PRC Sees Opportunities in US Election Results

Executive Summary:

• Beijing has been preparing for a Trump presidency since at least the spring, assessing potential cabinet picks and their views on the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
• Since November 5, the PRC has hyped areas in which the United States might want to cooperate, including those in which Beijing has leverage.
• Many see opportunities stemming from Trump’s likely approach to governing, his isolationist outlook, and his proximity to Elon Musk and other similar figures.
• Beijing’s calls for stability in the relationship are not made in good faith, as evidenced by efforts in state media and through covert interference and disinformation campaigns to sow confusion and distrust among the US electorate.

On November 7, the day after Donald Trump was elected President of the United States for the second time, Xi Jinping became one of the first world leaders to offer his congratulations (MFA, November 7). The official announcement of the call from the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was brief, but clearly telegraphed the priorities Xi wished to communicate.

This MFA statement and other analyses suggest the PRC will seek to push areas of cooperation where it sees opportunities to advance its objectives, though entreaties to cooperate do not imply that Beijing is willing to make many concessions. Sources also speculate on how personalities in the new administration might be handled to Beijing’s advantage or to mitigate damages.

PRC Touts Cooperation

Cooperation is the watchword, though Xi clearly hopes that this can be on his own terms. The readout begins by stating that “Xi Jinping noted, history shows us that when China and the United States cooperate, both benefit, and when they fight, both are harmed (历史昭示我们，中美合则两利、斗则俱伤).” Xi went on to suggest that bilateral relations developing along a stable, healthy, and sustainable path is not just in the interest of not both countries but is also “the expectation of the international community (国际社会期待),” before hoping that they set off on a path of the two countries “getting along correctly (正确相处)” in this new era (MFA, November 7). It is debatable how much one should read into such official announcements, as it is unclear how closely they reflect the actual conversation that took place (the PRC readout does not disclose anything that Trump said during the call). However, the contents of this readout convey a sense of hauteur on Xi’s part—he does not simply suggest a desire to cooperate but attempts to imply some external pressure through appealing to the views of the rest of the world and warning that the United States will also suffer from any stronger actions the incoming Trump administration might take.

This mix of welcoming and warning is evident in other official coverage of Trump’s victory. The People’s Daily website ran with a piece on the “Flying Tigers”—a World War II air force group composed of US personnel that fought in the China theater against the Japanese and is a common symbol of US-China cooperation in official media (People’s Daily, November 6). A Global Times article from November 7 that borrows the “getting along correctly (正确相处)” phrase for its headline also suggests areas of cooperation. It cites panda diplomacy and Tesla in particular, alongside other more general areas (Global Times, November 7). The piece follows up with some more monitory words, noting that the United States “must realize, China also has a right to development (美方需要认识到，中国也有发展的权利).” Meanwhile, a Xinhua commentary on November 8 titled “Grasping the correct course for the development of China-US relations (把握中美关系发展的正确航向)” argues that “the idea of changing each other is impractical, and the consequences of conflict and confrontation are more than anyone can bear (中美两个大国不能不打交道，改变对方的想法不切实际，冲突对抗的后果更是谁都不能承受). While it claims that the PRC’s strategic intent is “bright and open (光明磊落),” it makes clear that its priority is to promote the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation through Chinese-style modernization, which is unlikely a project in which the incoming administration desires to be a participant. The commentary even has some advice for the next Trump team: “A great power should act like a great power and have the breadth of mind and commitment of a great power (大国要有大国的样子，要有大国的胸怀和担当)” (Xinhua, November 8).

The irony of this generally warmer approach is its stark contrast with much of the official coverage of the US elections up until the announcement of Trump’s victory. A Xinhua series titled “US Election Handbook (美国大选手记)” included an article with the headline “Watching American Public Opinion Tear Apart in Key Swing States (在关键摇摆州看美国民意撕裂)” that focused on divisions in the country and the general lack of faith in US democracy (Xinhua, October 30). Another piece in the same series focused on the rise of betting markets during the campaign and criticized the monetization of the US political system. Titled “Election reduced to a ‘game of chance’ (总统选举沦为 ‘赌博游戏’), it gleefully announced that the election has become a ‘casino’ and ‘American-style democracy’ has ‘risen’ to a new level (大选变‘赌场’，‘美式民主’又‘上升’到新的层次)” (Xinhua, November 4). Months of disinformation campaigns and media coverage seeking to undermine political stability in the United States undercuts the past week’s messaging from the same outlets and senior officials on the importance of maintaining stability.

Trump, Musk, and Isolationism Provide Opportunities

The PRC government itself avoided expressing a preference for either presidential candidate. This has been a fairly common view within the PRC, leading to the resurgence of a phrase from the Qing dynasty classic Dream of the Red Chamber, “All crows under heaven are the same black (天下乌鸦一般黑，岂有两样的),” to indicate ambivalence between the two (Netease, August 10; 163.com, October 25).

