Georgia Remains Target of Attempted Russian Influence
By:
Executive Summary:
- Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze acknowledged challenges in Georgia-EU relations in early February, citing bureaucratic obstacles, while reaffirming Georgia’s pro-European stance despite concerns that the current ruling party is leading the country toward Russia and undermining democratic principles.
- Political turbulence in Georgia following its October 2024 parliamentary elections provides Russia with more resources to impede Georgia’s integration with the West.
- Moscow is leveraging economic, political, and ideological pressure to expand its influence in Georgia. This includes strengthening economic ties, exploiting Orthodox unity, and supporting pro-Russian narratives.
- Georgia remains economically reliant on Russia in terms of trade, gas imports, and investments. This dependence grants Moscow significant political leverage, creating vulnerabilities to Russian pressure.
- Western sanctions on Georgia risk fueling anti-Western sentiment and pushing the country further into Russia’s orbit. Georgia’s integration with the West, particularly with the European Union, will remain in jeopardy as long as the political status quo is maintained.
In a February 6 interview with Euronews, Prime Minister of Georgia Irakli Kobakhidze admitted to complicated relations between Georgia and the European Union, attributing this to “significant challenges with the European bureaucracy” (Euronews, February 6). Kobakhidze still expressed optimism, however, about Georgia’s prospects for EU membership and reaffirmed the unshakable pro-European orientation of Georgia and its government. In the same interview, he vehemently excluded the possibility of restoration of diplomatic relations with Russia until the latter withdrew its recognition of Georgia’s secessionist regions Abkhazia, which recently held presidential elections, and South Ossetia as independent states (Euronews, February 6; see EDM, February 12). These statements were a response to reprimands from the West that Georgia is deviating from its former European trajectory. There remains a growing perception in both Georgia and Europe that the former is drifting away from the West and democracy in favor of growing closer to Russia (1tv.ge, January 18; Civil.ge; PACE, January 29; Eeas.europa, February 7).
These concerns have been reinforced by the Georgian leadership’s multi-vector foreign policy in recent years, which includes building, as Georgian officials claim, “pragmatic relations with Russia.” This, in turn, has been increasingly welcomed by the Kremlin (Civil.ge, April 18, 2024, February 4; Sakartvelos Ambebi, November 28, 2024). Supposedly, Moscow perceives such a policy in Tbilisi as a window of opportunity to restore its influence in Georgia (see EDM, February 6). This poses a challenge for the West as it seeks ways of counteracting Russia’s attempts to influence democratic processes abroad (VoxEurop English, July 25, 2024; Congressional Research Service, September 4, 2024; Voice of America, January 18). The results of the 2024 parliamentary elections in Georgia disappointed the West because the ruling Georgian Dream party retained power for a fourth term. Hungary and Slovakia are the only European countries that have recognized the legitimacy of the elections (Jam-News, November 3, 2024; Euractiv, December 17, 2024). Meanwhile, Russian political circles assessed the elections as protecting Georgia’s sovereignty, which was supposedly threatened by the West, and accused Western countries of “blatant attempts” to interfere in the elections (TASS, October 15, 2024; Gazeta.ru, October 29, 2024).
Russia reacted calmly to the crushing defeat of the 28-member union of openly pro-Russian parties in the election. Collectively, these groups gained only 2.4 percent of the vote, well below the 5 percent threshold required to win any seats in parliament (Civil.ge, October 27, 2024). The electoral result, however, allowed them to receive budget financing and stay afloat (Sputnik-Georgia, June 24, 2024; Election Administration of Georgia, October 27, 2024). The most proactive local pro-Russian TV channel “Alt-Info” has already resumed broadcasting, which had been suspended after the elections (Civil.ge, October 29, 2024; Alt-Info, accessed March 1).
The periodic allegations about behind-the-scenes communications between Russia and Georgia, as well as suggestions that the founder and now honorary chairman of Georgian Dream, Bidzina Ivanishvili, is under pressure from Moscow have yet to be confirmed by reliable data. Ivanishvili, an oligarch who made his fortune in Russia, has been subject to sanctions for his alleged role in making Georgia more susceptible to Russian influence (see EDM, January 23). Officially, the bilateral dialogue between Georgia and Russia known as the Prague Format has been frozen since November 2021 (Civil.ge, December 3, 2024). So far, the parties have not shown readiness for its resumption (Agenda.ge, November 17, 2017).
Russian officials and pro-Kremlin expert circles saturate the Georgian information space with statements about Moscow’s desire to restore relations with Tbilisi on Russian terms (TASS, December 4, 2024; Apsny.ge, February 10). When speaking in favor of the further normalization of relations with Georgia, which severed formal diplomatic ties with Moscow following the Russian invasion in 2008, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin reaffirmed that Russia adheres to the same approach as with Ukraine. Galuzin noted that while Russia “intend[s] to continue to promote the normalization of ties with Georgia,” Moscow understood that “political demands” in Tbilisi “that conflict with the new realities in the region” (i.e., Russia’s recognition of the independence of the two separatist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia) make this all but impossible (TASS, February 10, 2024). Shortly before the Georgian parliamentary elections, Russia officially declared that the recognition of the independence of Georgia’s secessionist regions by Moscow “is not subject to revision” (Gazeta.ru September 24, 2024; Interfax October 4, 2024). For some, this refutes the local allegations that Russia attempted to improve Georgian Dream’s electoral standing by promising to restore Georgia’s territorial integrity. Russia’s reluctance to resolve this key problem in bilateral relations significantly weakens the positions of pro-Russian forces when they advocate for a more loyal policy toward Russia and further alienation from the Western orbit.
