PRC-Manufactured Weapons Abound Among African Militant Groups

Executive Summary:

• Weapons manufactured in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are increasingly falling into the hands of militant groups across Africa, with key contributors being state-owned defense contractors like Norinco. However, it is unclear how the weapons reach these groups.
• Militant groups such as Mali-based JNIM and the Democratic Republic of Congo’s M23 are employing PRC-manufactured arms in their operations, with evidence suggesting the potential involvement of Chinese criminal syndicates and corruption within PRC defense firms and African militaries.
• Extensive access to PRC-manufactured weapons by countries like Rwanda and Uganda, both of which support rebel groups, underscores the growing influence of PRC defense contractors in Africa, potentially contributing to regional conflicts.
• Beijing’s experience in Myanmar, where it supports both the government and rebel groups, may offer insights into its role in African conflicts, raising concerns about how escalating conflicts could strain Beijing’s partnerships and jeopardize its regional investments.

Weapons manufactured in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are increasingly falling into the hands of militant groups across Africa as PRC defense contractors expand their influence in the region. Many African governments have signed arms deals with Beijing, with the PRC becoming the continent’s leading supplier of weapons this year. It is unclear how weapons are falling into the hands of militants, though corruption is likely playing a part in the influx of PRC-manufactured arms on the continent. Corruption has been rampant in recent years within the PRC’s military-industrial complex, reaching right to the top of the system. At the same time, the likelihood of corrupt activities by PRC arms companies in Africa—that operate far from regulatory oversight by Beijing—is high, as is the involvement of Chinese criminal groups that are also active in the region.

In late September, the Mali-based, al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) continued to escalate its presence in Africa’s Sahel region, executing attacks that claimed over 70 lives in Bamako (Xinhua, September 18; September 20). JNIM has access to large numbers of PRC-manufactured weapons. This is one of several instances of non-state actors having access to substantial quantities of PRC military equipment—Myanmar constitutes another prominent case.

Mali-based Terrorist Group Maintains Extensive Arsenal of PRC Weapons

Propaganda videos and footage released by the Malian military reveal substantial stockpiles of weapons produced by PRC state-owned defense contractor Norinco (中国兵器工业集团; 北方工业), including a Type 80 machine gun, a Type 81-1 assault rifle, and at least two Type 69 rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers equipped with high-explosive anti-tank projectiles (Militant Wire, September 22). While the images also display weapons from other countries such as Russia, Romania, and older Soviet Union models, most of the arms pictured are of PRC origin.

Norinco has increasingly expanded its role in supplying militaries throughout the Sahel, particularly in Mali. A video released last summer shows Malian special forces outfitted with a broad array of PRC-manufactured weapons and equipment, including Norinco-produced CS/VP11 Lynx all-terrain vehicles equipped with W85 anti-aircraft machine guns, as well as JS 9mm submachine guns produced by Jianshe Industries (云南建设工业集团) (BiliBili, August 27, 2023). Last month, during the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing, Mali secured another contract with Norinco to provide additional weapons to its military (Embassy of the PRC in India, September 2; Military Africa, September 3).

In recent years, JNIM has funded much of its expansion by running a protection racket associated with the illicit harvesting and trade of southern Malian rosewood, a highly valued tropical hardwood prized for its distinctive color and durability (ISS Africa, June 19). In 2018, Malian whistleblower Amadou Traoré exposed the extensive deforestation and criminal activities tied to Mali’s rosewood trade, prompting several international investigations (Corruption Anonymous, September 13, 2023). Reports suggest that most of Mali’s exported rosewood ends up in the PRC, with PRC criminal syndicates operating in Mali and Senegal playing essential roles in the trade (South China Morning Post, May 22, 2022; PPLAAF, September 11, 2023). In the PRC, the trade of illegally exported Malian wood is so widespread that several online retailers sell it on Aicaigu (爱采购), a business-to-business platform operated by PRC tech giant Baidu (Aicaigou, October 10). However, the origin of JNIM’s vast cache of PRC-manufactured weapons and the group’s relationship with PRC criminal syndicates remains unclear. Although villagers in southern Mali have reported that local PRC crime syndicates pay protection money to JNIM, these reports remain unsubstantiated (ECOWAS, November 2023). Such factors call for further investigation.

PRC Defense Contractors Benefit From Worsening Conflict in the Eastern DRC

In the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the March 23 Movement (M23), predominantly composed of Tutsi rebel forces, continues to devastate the region using PRC-manufactured weapons, including an assault on the provincial capital of Goma and the plundering of vast quantities of minerals (United Nations, February 20; Africa Defense Forum, March 5). Photos of seized M23 weapons and equipment released by the Congolese military underscore the PRC origin of these extensive supplies, particularly from Norinco and Xinxing (中国新兴进出口有限责任公司), a firm specializing in military uniforms and tactical gear. In an interview with a local news outlet, Congolese-Belgian defense analyst Jean-Jacques Wondo Omanyundu noted, “the M23 weapons seized by the FARDC [the Congolese military] are almost all Chinese-made” (China Global South Project, July 12, 2022).

