New Armenia-U.S. Partnership On Pause

Executive Summary:

• The Charter of Strategic Partnership between Armenia and the United States, signed in January 2024 under the then-outgoing administration, aligns with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s strategy to reduce Armenia’s dependence on Russia, despite Moscow’s concerns and diplomatic engagements following the signing.
• The charter opens pathways for Armenia to modernize its nuclear sector, particularly by securing U.S. technology to replace its Soviet-era reactor by 2036, and strengthening Armenia’s development of artificial intelligence (AI).
• U.S. cooperation in border security aims to counter illicit trade and re-exports, potentially reducing Russian influence while increased Armenian control over borders with Iran and Türkiye signals broader geopolitical realignment.

During a visit to Washington, D.C. on February 5, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan claimed that Armenia hopes “to open a new page in relations with the United States” (Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, February 5). This hope was in reference to the Charter of Strategic Partnership between Armenia and the United States signed on January 14 to strengthen bilateral relations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 14). The signing of the charter occurred just days before the last administration left the White House.

The areas covered in the charter include economic and energy cooperation, defense and security, democracy and human rights, and cultural and education exchanges. It also came soon after the Biden administration decided to suspend a Strategic Partnership Charter between the United States and Georgia signed in 2009 (Civil Georgia, November 30, 2024). This followed the contested parliamentary elections on October 26, 2024, and ongoing protests in Tbilisi (See EDM, October 17, November 5, 2024, January 13, February 4).

For Pashinyan supporters, the signing of the charter was an essential foreign policy success amid falling ratings and as he attempts to diversify Armenia’s foreign policy relationships away from dependency on Russia. The charter also followed the Armenian government’s green lighting of an ostensibly extra-parliamentary drive to move the country along the path of EU membership even if Brussels has not extended a hand to such an eventuality (Eurasianet, January 14; see EDM, January 28). The agreement institutionalized stronger links between the United States and Armenia despite Yerevan having also significantly benefited from the re-export of sanctioned goods from the West to Russia and vice-versa (Azatutyun, December 20, 2024).

No sooner had the U.S.-Armenia Strategic Partnership Charter been signed than Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov announced that his Armenian counterpart, Ararat Mirzoyan, would visit Moscow for talks for the first time since November 2023. Armenian analysts considered this a response to the charter. They believed Moscow sought clarification on Yerevan’s intentions (Azatutyun, January 16). Mirzoyan called the talks with Lavrov “frank and constructive” (Asbarez, January 21).

Although a partnership commission to implement the charter’s details is expected over the coming years, the charter could have immediate benefits for Armenia, including the need to replace its ageing nuclear reactor (see EDM, July 22, 2024). After a number of reactor lifetime extensions, Yerevan has until 2036 to replace the Soviet-era reactor (World Nuclear Association, accessed February 28).  Pashinyan is known to be in favor of adopting U.S. technology, but that would require permission from the United States to export civilian nuclear technology abroad, including that integral to options from South Korea if Armenia chooses that (Interfax, January 16, 2024). The strategic charter includes reference to the 123 Agreement, which is necessary to allow the country to receive that technology (U.S. Embassy in Armenia, accessed February 28). Bordering Iran, this would also require Armenia to enhance border security to prevent the smuggling of nuclear technology and radioactive materials, including uranium.

There have been a number of alleged cases of uranium smuggling reported over the years, including in 2010 and 2016, though via Georgia (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 17, 2010; Eurasianet, July 8, 2016). The United States is already cooperating on countering the problem, but more needs to be done (US Embassy in Armenia, June 21, 2016). It is also unclear where and how Armenia would obtain small modular reactor (SMR)-compatible nuclear fuel in the event of choosing a non-Russian reactor. Moreover, given that Armenia does not dispose of spent fuel itself, where and how it would be remains unclear.

Similar concerns exist specifically in the area of Artificial Intelligence (AI), which is also a component of the Strategic Partnership Charter. The U.S. company Nvidia is already eyeing establishing an AI supercomputing center in Armenia (ArmenPress, November 30, 2023). This is a notable step considering the sensitivity of AI technology transfer (United Nations, September 2024). Armenia may be perceived as an attractive partner despite the sensitivities of AI technology transfer. Possible reasons for this attraction are the fact that Nvidia Vice President Rev Lebaredian is an Armenian-American and Armenia has a reputation of technological prowess given its former status as the “Soviet Union’s Silicon Valley” (Caucasian Journal, May 2022; fDi Intelligence, January 2023).

There is no doubt that border security plays a prominent role in the Strategic Partnership Charter. Even though some Armenian media and commentators believe this might concern the deployment of U.S. troops on Armenia’s borders, this overlooks the more common definition of what border security cooperation usually entails. Countries, including the United States, define it as preventing the “illicit movement of weapons, drugs, contraband, and people, while promoting lawful entry and exit, and lawful trade” (Homeland Security, accessed February 28). The timing of the charter, however, has come when Armenia’s border security issues are legitimate concerns. At the end of July, Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) border guards were removed from Yerevan’s Zvartnots International Airport (see EDM, August 15, 2024).

Speaking on the move a day beforehand at a Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing, then-U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs James O’Brien claimed that their removal would allow for a reduction in re-exports to and from Russia, circumventing sanctions over Ukraine (see EDM, August 15, 2024). At the beginning of this year, Russian border guards were also removed from the checkpoint on the Armenia-Iran border. The FSB, however, continues to control the border itself, albeit now with the participation of Armenian National Security Service (NSS) border guards (see EDM, January 16). Even though it is unlikely that one day U.S. troops might replace Russia on that border, the charter nonetheless includes support for strengthening border security capacity. At the signing it was announced that a U.S. team is expected to arrive in Armenia “within weeks” though it has yet to do so. The charter also mentions the need to initiate a working group to strengthen enforcement of export controls for dual-use goods. This last point has also been a problem in the past (Azatutyun, May 17, 2002).

Increasing Armenian border guard capacity would inevitably lead to one day removing the FSB presence on Armenia’s borders with Iran and Türkiye, as Armenian border guards have taken over responsibilities at Yerevan’s airport and the checkpoint with Iran. Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Paruyr Hovhannisyan confirmed this last month (Armenpress, January 24).

For the Armenian government, further improving ties with the European Union and the United States could boost Pashinyan’s chances in the upcoming parliamentary elections next year (Balcani Caucaso, February 3). Even if Iran says it is not concerned by the new agreement, Tehran’s ambassador to Yerevan, Mehdi Sobhani, has since announced that Armenia and Iran are also working on a comprehensive strategic partnership (Turan, January 24; Arka, February 10). Pashinyan recently met with U.S. Vice President JD Vance, which, according to one Armenian political analyst, left a “bleak impression” (Azatutyun, February 7).

At the end of February, Armenian media stressed the precariousness surrounding the new administration in the United States by noting that the U.S. Customs and Border Protection team had still not arrived (ArmenPress, February 27). Officials claim it has not been canceled (Azatutyun, March 3). However, plans for a cyber-security laboratory have been suspended in the current 90-day freeze of USAID assistance worldwide. Armenia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs stated that “no program or action stemming from the partnership is currently envisaged” (ArmenPress, February 27). While the new charter has provided conditions for positive bilateral relations between Armenia and the United States, Armenian officials appear uncertain about the next steps in bilateral relations.