By Allowing Regions to Form Militias, Moscow Increases Likelihood of Future Civil War

Executive Summary:

• The Russian cabinet is in support of a Duma proposal to allow the governors of oblasts, krais, and republics to form their own militias to deal with natural disasters and military interventions, such as the Ukrainian advancement into Kursk oblast.
• Moscow is confident it can control these new units, but the recent Prigozhin revolt and actions of Ramzan Kadyrov’s Chechen forces cast doubts.
• With the eventuality of a transition of power or weakened regime, these regional forces would increase the probability and violence of a civil war.

In September, the Kremlin announced its support for a proposal before the State Duma, allowing the heads of all federal subjects—the governors of oblasts, krais, and republics—to create their own regional military units. These regional militias will deal with extraordinary circumstances, including both natural disasters, such as flooding and fires, and foreign interventions, such as the Ukrainian advancement into Kursk oblast (Kommersant.ru, September 16). On September 16, the Russian cabinet approved amendments to laws governing military units as proposed by Andrey Kartapolov, an army lieutenant general who is a member of the ruling United Russia party and heads the State Duma’s defense committee. Moscow thus dramatically increased the number of actors allowed to form militias, which previously had only included those regions adjoining Ukraine and large corporations in the Russian far north (The Barents Observer, February 9, 2023; Charter97, September 1).

This government-backed measure, which will almost certainly be signed into law by the State Duma, is intended to allow regions to combat extraordinary circumstances both in the event of military conflict and during peacetime. This will also address the serious problem that many regions in Russia remain dangerously unprotected against any military challenge (Theins.ru, June 30, 2023). Simultaneously, it has the potential to give regions and republics armed forces that could be deployed in the event Russia descends into a civil war. Presumably, Moscow believes that it will be able to maintain central control over these militias through centrally organized recruitment, arming, and training. The Prigozhin revolt last year and the increasingly independent stance of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, who already has his own forces, strongly suggest that units created within a region under a regional leader are more likely to be loyal to their immediate commanders than to Moscow (Kavkazr.com, May 1, 2023).

Some in the regions and republics have already spoken out about the need for such regional defense forces, given Moscow’s inability to help them overcome natural disasters, defend against terrorist attacks, or even meet basic demands regarding regional needs (Window on Eurasia, June 30, 2023, April 6). Such talk is likely to increase, especially in non-ethnically Russian regions. This is all the more so if the new regional militias are primarily comprised of veterans of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine, as many currently expect, and have the support of the right-wing “Russian Community” organization, which is openly hostile to non-ethnically Russian groups. This organization has been working hand in glove with Russian officials to suppress non-ethnic-Russians in the North Caucasus and is now reportedly actively involved in recruiting Ukrainian war veterans in the Russian North for new regional forces (VK.com, July 2; Window on Eurasia, August 30; The Barents Observer, September 26). Unsurprisingly, the Russian Community’s involvement in this endeavor has already prompted one Circassian leader to call for non-ethnic Russians to form their own “community” organizations (Facebook.com, September 29). It is probable that leaders will suggest that these non-ethnically Russian groups play a key role in the formation of regional militias in their respective non-ethnically Russian republics.

The creation of these militias carries both short- and long-term consequences. In the short term, Moscow’s creation of multiple military hierarchies rather than maintaining a single military structure may make a coup attempt against Putin more likely. The point is often made that Russia lacks a tradition of military coups in large part because tsars, commissars, and presidents have insisted on having a single military loyal to themselves rather than creating multiple “armies,” who might be tempted to fight among themselves or challenge the country’s leader. Putin is violating that tradition, however, and thus putting himself at risk, according to some observers (Window on Eurasia, January 11). For instance, the Kremlin leader’s permissive attitude toward the Wagner Group led directly to Prigozhin’s armed revolt. The establishment of regional militias could open the way for similar and perhaps more successful actions, especially if some of them were to cooperate, a possibility made likely by the fact that regional identities are often far broader than the territories into which Moscow has carved the country. (On that oft-neglected aspect of Russian politics, see Window on Eurasia, August 27, 2022, April 12, September 11).

The speed of Prigozhin’s initial advance through Russia highlighted these risks to the Putin regime. It may help explain Moscow’s backing for regional militias, but the rapidity with which the Kremlin recovered and suppressed the Wagner leader underscores the likelihood that, for the time being, the appearance of regional military forces will not lead to a successful coup. The long-term consequences in the event of political instability, however, are far more pressing. If Moscow is weakened and regional leaders seek to carve out more power for themselves, they almost certainly would view the new regional militias as an important resource, one that the Russian government has now given them the power to form. In that event, these forces would likely be involved not only in challenging Moscow but also in fighting with each other, especially with those of a different ethnicity.

It is widely assumed that if the Russian Federation does fall apart after Putin leaves the scene, the process will resemble 1991, which was remarkably peaceful due to the fact that Moscow alone had significant military resources and the Russian Federation had agreed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The approaching end of the Russian Federation will be fundamentally different, not only because many in Moscow will not accept such a possibility, but also because regions and republics will now have their own military resources.

At the Sixth Forum of Free Peoples of Post-Russia in April 2023, this author argued that “the approaching end of the Russian Federation is more likely to resemble 1918 than 1991,” not only with regard to the amount of violence but also concerning what the arrangements will be when the dust settles after a civil war (Region.expert, April 26, 2023). The decision of the Putin regime to form regional militias guarantees there will be more violence in that event, but could also mean that the disintegration of the Russian Federation will be far more complete at the end of this historical cycle.