James Leibold. “Ethnic Governance under Xi Jinping: The Centrality of the United Front Work Department & Its Implications,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 29, No. 124 (2019): p. 487–502. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2019.1677359.

[6] Invoking Tibetan cultural symbols can also be politically significant for cadres in Tibet. For Tibetan cadres, wearing traditional dress can be perceived as a demonstration of their affiliations with the Dalai Lama. For senior non-Tibetan cadres, however, it can signal that they are going too far, raising suspicions that such acts can revive ethno-national sentiments. For example, Wu Jinghua (CCP Party Secretary of TAR from 1985 to 1987) used wearing Tibetan traditional dress during an official ceremony as political strategy to woo Tibetans and signal a relaxed political environment. See, Melvyn Goldstein. The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama. University of California Press, 1999, p. 75–76.

[7] Exact dates for the forum are yet to be announced, but it is expected to take place before March 2026.