The Russian National Research Institute for the Development of Communications (NIIRK), which annually monitors the relationships of the post-Soviet countries, released its observations on the “friendliness of communication of the post-Soviet regimes in 2024.” It concluded that fears of the post-Soviet countries coming under Russian influence, which they allege are instigated by the West, are gradually diminishing thanks to a better “understanding by national elites of geopolitical and geo-economic interests of both Western states and their interests in the context of benefits and risks of cooperation with Russia.” According to NIIRK’s research, in 2024, Georgia’s “friendliness” coefficient toward Russia increased from 12 to 15 points on a 100-point scale. Georgia has been included as number eleven in the group of conditionally friendly/unfriendly Post-Soviet countries, whereby South Ossetia is ranked first (not internationally recognized as an independent state), Belarus second, and Ukraine is ranked last (Nicrus.ru, February 26).
Another manifestation of Russian hybrid warfare is a targeted intimidation of Georgian society by proclaiming that the West was trying to support yet another “color revolution.”. This task appears to have been primarily assigned to the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), probably with the expectation that its information would be perceived as reliable. During July–September 2024, the SVR made several statements accusing the United States of planning “regime change” in Georgia through a “color revolution” with proactive engagement of opposition parties, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and even international organizations such as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (SVR, July 9, September 11, 2024). Russian propagandists tried to convince the local population that the West wanted to reshape the results of the Georgian elections (Gazeta.ru June 6, 2024; RIA Novosti, December 10, 2024; TASS, December 30, 2024). According to the SVR, the United States planned to depict the elections as rigged as a pretext to encourage Georgian citizens to protest (SVR, September 11, 2024). These SVR reports, widely disseminated by the Georgian media, appear to have influenced a significant share of the Georgian public. After the elections, the SVR claimed that the Western plans for a “color revolution” in Georgia had failed, and that the United States was losing the initiative in the post-Soviet space (RIA News, December 10, 2024). On February 27, the SVR again accused the West of supporting anti-government rallies in Georgia to maintain its influence there, given the “national-conservative turnaround” taking place in the world (SVR, February 27).
Using a proactive, multifaceted approach to strengthen its influence in Georgia, Russia capitalizes on the critical factor of Orthodox confessional unity with Georgia, using it as an element of “soft power” (Ponars Eurasia, June 6, 2014; MDPI.com, February 17, 2023). The Georgian Orthodox Church advocates the protection of national conservative traditions, which differ from the “alien values of the West.” Russia, which has declared itself a worldwide bulwark against “ultra-liberalism,” constantly bombards its Georgian audience with messages about the usefulness of “moving away from the ultra-liberal transhumanist agenda imposed from the outside” (Sovanews, December 10, 2024). Such messages held sway over the over one million Georgian Dream supporters in these elections, who represent a traditionalist-conservative segment of Georgian society.
The Russian military presence in Georgia’s two separatist regions, hovering like a “sword of Damocles” over the country, represents another powerful factor of Russian influence. This all but ensures Tbilisi’s cautious policy toward Moscow. Russia’s leadership claims to be concerned that the West would orchestrate a new military conflict near Russia’s borders, which would include Georgia’s secessionist regions (President of Russia, February 24, 2022). Russian officials and pro-Kremlin opinion-makers praise Georgian Dream’s restraint toward providing active assistance to Ukraine and its refusal to impose full-scale sanctions against Russia (Ekhokavkaza, September 6, 2024). This stance, however, does not exclude Georgia from Russia’s use of military force. Russia may resort to hostilities against Georgia if Moscow believes that the use of military force guarantees a reduction or elimination of Georgia-borne threats to Russian national interests in the region. Russia is creating new military infrastructure and dual-use facilities in Georgia’s secessionist regions, including the Russia-reconstructed Sukhumi airport where the first test flight from Moscow has been conducted (GlobalAffairs.ru, August 13, 2018; see EDM, November 20, 2023; SOVAnews, April 1, 2024; Civil.ge, November 25, 2024).
Against the backdrop of Western sanctions, Russia is searching for alternative transit routes, including those that would pass through Georgia’s territory to circumvent Western sanctions (see EDM, September 15, 2022, May 1, 2023, February 27; Civil.ge, February 3). In this regard, a Georgian portion of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor), may become the target for various Russia-driven subversive actions (see EDM, April 19, 2022). Ingushetia is discussing the construction of the Caucasus Railway, which will connect the North Caucasus region of Russia with Georgia (JAM-News, December 1, 2024). Entrepreneurs from the Russian-Georgian Business Council—established in 2023—within the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry see new opportunities in this initiative (Сivil.ge May 17, 2024). The Georgian government plans to completely modernize the highway—which leads to the border with Russia—and expand existing roads linking Russia and Georgia. The construction of a road that will be 23 kilometers (14 miles) long with five bridges and tunnels funded by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Asian Development Bank is well underway. The project is expected to be completed in 2025 (Kveshetikobiroad.ge, accessed March 3; Imedinews.ge April 23, 2024).