A recent UN Security Council report concludes that M23 receives substantial financial and material support from neighboring Rwanda and Uganda, both of which have acquired significant quantities of PRC-manufactured weapons (United Nations; ReliefWeb, June 4). In recent years, Rwanda has made large purchases of artillery systems and other arms produced by Norinco and other firms. A Shanghai-based firm called Deekon Group even uses images of the Rwandan military uniforms it produces for promotional purposes on its website (Deekon Group, October 8). The PRC and Rwanda also maintain close military and defense ties, with Beijing deploying an official defense attaché to Rwanda earlier this year (Embassy of the PRC in Rwanda, February 21). Uganda’s military, meanwhile, has purchased arms from Norinco and another Chinese firm, Poly Technologies (保利科技有限公司; 保利科技), according to a 2021 investigation by a Ugandan journalist (The Independent [Uganda], December 19, 2021). In November last year, Norinco partnered with the Ugandan military to establish a research center focused on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the country (MODVA, November 29, 2023). The extensive access of Rwanda and Uganda to PRC-manufactured weapons, along with their support for the M23 movement, highlight the likely source of the rebel group’s large PRC-made arsenal.

To counter the escalating threat from M23, the DRC military has also turned to the PRC defense industry, purchasing its first batch of three CH-4 attack drone systems from China Aerospace and Technology Corporation (CASC; 中国航天) last year (Africa Intelligence, May 22, 2023). Later that year, Norinco became embroiled in controversy in the DRC when its subsidiary, Norin Mining, attempted to acquire cobalt and copper mines outside Lubumbashi, in the Katanga province, south of the M23-led insurgency in North Kivu province. The DRC state-owned mining conglomerate, Gécamines, moved to block the sale, claiming it had not been properly informed of the decision (Africa Confidential, October 11). Although Lubumbashi is approximately 900 miles south of M23-controlled territory in North Kivu, the group conducted extensive attacks in the city during its 2014 offensive (BBC, January 7, 2014).

Corruption at Defense Contractors and the Myanmar Example Raise Further Questions

The PRC’s defense contractors are increasingly flocking to African markets, with the PRC surpassing Russia as the continent’s largest weapons supplier this year (ADF, July 23). Norinco, which manufactures a wide range of weapons from handguns to tanks, has been at the forefront of this expansion, operating offices in over 70 countries. Its latest expansion into Dakar, Senegal, signals growth intentions in the West African market (Norinco, October 8; SCMP, August 21, 2023). According to its website, Norinco controls mining sites across Africa (including gold, cobalt, and palladium mines), is deeply involved in the regional copper trade, and plans further expansion (Norinco, October 8). Although there is insufficient evidence directly linking these companies to the militant groups who are using their weapons, recent developments within the PRC shed more light on these companies’ practices.

Beijing has taken punitive actions against at least two senior Norinco executives since 2021 in response to corruption charges. In October 2021, PRC authorities charged former Norinco Chairman Yin Jiaxu (尹家绪) with bribery and seeking illegal profits for relatives and friends (People’s Daily, October 25, 2021). According to an official readout, Yin received “huge sums” of money and gifts, and held top positions at the company from 2002 until his 2018 retirement (Global Times, April 4, 2021; CCDI, September 30, 2021). Last December, authorities removed then-Norinco Chairman Liu Shiquan (刘石泉) from the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference amid an anti-corruption investigation into the defense and aerospace sector (China Brief, February 2; Global Times, March 3). Liu had previously held senior roles at the state-owned China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC; 中国航天科工).

These high-level disciplinary actions highlight the prominence of corruption within some of the PRC’s top defense contracting firms. Given the distance between operations in African countries and oversight by Beijing authorities, corrupt backchannels may be funneling the transfer of PRC-manufactured weapons to African militant groups for personal gain. Coupled with the involvement of Chinese criminal elements in Africa and the potential for internal corruption within the militaries of affected nations, this situation merits further investigation as a possible source of these weapons (OCCRP, May 25, 2022; Africa Report, August 12; May 14).

The PRC’s experience in Myanmar may offer insights into this involvement in internal African conflicts, such as those in Mali and the DRC. For decades, Beijing has supported Myanmar’s ruling government while simultaneously providing material and financial backing to various armed resistance groups (China Brief, March 17, 2023; MLM, July 31; South China Morning Post, August 25). Both JNIM in Mali and M23 in the DRC hold significant value for the PRC due to their access to rare and high-value resources. It is plausible that Beijing may unofficially support one or both groups to secure its continued resource access. However, if such claims are substantiated, they could damage the PRC’s reputation in Africa. Moreover, as seen in Myanmar, further conflict escalation could endanger Chinese investments and those of other nations. Moreover, JNIM’s prolonged conflict with Wagner mercenaries fighting for the Malian junta—coupled with the group’s use of PRC-manufactured weaponry—may strain the PRC’s “no limits” partnership with Moscow, particularly regarding African matters (Xinhua, January 2, 2021).

Conclusion

The expanding presence of PRC defense contractors in Africa and the increasing use of PRC-manufactured weapons by militant groups warrant deeper investigation. However, such inquiries will likely prove challenging due to the frequently opaque nature of business dealings in these regions. What remains clear is that the growing prevalence of PRC-manufactured weapons among powerful militant groups in Africa has considerable implications as Beijing moves to dominate the African arms market. These implications include regional security, as non-state actors gain further access to advanced PRC weaponry and equipment, and geo-strategic concerns, as resource-based conflicts can potentially disrupt global supply chains. Given current trends, these threats will likely intensify as PRC defense contractors seek greater access to the continent’s arms markets.