Widespread Liberalization of Russian Domestic Policy Remains Unlikely

Executive Summary:

• The Kremlin is reportedly considering “post-war normalization” scenarios, involving the rehabilitation of public figures and return of emigrants who left at the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine to project internal stability amid prospects for a peace deal with Ukraine.
• Russia continues to enforce property confiscation laws, foreign agent designations, and restrictions on emigrants, reflecting enduring hostility toward dissent and liberalization.
• Concessions granted to high-profile individuals who at some point opposed Russia’s war against Ukraine are unlikely to lead to widespread amnesty for victims of political repression.

At the end of March, journalists from the “Verstka” project reported on the possibility of domestic “normalization” in Russia following a prospective peace deal with Ukraine (Verstka, March 28). Under this plan, the government would resume work with social media influencers and entertainers currently considered “enemies of the people.” Several sources spoke to “Verstka” about the government possibly removing the status of certain individuals as “foreign agents” if they publicly recant, as well as the potential return of popular host Ivan Urgant, who spoke out against the war on the first day of the invasion, to Channel 1. Officials are also considering increasing the number of entertainment programs on television and bringing back “people’s favorites” to the screens, including those who left the country because of Russia’s war against Ukraine (Verstka, March 28).

Verstka’s sources claim that the government is considering a broader program “for the return of citizens who left the country during the Special Military Operation but who have not acted against the law” (Verstka, March 28). These include private entrepreneurs, information technology (IT) specialists, and representatives of the middle class who have not publicly declared an anti-war position. The program also includes a clause on “simplifying the procedure for removing the status of foreign agent from individuals” (Verstka, March 28).

These developments should not be seen as too encouraging. For several years now, the Russian authorities have been ambiguous about the fate of the so-called “relokants” (релоканты), people who left the country amid the war. In November 2022, the Russian Ministry of Digital Development announced the development of a program to return IT specialists to Russia as well as the possibility of returning teachers, scientists, doctors, and artists to the country (RBC, November 11, 2022; Verstka, November 30, 2022). Andrei Turchak, the former Secretary of the General Council of United Russia, Russia’s ruling political party, stated the Russian government must do everything to ensure the speedy return of fellow citizens who left the country (For Post, January 20, 2023).

The simultaneous actions of Russian parliamentarians suggest a desire to penalize Russians who emigrated after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In early 2023, the State Duma introduced a bill to raise taxes for relokants and forbade remote work for several categories of IT specialists (Bfm.ru, April 26, 2023). The ban applies to those who work in government information systems, critical information infrastructure facilities, and personal data (New News, February 22, 2023). 

At the beginning of last year, the State Duma passed a law on the confiscation of property for “fake news” about the army and calls for action purportedly inimical to national security (RBC, January 31, 2024). The head of the Center for the Resolution of Social Conflicts, Oleg Ivanov, even branded those who left Russia as a “fifth column,” a group of enemy supporters and sympathizers. He proposed killing oppositionists abroad according to the precepts of Pavel Sudoplatov, an infamous Soviet intelligence officer (see EDM, November 14, 2022).

The possibility of a new “thaw” in government oversight in Russia is unlikely. Even journalists who published information about the “normalization program” admit that some sources do not believe it will happen. They claim that only militaristic, patriotic policies are certain and doubt the possibility of amnesty for “foreign agents.” The sources also note that the presidential administration cannot influence these processes because “everything is decided by the [Federal Security Service] FSB” (Verstka, March 28; see Jamestown Perspectives, April 11).

Change in the narratives of the Russian information space is yet to be seen. Russian military analysts follow the lead of Russian President Vladimir Putin and promulgate unacceptable demands. They write that a peace deal in Ukraine must “guarantee the security of the Kaliningrad enclave as well as Transnistria, Abkhazia, North Ossetia, and many other places where there may be more people with Russian passports than without them” (Topwar.ru, March 24). Radical conservatives call for “finishing off” Ukraine and openly ignoring sanctions regarding Iran and North Korea (Tsargrad.tv, March 15, 30).

The mainstream Russian foreign policy journal “Russia in Global Affairs” (Россия в глобальной политике, Rossiya v globalnoe politikye) also demonstrates a confrontational position far from post-war normalization. One of the journal’s contributors, dean of the Faculty of World Economy and Politics at the Higher School of Economics, Anastasia Likhachyova, claims that “a deal is not a solution.” She says that the actions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its allies toward Russia “do not create preconditions for changing Russia’s foreign policy in the near future” (Russia in Global Affairs, April 1). She claims that the only chance for peace is “to transform the armed conflict into an unarmed one” wherein one armed conflict with Ukraine and its allies is split into five distinct conflicts, “Russia’s confrontation with Ukraine, Great Britain, continental Europe, U.S. Asian allies, and, in fact, the United States” (Russia in Global Affairs, April 1).

That the Kremlin is not inclined to stray from the “military-patriotic vector” is confirmed by both the words of propagandists and state analysts, as well as in practice. Independent media reports that the rules of the new military draft, which began April 1, have been tightened again. The government increased draftees’ term to one year, and a number of serious illnesses no longer preclude service (Verstka, March 31).

The Kremlin regime’s liberalization beyond what is politically expedient is unlikely. This is the case despite the regime’s adherence to militaristic policy, which does not exclude the possibility of luring emigrants back if they have skills needed by the state. Those who return to Russia will most likely be under scrutiny by the special services as “potential traitors,” and in the event of any careless act, they risk ending up in the army or behind bars.