The Cyberspace Force: A Bellwether for Conflict
By:
Executive Summary:
- Cyber operations will be involved in the opening stages of any conflict that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is involved in. This makes the Cyberspace Force an essential bellwether as to what conflicts Beijing anticipates and what conflicts it is tacitly preparing for.
- The Cyberspace Force demonstrates the depth of reform and centralization the People’s Liberation Army is willing to achieve to advance its operational capabilities. Beijing now possesses a truly global intelligence apparatus less stymied by parochial and bureaucratic interests.
- The Cyberspace Force has structured its principal operationally focused infrastructure into five regional “Technical Reconnaissance Bases,” Corps Leader-grade organizations that are generally correspond to military theaters.
- The Cyberspace Operations Base, which now oversees the PRC’s offensive cyber forces, is likely a critical factor in the significant increase in the technical sophistication, maturity, and operational discipline seen by PLA cyber operations over the last ten years
Editor’s Note: Please see the PDF at the bottom for satellite imagery of the Cyberspace Force’s various units and facilities.
One year ago, on April 19, 2024, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) eliminated the Strategic Support Force (SSF; 战略支援部队) and reconstituted its subordinate components into three distinct arms (兵种) that are directly subordinate to the Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest-level body within the Chinese armed forces (China Brief, April 26, 2024, [1], [2]). These three organizations are the Cyberspace Force (网络空间不对; Cyberspace Force), the Information Support Force (ISF; 信息支援部队), and the Aerospace Force (ASF; 军事航天部队).
In light of the anniversary of this restructuring, this piece sheds new light on one of these new organizations—the Cyberspace Force. The analysis is drawn from open source research of thousands of recruitment notices, public procurement documents, academic research, and news coverage.
Technical Reconnaissance Bases Align With Military Theaters
The Cyberspace Force has structured its principal operationally focused infrastructure into five regional “Technical Reconnaissance Bases” (技术侦查基地; TRB), each generally aligned to a corresponding military theater. These units appear to be Corps Leader-grade organizations composed of former military region (军区), service-level, and, in some cases, former General Staff Department Third Department (总参三部; 3PLA) technical reconnaissance bureaus. The TRBs have effectively consolidated all technical reconnaissance assets within the scope of the military theaters, theoretically enabling optimized targeting, tasking, collection, and analysis in support of Theater Command (战区; TC) operations. The TRBs are further divided into offices (处) and sections (科), likely influenced and consciously modeled on similar structures of its predecessor technical reconnaissance bureaus.
In crafting the TRBs, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) significantly broke and reforged existing organizational relationships. Existing units and organizations split apart, subordinate units were promoted to new echelons, and command and control was reassigned. This was done to consolidate and realign former structures to conform to new administrative and operational constructs.
The Cyberspace Force’s assimilation of the PLA Navy (中国人民解放军海军; PLAN) 1st and 2nd TRBs provides an instructive example. Prior to the major PLA reforms that began in 2016, the PLAN had arranged its TRBs along a North-South axis, with the 1st TRB concentrated along the Northeast and Eastern coast from Liaoning to Fuzhou and the 2nd TRB concentrated in the Southeast and Southern coast from Xiamen to Hainan island. As the new military theater-defined operational areas of responsibility did not align with this arrangement, overlaying an operational structure on top presented problems. To resolve this, the SSF split apart the PLAN TRBs along these new boundaries. This led to the current, unusual situation in which the former 1st TRB headquarters in Beijing lies under the Central TRB while most of its former subordinate units lie under the Eastern TRB. A similar situation has occurred with respect to the former 3PLA 6th Bureau (总参三部第六局 or 网络系统部队第六局), based out of Hongshan District in Wuhan. The SSF abolished the bureau shortly after the reforms and transferred its assets to form a significant part of the newly-established Eastern TRB, despite Wuhan technically falling within the Southern Theater Command area of responsibility. The former 6th Bureau has also maintained its unit designation of Unit (部队) 61726 (China (Hubei) Pilot Free Trade Zone Wuhan Area, October 20, 2010).