This February, another Georgian-Russian business association was officially registered with the Georgian government. The founding meeting gathered 60 companies, predominantly winemakers. The association’s main goal is to help the businessmen engaged in exports to Russia. The association claims that the welfare of at least 700,000 Georgian households heavily depends on Georgia’s economic relations with Russia (BM.ge, January 24, February 11). This factor has an influence on the electoral behavior of Georgian citizens.
Moscow is increasingly keen to capitalize on economic factors that strengthen its political footing in Georgia. The 10th International Economic Forum “Southern Gate of Russia 2024” underlined that “[t]oday it is time to revive” previously neglected relations with Georgia, especially through economic and socio-cultural relations, including opening new transit corridors and trans-border cooperation. Additionally, Russia has tried to lure Georgia into regional formats such as a “3+3” format between Türkiye, Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia (Ssoar.info, July 2022). Georgian pundits, however, argue that Georgia cannot and will not receive any benefits from such a platform (see EDM, March 16, 2020, February 6; March 16, 2020; Sputnik-Georgia, June 19, 2024; Jam-news, December 11, 2024, Rezonansi, January 15).
Moscow’s influence in Georgia also benefits from a significant number of Russian citizens who have relocated and settled there since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin considers these individuals as potential leverage that can be used if and when it deems necessary (see EDM, August 10, 2023, February 15, 2024). Russian officials consistently underline that Moscow will defend its citizens worldwide (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 7, 2007, March 31, 2023, February 19).
Georgia’s economic dependence on Russia remains alarmingly high. This gives Moscow significant influence on local socio-political processes (Jam-News, February 16, 2024; see EDM, January 13). Despite a publicly declared pro-European orientation, many Georgian businesses are closely linked to the Russian market (see EDM, February 15, 2024). Pro-Georgian government TV channel “Imedi” published a list of 30 large- and medium-sized companies that recently, together with 2,300 other firms, signed a petition demanding to keep Georgia’s pro-European orientation (Imedi.ge, December 26, 2024; Freebuisness.ge, accessed February 27). The published list shows that these companies conduct lucrative business inside Russia, receiving tens of millions in revenue (Imedinews, December 30, 2024). The income of a significant number of Georgian citizens, including employees of these companies, as well as the welfare of their families, largely depend on positive trade relations with Russia. Russia is likely to attempt to maintain this status quo.
Russia is among Georgia’s top five trading partners. According to the National Statistical Service of Georgia, despite a three percent decrease in Georgia-Russia turnover from January to August 2024, Russia remains Georgia’s second largest trading partner (RIA Novosti; Sovanews, November 6, 2024). Experts explain that territorial proximity, existing transport routes, long-established economic ties, and other factors facilitate this economic linkage. The experts, however, warn about the Kremlin’s unpredictability, implying sudden restrictions on the export of various goods or an increase in excise duty on Georgian wine and spirits could be undertaken. According to the statistics, Russia was the first among the top five export markets for Georgian wine in 2024 (Currenttime.tv, March 17, 2024; BM.ge, September 19, 2024). In 2025, Georgia expects to receive twice as much natural gas from Russia as compared to the figure forecast in 2024. The volume of liquefied gas supplied from Russia to Georgia in September 2024 increased by 77.3 percent compared to 2023 (Parliament’s Budget Office, 2024; EkhoKavkaza April 2, 2024; Sputnik Georgia, September 21, 2024; Vestnik Kavkaza, November 6, 2024; TASS December 18, 2024; BM.ge January 8; GPB, January 10, 17; Transparency.ge, February 16). It remains to be seen whether this trend will continue following a new package of Western sanctions on Russian oil and gas. In 2024, the volume of investments made by Russia’s Public Joint Stock Company “Inter RAO”-owned electricity distribution company Telasi, effectively one of Russia’s strategic assets in Georgia, exceeded GEL 160 million ($57.5 million)—a record high for the enterprise (Telasi.ge, accessed February 27). Additionally, Russia remains the largest grain supplier to Georgia (Commersant.ge, November 14, 2024).
Imposing more sanctions against the Georgian government, which to some extent will also negatively affect Georgian citizens, could be risky despite the prevailing pro-sanction position in the West. Excessive sanctions regimes against Georgia may not yield the expected results, as the negative economic effects may just as likely instill anti-Western sentiment in a significant portion of the Georgian population. Sanctions may also provoke Georgia’s leadership to intensify its multi-vector foreign policy at the expense of weakening the nominal pro-European path and increasing Tbilisi’s connections with Russia. Ultimately, the current conflict-prone political situation in Georgia and poisoned relations with the West hamper Georgia’s integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Russia will likely do its utmost to maintain this status quo for as long as possible.
