Overthrow of Syria’s Assad Echoes Across Post-Soviet Space, Worrying Moscow

Executive Summary:

•  Russian military losses typically have affected Russia and its neighbors at home even more than Russian victories. Moscow is now worried that the ouster of Bashar al-Assad will influence the post-Soviet space and Muslim regions in Russia.
• To reduce these dangers, the Kremlin is playing down the fact that what has happened in Syria is a Russian loss as part of a broader effort to counter the potentially explosive impact of Syrian events on the post-Soviet space.
• The fall of Assad has had a significant impact on the countries of the South Caucasus despite the Kremlin downplaying efforts. It is beginning to affect both Central Asia and Muslim regions in the Russian Federation, but Moscow has not found effective ways to counter developments.

The effects of the overthrow of the Kremlin’s Syrian client Bashar al-Assad on Russian influence in the Middle East and Africa has become a hot topic of conversation abroad. So far, relatively little attention has been given to what is likely to prove to be an even more important result of his fall: how this loss will impact Russia itself, especially in its Muslim regions, and on Russia’s neighbors, the former Soviet republics in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Russian analysts are focusing on that topic and have a good reason. Historically, Russian losses abroad have played a significant role in the political development of Russia, often leading to revolutionary outcomes. Russia’s loss to Japan in 1904 sparked the 1905 revolution, its looming defeat by Germany in World War I led to the Russian revolutions of 1917, and its retreat from Afghanistan at the end of the 1980s played an important role in causing the demise of the Soviet Union. Russian specialists have not forgotten these experiences, and so it is no surprise that they now feel compelled to focus closely on the impact of Assad’s demise inside Russia and across the former Soviet space and try to prevent Russia’s loss in Syria from having a similar destructive influence on Russia and her neighbors.

On January 27, the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences held a special meeting on “The Situation in Syria and Its Influence on the Post-Soviet Space” (Institute of Oriental Studies; MGIMO University, January 27; Kaspiiskii Vestnik, January 31). It attracted leading specialists not only from various Moscow research institutes but also scholars from the Muslim regions of the Russian Federation and the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Those taking part concluded that the demise of Assad was the result of “objective” causes, including how, as a result of developments in that country, the previously existing institutions that had ruled Syria during much of the 20th century had ceased to work over the last decade as a result of both the insurgency and the actions of the Assad regime itself (Kaspiiskii Vestnik, January 31). Some of the participants likely consider this conclusion to have lessons for Russia and its neighbors as well (cf., TASS, February 4).

“The main attention of the participants in the discussion,” the Caspian Courier (Kaspiiskii Vestnik; Каспийский Вестник) explains, “was devoted to the impact of Syrian events on the countries of the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and on Russian regions with predominately Muslim populations” (Kaspiiskii Vestnik, January 31).  These developments “in the short and medium term” may constitute “a circle of threats” to them beyond the negative consequences on Russia’s relations with countries in the Middle East and, more generally, on “the stability and security” of all concerned (Ibid). At the very least, participants suggested that “the rapid fall of Assad’s regime” will present “new challenges” and lead to speculation that regimes that look strong may quickly collapse if they prove incapable of responding to challenges (Ibid).  

The recent events in Syria have impacted the three countries of the South Caucasus particularly negatively, the meeting’s participants said (Kaspiiskii Vestnik, January 31). Armenia has had to deal with a flood of refugees. Georgia has been experiencing the increasing “political Islamization” of parts of its population. Azerbaijan has had to come up with a new balance in its relationship with Türkiye on the one hand and the threat of further Islamization on the other, as well as to calculate how to take advantage of the possibility that with the fall of Assad, Baku will be able to sell more oil (Sputnik Azarbaijan, February 5). According to the participants, “the role of the Near East in Caucasian processes has seriously grown in recent times” (Kaspiiskii Vestnik, January 31).

The effects of the fall of Assad on Central Asia and Muslim regions of the Russian Federation so far have been less than in the Caucasus but can be expected to grow, those taking part in this meeting suggested. According to the Caspian Courier report, they believe that “while in the South Caucasus, each country is developing its own response to the events in Syria, the countries of Central Asia are pursuing a similar or even coordinated policy on this issue” (Kaspiiskii Vestnik, January 31). This is a reflection of the more distant location of that region from Syria, low public interest in the events in the Middle East, and a widespread conviction that militants from Syria will find it difficult to move there. (For background on the reasons for that, see Terrorism Monitor, April 5, 2024.) Kazakhstan, however, is already proving the exception and, with the collapse of the Assad regime, has moved into a closer military alliance with Türkiye. This will affect Kazakh society at home and Astana’s relations with Moscow, which is a development Moscow has not yet decided how to respond to (Vremya i Den’gi, January 28). 

Unsurprisingly, the Caspian Courier did not report in detail discussions on the impact of the Syrian events on Muslim regions within the Russian Federation. Touching on that issue would be politically dangerous not only because of the current sensitivity of immigration issues but also because of the implication that Muslims in Russia may view the recent collapse of the Assad regime in Syria as indicative of how the Vladimir Putin regime might ultimately fall (Window on Eurasia, November 3, December 28, 2024, January 6). There have been hints, however, in other media outlets about how Syrian events are echoing in Muslim regions of the Russian Federation. Tatarstan, which has already taken in refugees from Syria, for example, may soon take more, and such arrivals likely will influence public and official opinion there, possibly in directions that Moscow will not welcome (Inkazan.ru, December 10, 2024).

Most immediately intriguing and certainly most worrisome to Moscow are signs that Chechen radicals who have been fighting in Syria may now return to their homeland and challenge Russian control. This is especially concerning given the anti-Russian attitudes of this group and of North Caucasians who have been living in Syria for decades (Riddle, January 31; Idel Realii, February 3). If such groups do return, they may find themselves at odds not only with the Kadyrov regime but also with another group of anti-Kadyrov Chechens, the secular and pro-Western ones now fighting alongside Ukrainian forces against Russian invaders but who also may return if conditions allow (Window on Eurasia, January 24).

Unless there is a reordering of the Middle East as a result of Western policies that might allow Russia to reclaim its influence in Damascus, Moscow’s loss there with the ouster of Assad is thus going to play an increasingly large role not only in the Middle East but also in Russia itself and its neighbors in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Understanding that and how it informs Kremlin thinking is thus critical for understanding the next steps to counter Russian moves.