Egypt–Ethiopia Tensions Fuel Conflict in the Horn of Africa

By:

Age: 7 days

Egyptian Minister of Defense Abdel Mageed Saqr meeting his Somali counterpart, Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur, in January. (Source: Egyptian Armed Forces via Hiiraan Online)

Executive Summary:

  • Egypt and Ethiopia are currently engaged in a battle for influence in East Africa. Egypt is promising to provide materiel as part of a defense pact with the Somali central government, while Ethiopia has signed a memorandum of understanding with the breakaway Republic of Somaliland to acquire basing and port rights on the Red Sea.
  • Given East Africa’s ongoing conflicts, the destruction potentially wrought by a regional proxy war between Ethiopia and Egypt would be significant.

The Egyptian government delivered on its promises to provide military aid to the Somali government. Over the last three days of August 2024, multiple plane loads carrying weapons, ammunition, and a small contingent of soldiers arrived in Mogadishu (almaydeen, August 28, 2024). The transfer represented only a small portion of the troops and an extensive list of armaments that Cairo had promised to provide to the Somali government over the next twelve months (The National, August 29, 2024).

Egypt’s defense pact with Somalia is driven by what it perceives as two existential threats (The New Arab, August 15, 2024). First, Ethiopia’s memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the breakaway Republic of Somaliland grants Ethiopia extensive basing and port rights on Somaliland’s Red Sea coast (The Horn Observer, June 21, 2024). In exchange, Ethiopia made an ambiguous promise to recognize Somaliland’s independence. Egypt regards a proposed Ethiopian naval base near the Bab al-Mandeb, a chokepoint for the Red Sea, as a potential threat to the Suez Canal.

Second, Egypt is responding to Ethiopia’s intransigence in negotiations over water flows through the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) (Egypt Today, September 1, 2024). More than 60 percent of the Nile’s waters originate in Ethiopia. The GERD gives Ethiopia the power to significantly curtail the water that Egypt receives, which Egypt’s 120 million citizens depend on.

Interlocking Conflicts

The intensifying competition between Egypt and Ethiopia will complicate and fuel the region’s layered and interlocking conflicts. This is especially true, given the two states’ position as among the African continent’s most influential and populous nations. The deployment of Egyptian troops to Somalia also risks a direct confrontation between Egypt and Ethiopia. The latter maintains forces and bases in multiple areas in Somalia to combat al-Shabaab.

The Horn of Africa is rife with high and low-intensity wars. Sudan is mired in a civil war, while Ethiopia is home to multiple ongoing insurgencies and just saw the decade’s most deadly conflict. Over half a million people have been killed in the recent fighting between the Ethiopian government and Tigrayan rebels (Daily Maverick, February 22, 2023). Somaliland, which was a bastion of relative stability, is engaged in a grinding conflict with separatists in two provinces that abut the semi-autonomous region of Puntland (Africa News, August 13, 2024). Somalia and Puntland, meanwhile, are home to al-Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab.

Cairo’s decision to enter one of the world’s most febrile regions is fraught with risk. While Somalia has made some sporadic progress in its battle with al-Shabaab, the al-Qaeda affiliate continues to control large swaths of territory. The group’s intelligence wing, the Amniyat, has operatives across all branches of the Somali government and security services (Garowe Online, April 10, 2024). Ethiopia has spent over two decades assisting various Somali governments in the battle against al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab nevertheless remains a severe threat to Ethiopia and its resource-rich Ogaden region. Ethiopian troops and its National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) have extensive experience and institutional knowledge vital to keeping al-Shabaab in check.

In response to Ethiopia’s MOU with Somaliland and enhanced relations with Egypt, the Somali government has demanded that Ethiopia remove all its forces from Somalia by December 31, 2024 (The Horn Daily, June 3, 2024). This demand has sparked fear among many Somali clans with longstanding relationships with Ethiopia. Many of these clans view Ethiopian forces as more reliable and capable than forces allied with the Federal Government of Somalia, whose writ does not extend much beyond Mogadishu. Consequently, many commanders of militias are refusing to comply with orders from the Somali government. Opposition to the Somali government and its demands to evict Ethiopian troops has grown (The Somali Digest, June 2, 2024). Despite the fact that this ultimatum has expired, Ethiopian forces have yet to fully withdraw (Somali Guardian, January 1).

Mogadishu’s insistence on replacing Ethiopian forces with what could be Egyptian forces, therefore, risks further fracturing Somalia and its patchwork of semi-autonomous regional administrations. Deepening divisions in Somalia combined with an influx of Egyptian troops with no experience fighting in Somalia will only aid al-Shabaab.

Potential for Proxy Wars

Tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia will not only impact Somalia. Ethiopia is home to multiple armed insurgent groups and has previously accused Egypt of aiding insurgents operating in Ethiopia and Sudan (The Africa Report, November 5, 2021). Ethiopia offered no proof of the accusations. However, if relations between the two countries continue to deteriorate, Ethiopia and Egypt’s backing of rival insurgent groups is likely. Both countries field capable intelligence services that are adept at manipulating and working with insurgent groups to advance state interests covertly (Middle East Research and Information Project, Summer 2019; The African Crime and Conflict Journal, February 7, 2023).

Egypt has longstanding ties to Ethiopia’s Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which ruled Ethiopia as part of a coalition from 1988–2018. The 2020–2022 war between Addis Ababa and the TPLF ended with a negotiated settlement that favored the government. However, the TPLF retains much of its weaponry. The Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) is also active across parts of southern and western Ethiopia, where it is engaged in a brutal war with the government.

Possible proxies for widening the conflict abound in Ethiopia and could be readily exploited by Egypt if it chooses to do so. At the same time, Ethiopia can retaliate by stoking clan factionalism and regionalism in Somalia, where Egyptian troops will be vulnerable. Ethiopia can also retaliate by further hardening its position concerning the GERD and water flow to Egypt.

Conclusion

Egypt’s decision to partner with Somalia is a high-risk policy driven by what the Egyptian government understandably views as an existential threat posed by Ethiopia. However, the tit-for-tat competition between Ethiopia and Egypt will pay few dividends and risks igniting new proxy wars that could spread well beyond Somalia. Turkey, which recently enhanced its relations with Egypt, is mediating talks between Ethiopia and Somalia (The New Arab, December 31, 2024). These talks and an overall cooling of tensions are the only off-ramp for two nations seemingly intent on escalation in one of the world’s least stable regions.