Russia Pressures Georgia to Join Regional 3+3 Format

Executive summary:

• Georgia is under increasing pressure from Russia to join the 3+3 format on regional cooperation for peace and stability in the South Caucasus, which includes Russia, Iran, and Türkiye along with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and, intentionally, Georgia. 
• The Kremlin views Georgia’s participation as crucial for strengthening Russian influence in the South Caucasus, given Georgia’s geographic significance, arguing that the format aligns with Georgia’s national interests.
• The ruling Georgian Dream party remains cautious, however, as concerns about economic dependencies on Russia, domestic discontent, and international alignment shape Tbilisi’s foreign policy trajectory.

On February 19, during a hearing in the Russian State Duma, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov repeated that the door remains open for Georgia to join the “3+3” format. The 3+3 regional cooperation format comprises Armenia and Azerbaijan and their three largest neighbors, Russia, Türkiye, and Iran (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, October 19, 2024; see EDM, March 13). Lavrov explained, “We understand the nuances of Georgia’s doubts and positions, however, a chair for Georgian representatives will always be set up in the meeting room of this format” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, February 19). Members of the format have repeatedly requested Georgia to join (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, January 14; Vestnik Kavkaza, February 10). The pressure from the Kremlin to join the 3+3 format is another factor in Georgia’s balancing act between Russia and the West.

Lavrov noted that Russia expects the Georgian government  “will support the need to focus on national interests,” claiming that the 3+3 format operates in accordance with the interests of all its participants. Lavrov emphasized the attractiveness of such a format as, according to him, the previous U.S. administration attempted to promote its own “3+1” format consisting of the United States and the three South Caucasus states (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, February 19). Washington officials have never spoken out against the participation of Georgia, or Azerbaijan and Armenia for that matter, in any regional format. Moreover, the 3+3 format cannot be entirely considered a Kremlin mechanism as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member Türkiye is a full participant and one of the founders of the format (TASS, October 15, 2024).

This echoes the dominant Kremlin narrative that “Georgia’s national interest” is to cooperate with Moscow and not the West (Euronews Georgia, February 19). On January 14, Lavrov contended, although initial meetings of the 3+3 format have already occurred, “Our Georgian neighbors have not yet occupied their seat. But this seat at the table, where we are going to discuss the problems of the region, will always remain accessible to them” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, January 14).

The first meeting of the 3+3 format took place in Moscow at the deputy foreign minister level in December 2021. Tbilisi refused to participate in such an organization because of the involvement of the Russian Federation, which has occupied the Georgian breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia since 2008 (Radiotavisupleba, December 21, 2021; see EDM, March 12).

In October 2021, then-Foreign Minister of Georgia David Zalkaliani responded to the invitation for Georgia to take part in the first meeting of the 3+3 member states. He explained, “It will be difficult for Georgia to cooperate in this format with Russia when there is no progress in the de-occupation process” (Radiotavisupleba, October 8, 2021). Zalkaliani maintained the possibility that Georgia would eventually join, stating, “In the future, Georgia will take part in this large project without violating the red lines on recognizing the territorial integrity of our country” (Radiotavisupleba, October 8, 2021).

Irakli Menagarisvili, who served as foreign minister of Georgia from 1995–2004, observed in an interview with this author that Moscow, Ankara, and Tehran tried to form a 3+3 alliance back in the 1990s, but Tbilisi always refused to participate in this pact. According to Menagrisvili, “At that time, Moscow formally recognized the territorial integrity of our country, but we demanded that the United States and the European Union may also participate in the new Caucasian format” (Author’s interview, February 27). He further argued, “President [Eduard] Shevardnadze and our entire team have always believed that without the equal and active participation of America and Europe, the 3+3 regional format would be unbalanced and unpromising for the development of our region. Tehran’s participation in it has never been seen by us as an obstacle” (Author’s interview, February 27).

On the one hand, the Georgian government, fearing a harsh reaction from Moscow, is forced to respond to persistent invitations to the 3+3 format. On the other hand, Tbilisi is afraid of a domestic reaction to these invitations in Georgia, including from opposition forces that constantly accuse the ruling Georgian Dream party of anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian collaboration with Putin. These concerns are all the more relevant against the backdrop of a large-scale protest movement that began in the country after the October 26, 2024 parliamentary elections and the November 28, 2024 announcement from Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze on the suspension of discussions on membership in the European Union (see EDM, December 6, 10, 2024, March 12).

The latest official statement on this topic by a Georgian Dream leader, Giorgi Volski, First Vice Speaker of Parliament, is ambiguous. On February 20, Volski responded to Lavrov’s Duma speech, claiming, “Regarding future prospects, something might appear, but at this stage, there is no indication that our involvement in the ‘3+3 format’ would be justified either politically or economically. So, let’s wait for the processes” (Netgazeti.ge, February 20). Volski mentioned that the “tense situation between Armenia and Azerbaijan” clearly hints that the military conflict is not an obstacle to cooperation in the format. In the case of Georgia, however, a lot will depend on “processes occurring worldwide,” which “will shape Georgia’s future position.” For this reason, Volski said, “Unfortunately, Georgia does not have the resources to influence global processes, but we have chosen the right policy and have maintained stability in our country up to this point” (Netgazeti.ge, February 20).

Paata Zakareishvili, who served in the Georgian Dream government as the State Minister for Reconciliation and Civic Equality from 2012 to 2016, claimed to this author that primarily Russia and Iran need the 3+3 format. According to Zakareishvili, “Moscow is trying to strengthen its position in the Caucasus, but for this, the Kremlin needs Georgia to be involved because our country occupies a central geographical position in the South Caucasus” (Author’s Interview, February 27). He characterized Georgian Dream’s policy toward the 3+3 format as a “double game,” balancing its position with Russia and the West. It is difficult to predict whether the Georgian government will be able to continue the “double game” if Moscow uses economic pressure levers to force Tbilisi to cooperate in a regional format important for Russia. Such a scenario may be possible because, as in 2024, Russia remains one of Georgia’s top three trading partners, along with Türkiye and the United States (Civil.ge; Interfax, January 20). How Tbilisi navigates this dilemma will likely be a point of contention in the months ahead and be a decisive factor in whether it moves toward Russia or the West.