Beijing Woos Washington While Advancing New International Order

Executive Summary:

• The PRC is tempering its criticisms of the United States and other powerful countries in the early part of the Trump administration in a seeming attempt to foster a stable external environment while it continues to enhance its national power.
• Official PRC media have mostly refused to criticize President Trump’s rhetoric regarding territorial expansion, in contrast to non-official media and other global coverage of the new president’s inaugural address.
• Beijing’s support of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as its frequently coercive and expansionist activities along its continental and maritime borders, belie rhetoric that it is a contributor to world peace.

Buried on page 16 of the January 21 edition of the People’s Daily under a story about an international textiles trade fair in Frankfurt, is the report on the inauguration of U.S. President Donald Trump (People’s Daily, January 21). While page 16 in that day’s edition is the first of two pages covering international news, it is not unusual for international events to appear closer to the front of the paper—not least when officials of the caliber of former politburo standing committee member and current vice president of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Han Zheng (韩正) are in attendance (MFA, January 21). For instance, page three of the same edition features an interview with Børge Brende, president and CEO of the World Economic Forum (WEF) (People’s Daily, January 21). By comparison, page two of the People’s Daily (overseas edition) on January 21, 2021, featured a column by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the incoming Biden Administration (People’s Daily, January 21, 2021).

The message seems clear, even if we cannot know the precise rationale behind it. Eschewing a story that led newspapers around the world that morning is a political signal that the CCP Central Committee no longer feels the need to accord the United States the same respect with which it has done so in the past. This follows from the themes that came out of the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference back in December 2023, which included a rising diplomatic focus on leadership of the Global South, Beijing’s enhanced conviction about its need to shape world events, and Xi’s turn away from the aggressive “wolf warrior” diplomacy that had characterized much of his first decade in power (Xinhua, December 28, 2023; China Brief, April 12, 2024). These themes are a useful lens through which to interpret the PRC’s approach to the new Trump administration. Underlying them all is an assessment that the United States will feature less prominently in the emerging multipolar and economically globalized world for which Beijing actively advocates. This assessment currently may be more aspirational than material, but the Party nevertheless sees it as the general trend of the times.

The PRC’s apparent confidence in both the decline of the United States and its own ability to shape the international environment has been on full display in recent weeks. In the People’s Daily coverage of Trump’s speech, the article’s main point emphasizes that the United States faces a “crisis of confidence (信任危机)” and quotes the President as saying that U.S. society is “almost beyond redemption (几乎无可救药)” (People’s Daily, January 21). According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs readout of his call with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Wang Yi (王毅) used unusually assertive language, telling his counterpart that he hopes Rubio will behave himself (“好自为之”), using an idiomatic phrase that is both a warning and an exhortation. Meanwhile, the interview with WEF president Brende published the same day has the former Norwegian politician repeat propaganda lines about the PRC’s ideas and actions “helping to rebuild trust in the world … [and] contribute to the promotion of world peace (帮助世界重建信任 … 有助于促进世界和平) (People’s Daily, January 21). More recently, the paper published a discussion by four prominent experts on international relations under the title “China has Always Been a Staunch Defender of the International Order (中国始终是国际秩序的坚定维护者).” In it, the experts talk about the ways in which the PRC approaches multilateral institutions and how the country can lead in issues of global governance. As one of the scholars concludes, “China maintains the current international order and also shapes the future international order (中国维护现行国际秩序，也是塑造未来国际秩序)” (People’s Daily, January 27).

Beijing Tones Down Criticism of United States

PRC framings of the international order invariably center on the principles set out in the United Nations Charter. The most prominent of these, which the PRC vociferously defends, is the provision in Article Two that the UN is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members. Indeed, in the discussion published in the People’s Daily, the scholar Wu Hao (吴浩) notes that this is “the most basic and core principle of contemporary international relations (是基于主权平等这一当代国际关系最基本、最核心的原则)” (People’s Daily, January 27). Officials are frequently quick to decry Western powers who seemingly abuse this principle (Xinhua, May 31, 2020; PRC Embassy to the United States, September 12, 2024).

It is therefore strange that the PRC’s official media apparatus has been unusually quiet on Trump’s remarks in his inaugural address that the United States “will once again consider itself a growing nation—one that … expands our territory” (White House, January 20). The Xinhua coverage gives full play to other themes in the speech, and relegates discussion of Trump’s expansionist rhetoric to the article’s shortest paragraph buried in the middle (Xinhua, January 21). Meanwhile, a short summary of the speech provided by the Global Times bears no mention at all of this rhetoric, and a separate Xinhua piece simply adds a sentence at the bottom of the article quoting Trump as saying, “Greenland is a beautiful place. We need it for international security (格陵兰岛是个美丽的地方。我们需要它来维护国际安全)” (Global Times, January 21; Xinhua, January 21). The topic was given similarly short shrift by Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning, who only addressed it in the last question of a press conference held on January 22, noting only that the PRC had always respected Panama’s sovereignty over the Panama Canal and refusing to respond directly to a question about Trump’s comments (MFA, January 22).