The SSF appears to have been highly judicious in the allocation of new military unit cover designators (军事代号; MUCD) from their limited assigned block of 100 (ranging from 32001 to 32100). It has preferred that units maintain their preexisting designators, apportioning new designators only when reform efforts place units in a new capacity and under a new operational structure where no previous designation exists and where their parent or previous designation is already in use. These instances have occurred as a result of units being split, promoted, or where wholly new units are created to fill an echelon under novel joint constructs (i.e. the creation of the TRB headquarters themselves), often to resolve operational and organizational discrepancies resulting from reform.
Table 1: Cyberspace Force Units and Their Locations
| Name (English) | Name (Chinese) | MUCD | HQ Location |
| Cyberspace Force Eastern Technical Reconnaissance Base (E-TRB) |
网络空间部队东部技术侦查基地 | Unit 32046 (32046部队) [1] | No. 9 Xianyin North Road, Qixia District, Nanjing (南京市栖霞区仙隐北路9号) [2] |
| Cyberspace Force Southern Technical Reconnaissance Base (S-TRB) |
网络空间部队南部技术侦查基地 | Unit 32053 (32053部队) [3] | No. 788 South Baiyun Boulevard, Baiyun District, Guangzhou (广州市白云区白云大街南788号) [4] |
| Cyberspace Force Western Technical Reconnaissance Base (W-TRB) |
网络空间部队西部技术侦查基地 | Unit 32058 (32058部队) [5] | Taihuayuan, Baihe Township, Longquanyi District, Chengdu (成都市龙泉驿区柏合镇泰花园) [6] |
| Cyberspace Force Northern Technical Reconnaissance Base (N-TRB) |
网络空间部队北部技术侦查基地 | Unit 32065 (32065部队) [7] | No. 22 East Daying Road, Shenhe District, Shenyang (沈阳市沈河区东大营街 22号) [8] |
| Cyberspace Force Central Technical Reconnaissance Base (C-TRB) |
网络空间部队中部技术侦查基地 | Unit 32081 (32081部队) [9] | No. 8 Xiangshan South Road, Haidian District, Beijing (北京市海淀区香山南路8号院) [10] |
(Source: Author research)
Cyberspace Force Order of Battle
Details of the Cyberspace Force TRBs, as well as the newly identified Cyberspace Operations Base, are listed below in protocol order.
Cyberspace Force Eastern Technical Reconnaissance Base
The Eastern Technical Reconnaissance Base (东部技术侦查基地; E-TRB) is assigned the cover designator of Unit 32046 and is located at No. 9 Xianyin North Road, Qixia District, Nanjing, just north of the Nanjing Normal University Campus (南京师范大学). (China-tender, June 4, 2018) The Eastern TRB headquarters is collocated with the PLA Air Force 2nd TRB (解放军空军第二技术侦查局; PLAAF 2nd TRB) also known as Unit 95851 (NDU Press, 2015, p. 153 ; Nanjing Dushiquan, April 25). Composed of roughly seven subordinate offices (处) and a training group/dadui (训练大队), the Eastern TRB maintains sites across the Eastern Theater Command area of responsibility, including in Nanjing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Wuhan, Nanchang, Fuzhou, and Xiamen (Xinhua, August 16, 2017; Dongbei University, [March 15, 2023]). [11]
Cyberspace Force Southern Technical Reconnaissance Base
The Southern Technical Reconnaissance Base (南部技术侦查基地; S-TRB) is assigned the cover designator of Unit 32053 and is located at No. 788 South Baiyun Boulevard, Baiyun District, Guangzhou (StarOceans, December 8, 2017), collocated with former Guangzhou Military Region Technical Reconnaissance Bureau Unit 75770 (75770部队) (Lanzhou University, February 23, 2023). Composed of at least ten subordinate offices (处), this TRB maintains sites across the Southern Theater Command area of responsibility, including in Shenzhen, Shantou, Nanning, Kunming, Zhanjiang, Sanya, and Haikou (NJUers Employment Enlightening Development System, 2019; Peking University Student Careers Center, March 15, 2024). [12]
Cyberspace Force Western Technical Reconnaissance Base
