Moscow Seeks to Capitalize on Weakening Western Unity

Executive Summary:

• The Kremlin remains committed to its policy of confrontation with the West through weakening alliances and financial influence, despite Russia’s ongoing preparations for the potential end of its invasion of Ukraine.
• Moscow continues to stake its strategy on the expectation that BRICS countries will advance their de-dollarization agenda, which has faced significant backlash from U.S. President Donald Trump and hesitancy among other BRICS member states. 
• Moscow supports divisions within the European Union, particularly aiming to leverage special ties with the “Danube Club,” comprising Hungary, Slovakia, and other EU nations with nationalist leanings, which could be potential EU advocates for Russia’s interests.

Pro-Kremlin analysts persist in formulating strategies for continued conflict with the West despite Moscow signaling the potential suspension of Russia’s war against Ukraine (see EDM, February 10). One such strategy, consistent with previous years, is to undermine the dominance of the U.S. dollar. Since 2022, Moscow has openly hoped for the creation of a single currency by the BRICS bloc. [1] A single BRICS currency would enable member states to avoid sanctions and replace “the toxic and inconvenient” dollar in international markets (VM.ru, July 3, 2023). This has placed other BRICS states in an awkward position, prompting, for example, South African Finance Minister Enoch Godongwana to officially declare in August 2023 that the question of establishing a single BRICS currency had never been discussed, even during informal meetings (Forbes.ru, August 24, 2023). In December 2024, the notion of another currency replacing the dollar in the global financial system angered then-U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, who threatened to impose a 100 percent tariff on products from BRICS countries if they continue to implement their plans for de-dollarization (X/@realDonaldTrump, December 1, 2024). 

Writers at the “Valdai Discussion Club,” an analytical center close to the Kremlin, have attempted to convince Russia’s BRICS partners to create a new payment system and reserve currency to avoid the risks of the “weaponization of the existing financial system” (Valdai Club, February 3). Shamil Yenikeyev, a professor of international relations at Russia’s National Research University Higher School of Economics, advises potential partners to carefully choose their words and use special terminology to lower the risk of backlash from the United States. For example, rather than calling for an “alternative payment system,” Yenikeyev recommended advocating for a “supplementary payment system.” Likewise, Yenikeyev suggested employing “financial diversification” or “risk management” in the place of “de-dollarization” (Valdai Club, February 3).

Moscow is unlikely to convince other BRICS members to jeopardize their own relations with the United States despite attempts to conceal its intentions behind vague formulations. The Kremlin-loyal website “Russia’s Pivot to Asia” published an analysis of bilateral trade between individual BRICS countries and the United States in January and concluded that the volume of bilateral trade increased in 2024 (Russiaspivottoasia.com, January 31). The volume of trade between the PRC and the United States in 2024 increased to a record-high $582.4 billion (Congressional Research Service, March 20, 2019; Office of the United States Trade Representative, accessed March 3). India, also a BRICS member that has relied on Russian and Soviet arms for decades, sharply reduced its orders for defense equipment from Russia and now purchases arms mainly from Western suppliers (The Monitor, March 25, 2002; Forbes.ua, December 3, 2024; see EDM, January 15). It is unlikely that serious economic players with their own strong currency will create a new financial system specifically for Moscow to the detriment of their own trade interests.

Another tool that pro-Kremlin commentators believe could be used to reduce Western dominance is stoking disagreements between the West broadly and the so-called “Danube Club,” a Moscow-originating term for potential advocates for its interests in the European Union (Valdai Club, January 31). Moscow labels Hungary and Slovakia as part of the Danube Club, with Croatia, Austria, and Czechia considered as Danube Club-adjacent, due to their opposition to many of the European Union’s policies—and in some cases, values (Valdai Club, January 31). Kremlin propagandists openly acknowledge their hopes not only for cooperation with certain Russian-leaning Eastern European countries but also for a deeper fragmentation of the European Union. For instance, they speculate that if Budapest successfully negotiates a bilateral trade agreement with Washington, other EU member states may follow suit—an outcome they claim would push the European Union “to the brink.” Moreover, these analysts explicitly state that “Russia’s strategic interest lies in provoking a confrontation between Brussels and Hungary, aiming to weaken the European Union and widen existing divisions” (Vzglyad, February 5). The commentators emphasize the supportive role Slovakia and Hungary could play in restructuring and/or downsizing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—provided Trump endorses such a move. Pro-Kremlin analysts argue that “[Hungarian Prime Minister] Viktor Orbán and [Slovakian Prime Minister] Robert Fico would, at the very least, be willing to back a Republican-led initiative” in this direction (Vzglyad, February 13). 

While Moscow’s aspirations for internal EU conflicts may seem ambitious, they are not entirely without basis. Fico is reputed to be pro-Russian and even threatened to block aid to Ukraine if Kyiv does not renew the transit of Russian gas through his country (Deutsche Welle–Russian Service, January 20). Additionally, Orbán accused Ukraine of trying to draw the entire world into the war with Russia and declared that his country must maintain its distance from the war (Ukrainska Pravda, June 6, 2024).

The Kremlin does not consider such things as popular sentiment. Fico’s “pro-Russia” policies already have caused massive protests in Slovakia. The latest outbreak occurred in January, triggered by Fico’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow (Euronews.com, January 25). Despite Moscow’s hopes, in the Forbes ranking of the 20 countries that have helped Ukraine the most since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Slovakia and Czechia are ahead of the countries of “old Europe,” such as Spain, France, and Germany (Forbes.ua, May 31, 2022). Moreover, sociologists have recorded a decrease in support for a “fast peace” over a “just peace” in such countries as Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. In these states, more individuals appear to prioritize Ukraine’s long-term security over a hastily concluded peace agreement in which Ukraine suffers undue losses (Re-Russia.net, December 27, 2024). Against the background of Moscow’s aggressive rhetoric, however, even a slight change in mood is unlikely to help the Kremlin find “allies” willing to do its bidding in these states. 

The Kremlin is far from establishing fully-fledged political alliances with other European states or BRICS members. It is crucial to recognize, however, that on a tactical level, Moscow may not need to invent new wedge issues to exploit between Western states given ongoing divisions and existing contradictions (see EDM, March 3). In the meantime, the Kremlin’s ambitions are unlikely to succeed, as its potential allies and advocates prioritize their own interests and relationships with the West over Russia’s influence.

Note:

[1] A loose political-economic grouping initially consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and South Africa, which has now expanded to include Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates.