New Security Arrangements Between Moscow and Minsk Cement Russia’s Influence (Part 1)

Executive Summary: 

• Russia and Belarus signed two security-related documents in December 2024 that deepen Belarus’s integration within Russia’s geopolitical influence and obligate the Belarusian leadership to participate in military conflicts alongside Russia, similar to the latter’s agreements with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
• The Treaty on Security Guarantees within the framework of the Union State locks in Russia’s control over Belarus’s foreign and defense policies, extending beyond the era of Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka.
• The Treaty significantly reduces Minsk’s strategic autonomy and sovereignty from Moscow by formally allowing for the deployment of Russian military bases and troops on Belarusian territory.

On December 6, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the Security Concept of the Union State and the Treaty on Security Guarantees within the framework of the Union State (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, December 6, 2024; Soyuz.by, December 17, 2024). When signing the papers, the two leaders emphasized the unprecedented level of “mutual trust and partnership” that Minsk and Moscow have achieved thanks to these documents (President of Belarus, December 6, 2024). Formally, the agreements are designed to counter external pressure and tensions created by the West and ensure the peaceful development of the two states (Kremlin.ru, December 6, 2024). Putin submitted the Treaty to the Russian parliament for ratification in early February (TASS; Russian State Duma, February 5).

The Security Concept assesses the complex international situation and defines in general terms joint measures to counter challenges and threats from the West and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The document contains a long list of claims and accusations against them from Minsk and Moscow (Soyuz.by, December 17, 2024).

One claim is that the United States and its allies portray Union State member states as enemies, leading to NATO’s expansion eastward and in the Arctic (Soyuz.by, December 17, 2024). According to this claim, NATO is enhancing its military presence and offensive capabilities near the Union State’s borders while lowering the threshold for using nuclear weapons and incorporating them into military planning. The concept claims that the “North Atlantic bloc” is preparing for operations in outer space and against critical information infrastructure (Soyuz.by, December 17, 2024). These actions heighten the risk of military clashes, including those involving nuclear powers and weapons of mass destruction, escalating into large-scale wars.

Second, the crisis in Ukraine, along with tensions in the South Caucasus, Black Sea, Baltic, and Arctic regions, is being used to justify perceived threats from NATO countries and increase military spending, benefiting the United States and its allies (Soyuz.by, December 17, 2024).

Third, the West and its special services continue to incite conflicts in areas of strategic interest to the Union State, especially in the post-Soviet space and the Arctic. They aim to “illegally alter constitutional orders, destabilize socio-political conditions, and weaken the unity of the Union State.” According to treaty signatories, Ukraine exemplifies the West’s efforts “to undermine the historical ties, traditions, and values of fraternal peoples, creating long-term instability in the Eurasian region” (Soyuz.by, December 17, 2024).

Finally, in Minsk and Moscow’s views, “a primary objective of the United States and other NATO countries is to create divisions among the states and peoples of Eurasia and to undermine the integration processes in the post-Soviet region” (Soyuz.by, December 17, 2024). The United States and its allies perceive the Union State as a significant threat to Western interests. Therefore, they aim to destabilize the Union State, achieve a strategic defeat against Russia, and “exert control over the member states’ territories, resources, and populations, depriving them of genuine sovereignty and independence” (Soyuz.by, December 17, 2024). The provisions of the concept will be implemented by adopting organizational, military, economic, technical, and other measures coordinated by Minsk and Moscow to ensure the security of the Union State (Soyuz.by, December 17, 2024).

The Treaty on Security Guarantees proclaims the integrity of the defense space of the Union State and enshrines the mutual obligation of the parties to support each other in cases of encroachment on their security or the Union State as a whole. Encroachment is understood as the creation or implementation of a threat to “the sovereignty, independence, and (or) constitutional order of the parties, the integrity and inviolability of the territory and the external border of the Union State” by third states and their associations, international organizations, terrorist and extremist entities, and groups (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 6, 2024).

The treaty operates with the general concepts of encroachment and the creation of a threat of aggression despite references to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations (the right to self-defense). This implies that military force by the Union State is acceptable even before the act of aggression itself is committed by a potential enemy, so long as a threat of aggression exists. Similar provisions are contained in the recently adopted Military Doctrine of Belarus, which states that it would consider itself in a “military-political crisis” in the case of escalated military threats (Ministry of Defense of Belarus, April 25, 2024).

According to Article 5 of the treaty, to prevent and repel aggression against Belarus and Russia, military and other facilities will be established on its territory as well as possible deployment of Russian military personnel. However, the document does not contain the list of specific types of these facilities, but most likely implies military bases. According to Russian legislation, military facilities include existing or planned to be built ranges, airfields, communication hubs, bases, warehouses, arsenals and other facilities used for the needs of national defense and state security, as well as immovable property located at positions of troops and military units, stationary command posts, military research organizations, blocks and separate buildings, structures and facilities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and bodies performing defense tasks. They also involve the creation of prohibited and other zones with special conditions of land use around them (Garant.ru, February 11, 2006; May 5, 2014). For instance, Russian joint military bases in self-proclaimed South Ossetia and Kyrgyzstan have the military facility status (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 7, 2010; September 20, 2012).

Finally, in the event of sanctions imposed by third countries against the Union State or its members, either party has the right to request support and joint countermeasures (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 6, 2024).

The document contains provisions similar to the terms of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 19, 2024). This is noteworthy given the recent military cooperation between these two countries in Russia’s war against Ukraine (see EDM, October 30, 2024). It is conceivable that such military cooperation may occur vis-a-vis the Belarus-Russia treaty, especially given the similarities in language between the two treaties. For example, the Russia-DPRK treaty outlines that, in the case of an imminent threat of armed aggression against either party, bilateral consultations will be immediately initiated to coordinate responses and agree on measures to eliminate the threat (Article 3) (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 19, 2024). The Russia-Belarus treaty requires that Minsk and Moscow promptly initiate consultations regarding retaliatory measures in the event of encroachment (Article 2) (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 6, 2024).

In the case of physical aggression, both treaties outline specific joint measures in response. The Russia-DPRK treaty states that if one of the parties is subjected to an armed attack by any state or several states and thus finds itself in a state of war, the other party will immediately provide military and other assistance by all means at its disposal (Article 4) (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 19, 2024). According to the Russia-Belarus Treaty, both parties will undertake joint actions to repel aggression using all available resources. This includes the immediate provision of necessary military, military-technical, and other assistance to the attacked party, as agreed upon by the heads of state after an official request from the party that is subjected to aggression or faces an imminent threat of aggression (Article 3) (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 6, 2024).

It is indicative that after the entry into force of the Russia-DPRK treaty on December 4, 2024, North Korean military units were deployed to support Russian forces against the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Russia’s Kursk oblast (T.me/DIUkraine, December 14, 2024). Considering the fact that hostilities are already underway inside Russia and in the occupied Ukrainian territories, which Putin officially claimed as “entities of the Russian Federation” in 2022, it may be likely that parts of the Belarus-Russia treaty will be implemented in the near future (Kremlin.ru, September 30, 2022). The document signed by Minsk and Moscow creates all formal grounds for the direct entry and participation of the Belarusian army in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Part 2 of this article is available here.