Tbilisi Eyes Integration with Separatist Territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia

Executive Summary:

• Tbilisi’s ruling Georgian Dream party stated the possibility of returning the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as part of their campaign for the parliamentary elections.
• Moscow has not expressed support for reintegrating the Russian controlled regions into Georgia but alternatively for “normalizing” relations between Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia with the separatist territories as independent entities.

• Russia maintains a military presence in Abkhazia and controls the its military. Reintegration with Georgia would likely lead to Moscow losing this military presence in the South Caucasus. 

In the lead-up to Georgia’s October 26 parliamentary elections, Tbilisi’s ruling Georgian Dream has raised the possibility of returning land to the occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia through peaceful means in their public pronouncements (Civil.ge, September 16; see EDM, September 18). Occupied by Russian forces since 2008 following Moscow’s invasion of Georgia, the two regions have seen little engagement with the outside world. Yet, while Russia is distracted with its war in Ukraine, Moscow has less resources to dominate the South Caucasus than before. This was evident in the case of Karabakh and the ongoing tensions between Moscow and its long-time ally, Yerevan (see EDM, April 22, August 5). Although this possibility is seemingly unrealistic, broader geopolitical developments between Georgia, Russia, and the West indicate that some shifts in this arena might occur. 

The changes in the region’s geopolitics have influenced Russia’s relations with the separatist regions. In the case of Abkhazia, Moscow suspended social aid on September 1, which was confirmed by the separatist leaders in Sukhumi on September 3 (OC-Media, September 3). Given that Abkhazia has exclusively relied on Moscow for social and financial support, this development could be a significant blow to the region’s fragile economy. Russia’s decision follows recent mass protests in Abkhazia, where the separatist government vowed to adopt the “Apartment Law,” which was essentially meant to pave the way for foreigners, in most cases, Russians, to buy land and real estate property in Abkhazia (JAM-News, June 25; see EDM, July 31). 

In recent years, Tbilisi has pursued a different course of foreign policy, moving away from reliance on a single geopolitical partner—in this case, the collective West—and adopting a multi-vector approach. The present international environment is favorable for pursuing this kind of foreign policy given the emergence of new players such as China, Gulf Arab states, India, and traditional regional actors like Türkiye and Iran, all vying for influence in the South Caucasus through transport corridors and infrastructure projects in Georgia (see EDM, September 18, 2023, March 5, June 6). 

This changing landscape gives smaller countries such as Georgia more room to maneuver diplomatically, allowing them to strengthen their position without overly relying on any one major power. Georgia’s behavior now revolves around building relationships with various partners, signaling a shift toward a more equidistant foreign policy rather than kowtowing to Russia’s domination over the country.

The real challenge for Georgia, however, is maintaining a strong connection with the United States and its Western allies while simultaneously fostering stable relations with neighboring countries, even if these relations must include Russia. The balancing act is both difficult and extremely hard to maintain. Given that the West does not want to see Georgia fall under Russia’s or any other power’s exclusive influence, Washington and Brussels could support Tbilisi’s nascent multi-vector policy (Civil.ge, September 9).

The shift in Georgia’s foreign policy is also supported by rumors that if Georgian Dream secures victory in the upcoming parliamentary elections, discussions may begin about removing Georgia’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aspirations from the country’s constitution, signaling another step toward a thaw in relations with Russia and a move away from the West (Eurasianet, July 24).

This is occurring amid the deterioration of Georgia’s ties with the West due to the adoption of the so-called “foreign agent” law (see EDM, April 9, 24, May 1, 13; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 24). Additionally, recent US sanctions have strained relations, and Tbilisi has hinted that it may reconsider its core partnership with Washington due to these steps (see EDM, July 11; 1TV.ge, August 27; US State Department; US Treasury Department, September 16). While tensions may ease somewhat following the elections, Georgia’s relations with the United States and the European Union are expected to remain uneasy, possibly evolving into a more transactional relationship.

As Georgia’s foreign policy changes, Russia looks to improve its ties with Tbilisi (Ekho Kavkaza, June 12). This is likely in part due to Russia’s deteriorating relations with the collective West because of its war in Ukraine and because Russia wants to maintain its control and influence over the post-Soviet space. Georgia’s rhetoric about regaining control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia stirs tensions and fears in those territories, where many think the two regions might become bargaining chips in broader geopolitical negotiations, especially with Russia, who sees these territories as a means to maintain control over Georgia (see EDM, June 11, 17).

There have also been changes in how Russia approaches its relations with Georgia and neighboring Azerbaijan. The Middle Corridor, a trade route linking Azerbaijan and Georgia to Central Asia, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, has gained importance since 2022 and is attracting Russia’s attention (see EDM, April 19, 2022). The Middle Corridor provides these countries an alternative to using the Northern Corridor, which traverses through Russia and Belarus and has classically been the main route of railway trade between China and the European Union. Due to Russia’s war against Ukraine, many countries in the region seek new routes to the West to avoid sanctions against Russia (see China Brief, June 21). The shift in focus in Central Asia and the Caucasus to alternative transport routes outside of Russia influences Moscow’s broader repositioning in the South Caucasus. Moscow’s influence is not rapidly receding, but the country is certain to experience difficulties as developments are made in these projects.

Although these broader and local geopolitical developments might be favorable for some progress in Georgia’s quest to reintegrate the occupied territories, it is uncertain how far Russia is willing to go regarding Georgia’s occupied regions. Moscow has already implied that reintegration of the separatist regions with Georgia is not an option, but it is ready to help Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia “normalize” relations if the parties were interested  (Civil.ge, September 29). Historically, Moscow has been against Georgia’s reintegration of territories, as Abkhazia and South Ossetia have allowed Russia to project its military influence beyond the Caucasus range through Russia’s military bases in two regions (Babel.ua, August 13). More realistically, Russia may be willing to push to keep Georgia closer through limited cooperation between Tbilisi and the separatist regions to keep its ties alive as long as possible.