Putin Turns to Linguistics Like Dictators Before Him

Executive Summary:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin has made knowledge and use of the Russian language central to his understanding of Russian identity, the basis of links between the Russian population and his regime, and a key part of his foreign policy.
• Putin has also declared that the Russian language is currently subject to attack by other powers with other languages and that these attacks require the constant intervention of the state to defend it from corruption and defeat.
• The Russian leader has denigrated the non-Russian languages spoken by many in the Russian Federation and suggested that they are first and foremost a means of connecting to Russian and thus to the broader world.

More than any previous Moscow ruler, Russian President Vladimir Putin has made knowledge and use of the Russian language central to his understanding of Russian identity, a core link between the Russian people and his regime, and a key element in his foreign policy (Russian Presidential Academy, November 6). Tsars typically put the Orthodox faith at the center, and the Soviets used Marxism-Leninism. The current Kremlin leader, however, has made language more than anything else the basis of identity and loyalty for residents of the Russian Federation and even for those abroad who are linked to Moscow or whom he hopes will be (Wsem.ru, June 11). While stressing the power and importance of the Russian language, Putin has also suggested that it is currently subject to attack by other powers with other languages. He claims that these continuing attacks require the constant intervention of the state to defend it from corruption and defeat, something he has committed himself to doing, and that allows Russians to feel both triumphant and victims at the same time (Business Online, June 5). As part of his support for the Russian language, Putin has threatened the non-Russian languages spoken by many in the Russian Federation and suggested that their speakers must learn Russian and use it as their primary means of communication, not only with others in Russia but also more generally (Window on Eurasia, June 8).

These ideas have been present in Putin’s discourse since he came to power. They converged, however, last week at a meeting of the state council on June 5 devoted to state language policies. (For a transcript of these remarks, see President of Russia, June 5; and for an initial Russian discussion of their meaning, see Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 5.) This was unsurprising given his past actions and the propensity of dictators to focus on language as a value, which does not limit them nearly as much as any religious or political faith. Similar to Mussolini, for example, who promoted the Italian language, which he viewed as important not only in its own right but as a link to the glories of the Roman Empire, and Stalin, who argued near the end of his life that Russian not pass away as some interpretations of Marxism-Leninism suggested it would, Putin has now made clear that he views the Russian language as key to holding Russia together and even to expand more broadly beyond its borders (Mees, Kirk, “Stalin, Marr and the struggle for a Soviet linguistics,” 2006; University of Oslo, June 3, 2019). That is all the more the case since he and his supporters have followed up his remarks with additional comments along the same line, as well as the speeding up of the adoption of new laws governing the teaching and use of Russian at home and abroad (Parlamentskaya Gazeta, June 11; Regnum, June 10).

Because Putin has pushed Russian so hard in the past, his speech on June 6 may well be dismissed as little more than a codification of what he has done and hopes to do. Even those who take that view, however, can easily see that the Kremlin leader’s decision to raise the issue to a new level—both by bringing these disparate ideas together and making some new proposals as well—suggests that it will become a turning point in Russian policies and politics.

There are three reasons for that conclusion. First, as even Putin himself conceded, work on supporting non-Russian languages has gone far slower than Moscow promised. His regime likely intended this, and that signals the further decline of their importance in his mind and a development that is already sparking additional anger among non-Russians (Chechen State Television and Radio Company – Grozny, June 9). Second, Putin elevated Fyodor Tyuchev, a minor poet, tsarist censor, and conservative nationalist police spy, over Aleksandr Pushkin, long acknowledged as the national poet of Russia, as the candidate for regime commemorations during their shared anniversary year of 2028, something hitherto unthinkable and certain to be much criticized (RIA Novosti, June 5). Third, the Kremlin leader called for creating new centers to promote the study of Russian, not only within the Russian Federation but also abroad, to further unite the country and spread Moscow’s influence (Vedomosti, June 5).

The most important aspects of Putin’s speech lie elsewhere, starting with the fact that he gave it at all. That choice almost certainly reflects his concern that unless everyone in Russia is fluent in Russian, his country could be at risk of disintegration along ethnic and, thus, in his mind, linguistic lines, given his definition of nationality. According to some Russian commentators, that is what Putin believes has happened in Ukraine (The New Times, June 9). These analysts warn that, at the very least, Putin’s approach will further isolate Russians from the rest of the world (The New Times, June 9). The most important consequence of Putin’s speech is likely that his focus on language will not only further divide ethnic Russians and non-Russians within the Russian Federation, but also Russian speakers and others in some foreign countries as well.

Non-Russians inside Russia are certain to view Putin’s words as a sign that he plans to step up his effort to Russianize and even Russify them. This has the added threat that if they stop speaking their national languages, Putin will likely no longer view them as separate nations with the right to have their own state institutions. The Kremlin leader’s words obviously support such a conclusion. To the extent that non-Russians within the Russian Federation read it that way, they will become more radicalized in their defense of their languages and thus their nations. That sets the stage for increased ethnic conflict in Russia itself, exactly the opposite of the future Putin wants but one he is making inevitable by violating what most have long understood to be true: multi-national states put themselves at risk when they try to promote the language and culture of the largest nation at the expense of all others.

This problem for Moscow will not end at the borders of the Russian Federation. By conflating Russian-speaking with a Russian national identity loyal to Moscow, Putin will unwittingly be promoting ethnic conflict in many former Soviet republics and hostility to Moscow, which is now openly conflating the Russian language with loyalty to Moscow. Many non-Russian nationalists in these countries already believe that it is already true, and Putin has just provided them with evidence that they are right. His words thus are likely to prove far more fateful than he expects—and in a direction far different from what he wants.