There are indications that Beijing sees opportunities in a Trump victory. Reports of attempted online election interference by PRC actors suggest that, even if the principal aim was to sow confusion, a lot of disinformation efforts pushed pro-Trump narratives, including fake accounts posing as Trump supporters (CAA, August; Graphika, September 3; Microsoft Threat Intelligence, September 17).

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) feels better prepared for a second Trump administration. An article in the South China Morning Post (SCMP) said that policy strategy and contingency planning began this spring, quoting anonymous sources involved in the research. A state-affiliated researcher also told the reporters that the country’s top international relations think tanks have all submitted papers on prospective cabinet members and their individual views of the PRC (SCMP, November 7).

Many PRC analysts see advantages in Trump personally occupying the White House. The incoming president is commonly referred to online as “Nation-builder Trump (川建国),” implying that a he helps the PRC to build its comprehensive national power (VOA, July 19). He is also widely viewed as a transactional figure who is open to making deals. An op-ed by Henry Huiyao Wang (王辉耀), who runs the united front-affiliated Center for China and Globalization (CCG) think tank, argues that a “Transactional Trump may well improve US-China ties” (CCG, November 9). Part of Wang’s calculus is that Trump will be obliged to cooperate with the PRC to enact certain parts of an isolationist agenda. These include negotiating a “Phase Two” trade deal, ending the ongoing wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, and maintaining the status quo over Taiwan. Wu Xinbo (吴心伯), a professor at Fudan University in Shanghai, to this list cooperation on drug control to this list (WeChat/Jiemian News, November 5). Others see Trump’s relative inexperience and unorthodox approach as working in the PRC’s favor. One scholar writes that “Trump’s amateurish approach will give global revisionist forces an excellent opportunity to showcase their skills” (CDT, November 6). Meanwhile, the stridently nationalist commentator Jin Canrong (金灿荣) believes that Trump “has no stamina (后面没有后劲),” and so will not be able to harm the PRC much in the medium-to-long-term (Renda Chongyang, November 2; Guancha, November 5).

The PRC believes it will be ready to capitalize if the new administration does pursue a more isolationist approach. An article by three prominent scholars in Foreign Affairs over the summer—apparently written at the request of the Party-state—argued that “America first” would mean that Washington holds “less credibility and leverage in coordinating with other countries” and notes that the former Trump administration did not build and lead a strong multilateral front to counter the PRC (Foreign Affairs, August 1; Sinocism, August 15). Similarly, an essay by Ding Xueliang (丁学良), a professor at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, suggests Trump could cut the number of US troops stationed in South Korea and Japan by half, which Trumps hinted at during his first term, cease upgrading and expanding air and naval bases in the Philippines, and decline to provide military assistance to South Pacific Islands. This could lead to a dramatic strategic rebalancing in the region in the PRC’s favor (CDT, November 6). A post by Hu Wei (胡伟), thought to be the same Hu Wei who was formerly a professor at the Shanghai Municipal Party School and Vice-Chairman of the Public Policy Research Centre of the Counsellor’s Office of the State Council, argues that Trump will cause the US strategy of outcompeting the PRC to run aground “(搁浅),” “create cracks (出现裂痕)” with allies, and cause its international leadership to decline. All of this, Hu believes, opens the door for the PRC to garner “greater international space (更大的国际空间)”(WeChat/Zhongxi Daxuetang , November 7; Sinification, November 8).

Elon Musk, who has been central to Trump’s reelection and is looking to have an outsize impact in the incoming government, is also noted by PRC experts. Officials are said to looking into the prominent role he played during the campaign, as well as his ties with the PRC (SCMP, November 7). Hu Wei also argues that Musk could be a “broker (掮客)” to “grease the wheels of US-China relations (润滑中美关系),” noting that he has publicly stated that Taiwan “is an integral part of China” (WeChat/Shanxi Daxuetang, November 7). Musk has also suggested Taiwan accept a level of PRC control similar to that of Hong Kong, and it is reported that he has not provided Starlink connectivity to Taiwan at Vladimir Putin’s request as a favor to Xi (Taiwan News, October 28; Wall Street Journal, October 25). Other business leaders in Trump’s circle are also seen as a source of moderation, potentially leading him to be more open to PRC investment in the United States (Sinification, November 8; CCG, November 9; Caixin, November 13).

Conclusion

Most PRC scholars and experts see tariffs, a potential resumption of a trade war, and further decoupling as highly likely. Some suggest a major crisis, a new cold war, or even all-out conflict as possibilities. This suggests the PRC will operate cautiously in the opening months of the new administration, shoring up its advantages and pursuing conciliatory strategies elsewhere in the world while exploring how to deal with the new Trump administration. This is already evident in attempts at friendlier overtures to regional powers such as India and Japan.

If the US Government does decide to pursue policies that start to realize the PRC’s worst fears, it is unclear how Beijing will respond, or indeed its capacity to do so. The triumphalist certainty that “the East is rising and the West is declining (东升西降),” which reached its peak in the COVID-19 pandemic, has given way in the last two years in the face of economic challenges at home. Xi Jinping might have opened his call with Trump with a call to learn the lessons of history but, as ever, it is unclear which lessons, and which history, really matter today.