The Western Technical Reconnaissance Base (西部技术侦查基地; W-TRB) is assigned the cover designator of Unit 32058 and is located at Taihuayuan, Baihe Township, Longquanyi District, Chengdu (NJUers Employment Enlightenment Development System, December 4, 2023). The Western TRB is principally comprised of the former Lanzhou Military Region’s (MR) 1st and 2nd TRBs, units 68002 and 69010, and the former Chengdu MR 1st TRB, unit 78006 (Project 2049, November 11, 2011). Composed of at least eight offices, the Western TRB maintains sites across the Western area of responsibility, including Chongqing, Urumqi, Kashgar, Hetian, Lanzhou, Altay, and Wujiaqu. The former Chengdu MR 2nd TRB located in Kunming, Unit 78020, likely now falls under the Southern TRB. [13]
Cyberspace Force Northern Technical Reconnaissance Base
The Northern Technical Reconnaissance Base (北部技术侦查基地; N-TRB) is assigned the cover designator of Unit 32065 and is located at No. 22 East Daying Road, Shenhe District, Shenyang. It also appears to maintain a second site at No. 1 Sushan Road, Tianqiao District, Jinan (山东省济南市天桥区粟山路1号) (Shandong University, April 27, 2023); Shandong University Student Career Guidance Center, March 8, 2023). The Northern TRB is principally comprised of the former Jinan MR and Shenyang MR TRBs, units 72959 and 65016. Composed of at least ten offices, the Northern TRB maintains sites across the Northern Theater area of responsibility, including in Harbin, Jinan, Dalian, Weihai, Dandong, Mudanjiang, Changchun, Hohhot, Hulunbuir, Alxa, and Yanbian. [14]
Cyberspace Force Central Technical Reconnaissance Base
The Central Technical Reconnaissance Base (中部技术侦查基地; C-TRB) is assigned the cover designator of Unit 32081 and is located at No. 8 Xiangshan South Road, Haidian District, Beijing—an address it shares with the headquarters of the former PLAAF 1st Technical Reconnaissance Bureau, Unit 95830 (Beijing Zhongtian Guohong, October 20, 2017; Jing City, No date). The former Beijing MR Technical Reconnaissance Bureau, Unit 66407, forms the core of the TRB and is located near headquarters at No. 87 Xiangshan South Road (Jing City, no date). The Central TRB is overwhelmingly concentrated in the Beijing area, maintaining at least six units across Haidian and Daxing districts, with additional sites in Xi’an, Jinan, Hohhot, Langfang, and Hanzhong (Haitou Net, March 10, 2023).
Cyberspace Force Cyberspace Operations Base
The Cyberspace Force Cyberspace Operations Base (网络空间作战基地; WZJD or CSOB) is an entirely new Corps Leader-grade organization, equivalent in echelon and serving alongside the regional TRBs. It is responsible for cyber offense, electronic warfare, psychological warfare, and advanced cybersecurity research capabilities nation-wide (Beijing Normal University, December 10, 2020). The Cyberspace Operations Base has comprehensively consolidated disparate cyber espionage, cyber offense, electronic warfare, psychological warfare, and cybersecurity technology research and development (R&D) units from the former 3PLA, 4PLA, PLAAF, PLAN, PLARF, and military regions. Assigned the designator of Unit 32087, the Cyberspace Operations Base is headquartered at No. 9 Fengrun East Road, Haidian District, Beijing (北京市海淀区丰润东路9号) in the Da’niufang Community (大牛房社区). The unit has been variously referred to as the Information Technology Force (信息技术部队), the Cybersecurity Base (网络安全基地), and the Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Information Center (网络空间与电子战信息中心) (FX361, October 21, 2018; Strategic Support Force, 2023; Facebook/Joseph Wen, May 16, 2024). The cause for the variation in naming for this unit is unclear and may be the result of the inherent secrecy of the unit itself.