This contrasts with non-official media channels (and with much of the coverage both within the United States and across the rest of the world). One online essay published by a think tank describes Trump’s intentions as “radical (激进)” and “unapologetic (毫不避讳)” (Kunlunce, January 21). Other articles carry headlines that are variations on “Trump’s Inaugural Address: Expand U.S. Territory (特朗普发表就职演讲: 将扩张美国领土)” (Sina News, January 21; 163, January 21). Trump’s rhetoric even seems to have emboldened some commentators. One account that posts military-related media, called “Crazy-Warfare Show (军武次位面),” had an article published on nationalist media website Guancha, which concludes by suggesting that if the United States can take over North America, perhaps China should “return to the ‘Three Xuan and Six Wei’ (凭什么中国不能重回三宣六慰).” This is a reference to a period during the Ming Dynasty when senior officials were sent to southeast Asian countries to set up administrative systems there (Guancha, January 23). This non-official coverage is more reflective of official coverage in the runup to the inauguration. In late December and early January, both the People’s Daily and Xinhua carried articles criticizing Trump’s expansionist plans (People’s Daily, December 27, 2024; Xinhua, January 9). The one exception found by this author following the inauguration is a piece published on January 21 in Xinhua’s weekly Globe (全球) magazine. This article discusses Trump’s claims directly, describing them as “shocking statements (雷人言论)” that constituted his “his first time raising the possibility of using military means to implement territorial aims (这是他第一次提到动用军事手段以实现领土目标的可能性),” and could “upend modern thinking on international relations (颠覆现代国际关系思想)” (Xinhua, January 21).

PRC Sovereignty Insouciance

The muted official reaction to Trump’s rhetoric in his inaugural address has two implications. One conforms with the dialing down of “wolf warrior” rhetoric signaled at the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference and a desire to reduce friction with powerful and potentially hostile governments since the latter half of 2024. This latter development recently has been seen in the smoothing of relations with India, as evidenced in the recent six-point border consensus and the resumption of international flights (FMPRC, December 18, 2024; MFA, January 27; Zaobao, January 27). It is also evidenced in relations with Japan, with moves toward relaxing seafood imports and walking back concerns about contaminated sea water, and a new agreement on people-to-people exchanges (AP News, September 20, 2024; CGTN, December 25, 2024; MFA, January 23). This softer tone may stem from a desire to stabilize the PRC’s international environment amid economic challenges at home, by signaling openness to foreign investment and ensuring market access to PRC exports. A separate reason could be a desire to be seen as a responsible and engaged international player that has the capacity to shape the international order.

The second implication is that there is a growing discomfort in Beijing with its traditional stance on issues of territorial sovereignty. While the concept of sovereignty has provided a useful tool in the past, its interpretation has always had a degree of flexibility since it was adopted from the West in the Qing dynasty. [1] This flexibility is being pushed to breaking point, most visibly in Beijing’s ongoing support for Russia’s war in Ukraine, which clearly violates the principles of the UN Charter that the PRC claims to cherish (Eurasia Daily Monitor, September 10, 2024). A closer look at the PRC’s own borders suggests that its desire to avoid discussion of Trump’s rhetoric on territorial expansion may also stem from a preference to avoid acknowledging its own recent history of expansionism.

A cursory look at the PRC’s borders suggests that it has, whether through coercion or other means, acquired territory from the majority of its neighbors. In terms of its land borders—which it shares with 14 other countries—the PRC in recent years has had border disputes with neighbors including at least India, Bhutan, Kyrgyzstan, and Nepal (The Hindu, August 30, 2023; China Brief, February 2, 2024; Jamestown, April 12, 2024; The New York Times, October 12, 2024; USIP, October 31, 2024). It has also heavily built up infrastructure on its side of the border with most of these countries, as well as with Russia and Tajikistan (Wall Street Journal, July 3, 2024; Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 18, 2024). In the maritime domain, Beijing continues to press its aggressive claims throughout the South and East China Seas. All of its territorial assertions are supported by Party-state-sponsored historical research, which do not reflect international law (U.S. State Department, December 5, 2014). These assertions have expanded over the years, as Beijing has become better able to enforce its claims. A high point came last summer in Beijing’s approach to the Philippines, with actions that were interpreted by some as an act of war and nearly triggered the Philippines’ mutual defense treaty with the United States (China Brief, June 21, 2024). Though tensions in the South China Seas have reduced somewhat in the last several months, Beijing continues to perform coercive actions in the region (Reuters, January 25).

Conclusion

In the scholarly discussion by published by the People’s Daily this week, one international relations expert concluded by saying that “it is essential to continuously enhance comprehensive national power, consolidate capabilities and foundations, continuously reap the dividends of Chinese-style modernization, and provide a solid material foundation for playing a greater role in global governance (陈东晓: … 要持续增强综合国力，夯实能力和基础，不断释放中国式现代化的红利，为在全球治理中发挥更大作用提供坚实的物质基础)” (People’s Daily, January 27). What this entails in practice may require different approaches with different actors at different times. Nevertheless, this overriding ambition is a useful framework in which to analyze Beijing’s actions and can explain apparent inconsistencies in its overtures to “global south” countries, the West, Russia, or its immediate neighbors. In this way, Beijing is adhering to the priorities set out at the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference; and this is unlikely to change soon.

Notes

[1] For more on this history, see Carrai, Maria Adele. Sovereignty in China: A Genealogy of a Concept since 1840. Cambridge University Press; 2019.