Russia Prepares for 80th Anniversary of the End of World War Two

Executive Summary:

• Russia is planning extensive events for the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II (WWII), using historical memory as a tool to legitimize its Ukraine invasion.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin declared 2025 the “Year of the Defender of the Fatherland,” and propaganda lessons, military-themed competitions, and Cossack institutionalization aim to instill a narrative of Russian resilience.
• The Kremlin’s efforts to equate Soviet victories with current military operations serve to justify its ongoing aggression. Russia is fostering a militarized identity while potentially reframing future peace agreements as extensions of past triumphs.

It is no secret that Russia’s victory in World War Two (WWII), deemed in Russia and some former Soviet republics as the Great Patriotic War, is a source of pride and a unifying spectacle for ordinary citizens. This has featured heavily in the Kremlin’s attempted legitimization of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine (The Moscow Times, May 8, 2023; Kremlin.ru, January 15). Therefore, it is no surprise that the Kremlin is planning even more elaborate commemoration plans than the usual annual May 9 Victory Day events to raise the prominence of what will be for the 80th anniversary of the end of WWII (see EDM, January 21). While few veterans of the war are still alive, the Kremlin is keen to ensure that the spirit of Victory Day continues. As a result, a number of peripheral events and projects reinforce the Kremlin’s discourses related to the Great Patriotic War. For example, the Kremlin’s “Volunteers of Victory” (volontyory pobedy; Волонтеры Победы) project has been running since 2015 as a means of uniting “hundreds of thousands of volunteers who preserve historical memory in Russia and abroad” (RIA Novosti, January 23; Volunteers of Victory, accessed February 3). Similarly, the “grandchildren of victory” (Vnuky pobedy; Внуки Победы) project in Kaliningrad will be celebrating the East Prussian offensive in April to reinforce the importance of young people knowing their history and honoring it, according to the Minister of Youth Policy of the Kaliningrad Region, Anna Musevich (NIA-Kaliningrad, January 31). The marking of one hundred days until the solemn anniversary occurred on January 29, which saw a renewed emphasis on preparations (RIA Novosti, January 23; Izvestiya, January 29). 

In his New Year’s Eve speech, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared 2025 to be the year of the defender of the Fatherland, and that was the theme of the new propaganda lesson “Conversations about important things” on January 27 (Kremlin.ru, December 31, 2024). The lesson featured a video of a veteran of WWII, Konstantin Sergeevich Fedotov, speaking to a participant in the so-called Special Military Operation, Nikolai Andreevich Sokolov (Uchitel’skaia Gazeta, January 24). The point of this lesson is to demonstrate how they believe the two wars are linked in such a way that contributes to a story of Russian history as an endless struggle against foreigners intent on ruining the country (Institute for the Study of Childhood, Family, and Education, January 27). Following through on his declaration, Putin signed a decree on January 17 formalizing the status of 2025 as the “year of the defender of the Fatherland” to “preserve historical memory, commemorate the 80th anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War … express gratitude to veterans, and acknowledge the heroic deeds of the participants in the special military operation” (Kremlin.ru, January 16, 17).

Social events pioneered by the Kremlin in the name of the great victory are the “Roads of Victory” (Dorogi Pobedy; Дороги Победы) program, which will take some estimated 30,000 schoolchildren to 800 “places of military glory” (TASS, January 30). Similarly, the “dictation of victory,” an “international historical writing competition on the theme of Great Patriotic War events,” is planned for April this year at regional sites and online. There have been no announcements yet, however, about whether the competition will also be taking place abroad, as it has in the past. The organizers hope, at a minimum, to reach the same level of participation as in 2024, in which more than 2 million people took part at 30 thousand sites, according to the chairman of the Russian Historical Society (Victory Dictation; RIA Novosti, January 31). Likewise, the “We are the heirs of victory! We remember, we are proud” (My nasledniki pobedy! Pomnim, gordimcya; Мы наследники Победы! Помним, гордимся) campaign will feature free events, including exhibitions of drawings by children from the 1940s, the post-war period, and the twenty-first century, lectures, and other educational activities (RIA Novosti Sotsial’nyi navigator, January 29). Events are currently being planned in fourteen cities, mostly located in the west of the country, including in Tver, Smolensk, and Ryazan, and culminating in Moscow on May 9. Changing weekly, the events will begin on the first Monday in February (RIA Novosti Sotsial’nyi navigator, January 29). Such events both bring history to life for those involved and enliven the sense of connection between the modern day and the past, providing a clear rationale for militarism in areas such as the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Against this background of militarism and the Nuremberg-like worshipping of the nation, the institutionalization of the Cossacks provides a quotidian example of enduring attempts to forge the impression of continuity with the past. For example, a meeting between chief Ataman of the All-Russian Cossack Society (VsKO), Valery Kuznetsov, and the governor of the Vologda Oblast, Grigory Filimanov, sought to establish the Cossacks in the region (VsKO, January 31). During the meeting, Kuznetsov highlighted the involvement of forty-three thousand Cossacks, including those from Vologda Oblast, in the so-called “special military operation” against Ukraine (VsKO, January 31). Geographically, the Vologda region is of great importance as the Kremlin attempts to create a Cossack society in northwest Russia (see EDM, January 25). Vologda was one of the first to adopt a regional law, “On the Development of Russian Cossacks in the Vologda region (5488-OZ),” dated December 13, 2023 (Pravo.gov.ru, December 13, 2023). This will be important for Kuznetsov’s and Filimanov’s stated intent to create structures through which young people can provide service to the Russian state (VsKO, January 31). Moreover, the Cossacks will be present in the May 9 celebrations, where the Great Don, Kuban, and Terek Cossack voiskas (войски) will participate in the parade on Red Square (Kazachestvo.ru, November 15, 2024).

Factors such as those examined above will distinguish this year’s 80th Victory Day in Russia from those in the past as unprecedented effort is dedicated to bringing together both the heroes of the Soviet Union and the participants of the current invasion of Ukraine. The morality of the two wars is completely inverted, while the daily performance of propaganda narratives becomes a core feature of the current Russian system. Against the backdrop of hopes to negotiate an end to Russia’s war against Ukraine that have accompanied the early days of the new Donald Trump Administration in the United States, it remains to be seen whether the celebration will create a significant impact on bringing the current fighting to an end (see EDM, January 14). After all, the possibility remains of the Kremlin propagandizing any peace agreements by reframing them as a continuation of Russia’s victories in the war that ended eighty years ago.