Table 2: Cyberspace Operations Base Cyber Units and Their Locations
| Unit | Old Name | Location |
| Cyberspace Force Unit 32075 | Former Nanjing MR 1st TRB Unit 73611 | Nanjing Xuanwu |
| Cyberspace Force Unit 32045 | Former PLA Navy 2nd TRB Unit 92762 | Xiamen Jimei |
| Cyberspace Force Unit 32059 | Former 3PLA 6th Bureau Unit 61726 | Wuhan Hongshan |
| Cyberspace Force Unit 32061 | Former Jinan MR TRB Unit 65016 | Jinan Tianqiao |
| Cyberspace Force Unit 32066 | Former Chengdu MR 2nd TRB Unit 78020 | Kunming Wuhua |
| Cyberspace Force Central TRB Unit 32081 | Former PLAAF 1st TRB Unit 95380 | Beijing |
| PLA Rocket Force Unit 96669 | (Designation maintained) | Beijing |
(Source: Author research)
The Cyberspace Operations Base can be thought of as being composed of four major components or “types” of forces; namely, cyber warfare, electronic warfare, psychological warfare, and cyber R&D. The base’s cyber units are organized into offices (处) that are dispersed across the Military Theaters and broadly align with the boundaries set forth by Military Theaters and TRBs. Some elements or sections (科) of former MR and Service TRBs appear to have been seconded to the Cyberspace Operations Base. These have been separated and redesignated under a new cover designation.
The Cyberspace Operation Base’s electronic warfare forces are consolidated under Unit 32090, a Division Leader-grade unit based out of Beidaihe Qinghuangdao. Unit 32090 is primarily composed of the former 4PLA’s strategic electronic warfare brigades, which include Unit 61906 based in Langfang and Unit 61251 based in Qinghuangdao and with which the headquarters of 32090 is collocated. Unit 32090 has also absorbed a number of former PLA Navy radar and electronic warfare units, including Unit 91709 based out of Beijing’s Yanqing district and two unnamed units based out of Rongcheng, Weihai and Jimo, Qingdao in Shandong Province.
Table 2: Cyberspace Operations Base Cyber Units and Their Locations
| Name (English) | Name (Chinese) | Location | Year Built |
| Unit 32090 Yingtan Yuehu Detachment | 32090部队鹰潭营区 | East of Helongqiao Jiangjia (何垄桥姜家) off Old Route 206 (G206旧) | 2010–2013 |
| Unit 32090 Shanghai Nicheng Detachment | 32090部队泥城营区 | Huangpu District, Shanghai (南芦公路Nanlu Highway, | 2021 |
| Unit 32090 Ledong Hainan Detachment | 32090部队乐东营区 | Ledong Li Autonomous County No. 031 Township Road (乐东黎族自治县031乡道) | 2021–2025 |
| Unit 32090 Nyingchi Tibet Detachment | 32090部队林芝营区 | Uraki Village, Bayi District, Nyingchi City (浦给及乐巴宜区林芝市) | 2021–2024 |
| Unit 32090 Yanqing Detachment or PLAN Unit 91290 | 32090部队延庆营区海军91290部队 | No. 251 Zhuojiaying Village, Yanqing District, Beijing (北京市延庆区东卓家营村251号) | 2022–2025 |
(Source: Cpeee, October 28, 2020; Bidradar, June 8, 2021; 99steel.cn, June 29, 2021; Thepaper.cn, July 26, 2021; Ixbang, December 20, 2022)
Since its creation shortly after the reforms, Unit 32090 has seen a rapid and far-ranging expansion of its space-sensing and non-kinetic counterspace assets, building on its existing counterspace detachments in Nicheng, Shanghai and Yuehu, Yingtan, in Jiangxi Province. Additional sites are located in Nyingchi, Tibet and in Ledong, Hainan Island. As of 2020, each site, now including the PLAN Yanqing facility, sports a 30-meter parabolic antenna accompanied by at least four 13-meter radome-covered dishes. This focus on space tracking and counterspace jamming reinforces the PLA’s long-standing view that the U.S. military’s dependence on space-based C4ISR [16] constitutes a critical vulnerability—even describing the U.S. as a “no satellite, no fight” (无星不战) (FX361, July 22, 2016).
The technology R&D contingent of the Cyberspace Operations Base is a collection of disparate former 3PLA and 4PLA units that have historically played operational supporting roles in vulnerability discovery, encryption breaking, and the development of tactics, tools, techniques, and procedures for bypassing or circumventing cybersecurity defenses. These units are particularly vital in the success of PLA cyber operations. Though ostensibly conducted for computer network defense purposes, such research is equally applicable to computer network attack and provides a steady source of new and evolving tools and exploits for PLA cyber operations conducted by the Cyberspace Force. Designated as Unit 32085, it is based at the headquarters of former Unit 61539, also known as the Beijing North Computing Center (北京北方计算中心), located in Shaoziying (哨子营) just East of the Central Party School’s North Gate (中共中央党校北门) (Project 2049, November 11, 2011, p. 20).
Unit 32085 appears to oversee or at least be affiliated with Unit 32082, which notes Shaoziying as its primary address in patent filings (Wanfang, June 21, 2019). Also known as Unit 61770, it appears to be the new designation for the cyber warfare research portion of the former General Staff Department 54th Research Institute (总参五十四所; GSD 54RI). It also continues to operate out of a small facility in Hongfu Business Park (宏富创业园) in Beijing’s Changping District (YktChina, May 13, 2019; Wanfang, June 21, 2019, January 19, 2021). Members of this office were indicted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in February 2020 for their alleged part in the 2017 cyberattack against Equifax (FBI, February 10, 2020).
The Cyberspace Operations Base also oversees Unit 32070, which with 32051 is one of two military designations for the 56th Research Institute (五十六研究所; 56RI), based out of Wuxi, Jiangsu Province. Also known as the Jiangnan Institute of Computing Technology (江南计算技术研究所), it is a wholly PLA-owned commercial enterprise and research institute that researches and develops advanced computer chips, semiconductors, quantum computing, and encryption technologies for both the PLA and commercial sale. It is best known for the development of the Sunway (申威) series of computer chips, the principal source for the PRC’s record-breaking supercomputer the Sunway Taihu Light (神威太湖之光) (PC World, June 20, 2016; China Money Network, May 23, 2018).
Unit 32070 likely specifically designates the 56RI’s information security subsidiary, known as the Jiangnan Information Security Engineering Technology Center (江南信息安全工程技术中心; JIST or “security center”) (Jiangsu Encryption Bureau, October 20, 2017). Though headquartered in Wuxi, Unit 32070 established a computing and testing center on Zhongkai Road, Songjiang District, Shanghai some time in 2018. (Sohu, April 11, 2022; Shanghai.gov, August 12, 2024)
Analysis
Now more easily evaluated outside of the SSF construct, the Cyberspace Force appears to be a critical tool for the CMC in shaping the PLA into a modern, joint force able to wage wars under informatized conditions. The regional TRBs and the Cyberspace Operations Base appear to be designed specifically to address key bureaucratic and practical shortcomings in the PLA’s operational structure, serving to centralize and consolidate strategic resources in ways that allow for greater oversight, planning, and control. This in turn serves the political need of assured CMC control as well as the practical need of subjective, prudent allocation of resources according to operational priorities.
The regional TRBs appear to be crafted specifically to simplify and address the complex, overlapping, and siloed technical intelligence apparatus that existed prior to the reforms. The TRBs have consolidated technical collection and analysis under one roof, a situation which at least hypothetically diminishes bureaucratic barriers to intelligence fusion. This provides clear operational and practical advantages. The TRBs are in a much better position than any of their predecessor organizations to optimize collection and craft more comprehensive situational awareness. They face fewer bureaucratic hurdles and can employ a far greater span of assets.
Political considerations could also be behind the reorganization, beyond any efficiency gains from the more streamlined structure. Consolidating and centralizing technical collection under the TRBs while charging them with supporting Military Theater Commands has diminished service-level intelligence collection. As a result, operational elements are more dependent on the military theater joint construct for intelligence information necessary for their operations. This has the effect of increasing the inherent institutional power of the Military Theaters while providing a critical demonstration of the value promised by the new joint construct. It also demonstrates the risks service elements face if deprived of it.
In this, more cynical view, the CMC’s decision to make the TRBs answerable to the Cyberspace Force rather than to the theaters is likely part of a delicate balancing act. To prevent competing power centers from emerging, power is distributed and “checks” in PLA organizational structure are maintained. In this arrangement, the CMC effectively hold the reins of regional and global situational battlespace awareness for the theaters and the services.
The Cyberspace Operations Base, which now oversees the PRC’s offensive cyber forces, is likely a critical factor in the significant increase in the technical sophistication, maturity, and operational discipline seen by PLA cyber operations over the last ten years. It has likely also afforded the CMC the direct control necessary to instill the operational discipline and focus that now characterize PLA cyber operations. Prior to the reforms, PLA cyber operations were known for their “smash and grab” tactics, frequent moonlighting, and incessant commercial intellectual property theft. Since the reforms, which broadly coincided with the 2015 Xi-Obama agreement that carried stipulations on restraining cyber operations, PLA cyber forces appear to have refocused on “legitimate” intelligence targets and operational preparation of the battlespace consistent with PLA conception of use of cyber operations in the opening stage of conflict (The White House, September 25, 2015). This includes targeting critical infrastructure in the United States (CISA, accessed April 25).
The consolidation of the PRC’s cyber forces has also allowed greater scalability and sharing of exploits, tools, tradecraft, and infrastructure across the myriad cyber operational units under the Cyberspace Force. Prior to the reforms, the 3PLA, 4PLA, services, and MRs each maintained their own vulnerability discovery, tool development, and infrastructure procurement apparatus. Their integration under the Cyberspace Operations Base enables a level of knowledge and information sharing that creates economies of scale, which in turn increases effectiveness while reducing costs for each operation.
Conclusion
The Cyberspace Force is a visceral demonstration of the depth of reform and centralization the PLA is willing to achieve to advance its operational capabilities. While specific numbers are difficult to come by, the sheer degree of development and expansion of the PRC’s technical intelligence and cyber forces over the last ten years are remarkable. Beijing now possesses a truly global intelligence apparatus less stymied by parochial and bureaucratic interests.
Any version of conflict that the PRC envisions will involve cyber in its opening stages. This makes the Cyberspace Force a critical service branch to watch in the coming years, as it serves as an essential bellwether as to what conflicts Beijing anticipates and what conflicts it is tacitly preparing for.
Notes
[1] (NJUers Employment Enlightenment Development System, December 4, 2023)
[2] China-tender, June 4, 2018
[3] (China Military Online, January 2, 2018; University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, March 3, 2024; Peking University Student Careers Center, March 15, 2024)
[4] (StarOceans, December 8, 2017)
[5] (Yixinjie, August 29, 2019)
[6] (Youmifa, April 8, 2021)
[7] (Shandong University Student Career Guidance Center, March 8, 2023)
[8] (Nankai University, April 25, 2025)
[9] (Bidcenter, September 19, 2019)
[10] (Beijing Zhongtian Guohong, October 20, 2017)
[11] An SSF 2024 recruitment plan lists what is likely the Eastern TRB as Unit 242438 (“2024 Public Recruitment Position Plan for Civilian Personnel in the Military (Excluding Positions with Interview Before Written Exam, 2024).
[12] An SSF 2024 recruitment plan lists what is likely the Eastern TRB as Unit 242439 (“2024 Public Recruitment Position Plan for Civilian Personnel in the Military (Excluding Positions with Interview Before Written Exam, 2024).
[13] An SSF 2024 recruitment plan lists what is likely the Eastern TRB as Unit 242440 (“2024 Public Recruitment Position Plan for Civilian Personnel in the Military (Excluding Positions with Interview Before Written Exam, 2024).
[14] An SSF 2024 recruitment plan lists what is likely the Eastern TRB as Unit 242441 (“2024 Public Recruitment Position Plan for Civilian Personnel in the Military (Excluding Positions with Interview Before Written Exam, 2024).
[15] An SSF 2024 recruitment plan lists what is likely the Eastern TRB as Unit 242442 (“2024 Public Recruitment Position Plan for Civilian Personnel in the Military (Excluding Positions with Interview Before Written Exam, 2024).
[16] Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.
