Russia’s Soaring Serious Crime Rate Harbinger of Conflict in North Caucasus

Executive Summary:

• Serious crime has risen to its highest level since 2010 in Russia because of the influx of weapons from Moscow’s war against Ukraine, as well as the Kremlin’s increased focus on prosecuting corruption.
• The influx of weapons into Russia, brought into the country by returning veterans or sold by Russian army personnel in Ukraine into the Russian black market, has made instances of violence more difficult for authorities to ignore.
• The situation in the North Caucasus is especially concerning to Moscow. Officials have long played down ethnic clashes, but worsening violence is forcing them to acknowledge the seriousness of ethnic tensions in the region.

Charges involving what Russian officials call “serious” and “especially serious” crimes have risen dramatically over the last year to their highest level since 2010. These crimes, which include major acts of corruption, treason, and the use of weapons in the commission of criminal acts, have increased despite the overall number of criminal charges in Russia falling for four consecutive years (Fedstat.ru, accessed July 2025; United24 Media, July 8). Russian officials and news outlets are specifically focused on growing cases of serious corruption, crimes by migrants, and crimes by ever younger people (TASS, June 3; Vesti Moskovskovo Regiona; Regnum, July 8). Recently, the media and the Kremlin have begun to identify the war itself as a significant criminogenic factor. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine creates opportunities for crime and corruption while driving an influx of weapons and veterans into Russia, making crime more violent (see EDM, February 25).

The increase in serious crimes is most pronounced in the regions bordering Ukraine, where weapons and war-related disorder are most widespread (see EDM, July 10). Ethnic minority regions of Russia far from the Ukraine border, particularly the republics of the North Caucasus, however, are gaining more Kremlin attention for an uptick in violent crime (Kavkaz Realii, July 9; Komsomolskaya, July 13). Even though officials previously dismissed low-level violence in the Caucasus as routine, conflict cannot so easily be ignored when the participants are armed with weapons brought back by soldiers returning from the war against Ukraine. This increase in violence contradicts Moscow’s claim of a pacified Caucasus and suggests that Moscow may soon face more violent challenges in the region than it has in the past decade (Window on Eurasia, July 11). 

Over the last month, the Russian Interior Ministry has been releasing statistics on the number of crimes committed between January and June of 2025 (Fedstat.ru, accessed July 2025). The figures that have alarmed Russians most concern the rise in “serious” and “especially serious” crimes, two categories which cover crimes ranging from major corruption to armed violence. The Interior Ministry’s data is not broken down by category, making it difficult to specify what has driven the increase in the rate of “serious” and “especially serious” crimes. Observers point to the Kremlin’s campaign against major corruption or other factors, including more crime among migrants and the young, and the increasing availability of guns flowing from Putin’s war against Ukraine. Greater availability of firearms has led many who commit crimes to do so with weapons, boosting the number of those charged with serious or especially serious crimes. Statements by Russian officials and observers suggest that the push to prosecute corruption is driving the increase in “serious” and “especially serious” charges in Moscow and other predominantly ethnic Russian regions (Vibor Naroda, June 16). Greater access to firearms is likely a more relevant factor in the increase of crimes in non-Russian areas in general and the North Caucasus in particular (see EDM, May 9, 2024, October 22, 2024; Kavkaz Realii, June 26).

Greater violent crime in the North Caucasus is worrisome to the Kremlin, given its continuing problems with restive regions far from Moscow. Serious crimes in the North Caucasus are rising at a rate equal to or greater than the figures for the country as a whole (Fedstat.ru, accessed July 2025). Slightly more than a third of the 13,093 “serious” or “extremely serious” charges registered in North Caucasus in the first half of 2025 were in Stavropol krai at around 5,200 (Fedstat.ru, accessed July 2025). The interior ministry reported 3,100 “serious” or “extremely serious” convictions in Dagestan, 1,600 in North Ossetia, 1,300 in Kabardino-Balkaria, 908 in Karachayevo-Cherkessia, 515 in Ingushetia, and 490 in Chechnya. The greatest increase over the last year came in Adygeya, reflecting its low initial crime numbers (Fedstat.ru, accessed July 2025). The next biggest increases were found in Kalmykia, Chechnya, and Karachayevo-Cherkessia (Kavkaz Realii, January 15, July 9). Many of those crimes may have been the selfish actions of individuals, but at least some who faced serious charges acted on behalf of their national or ethnic group. Communities in the North Caucasus are gaining more people and weapons as veterans return from Ukraine, rendering the region better armed than it has been in recent history (Window on Eurasia, May 17).

The clearest examples of armed groups converging with ethnic activists have arisen in Dagestan and Ingushetia. In both cases, the return of veterans from Putin’s war against Ukraine has intensified land disputes, with returning veterans wanting land currently in the hands of others, frequently other ethnic groups (VKrizis.ru, March 5; Kavkaz Realii, May 15). So far, the government has taken the side of returning veterans, encouraging them to be ever more assertive in their land claims. Those in possession of the land are resisting forcefully in turn because if they lose their land, they will lose their way of life as well. The government has attempted to resolve these disputes through the courts due to a serious shortage of police officers (Kavkaz Realii, November 15, 2024; VKrizis.ru, March 5; see EDM, March 11, July 10; Kavkaz Realii; Fortanga, May 15).

Land is in short supply in the North Caucasus republics as their population continues to grow. Land disputes are becoming increasingly common and violent, particularly when they arise between ethnicities and nationalities. The government is using the courts to try to rein in such disputes lest they provoke widespread unrest (Telegram/@fortangaorg, April 11, 2023; Telegram/@sunzha_rayon, April 10). The combination of returning veterans and increased availability of weapons makes the situation likely to deteriorate further (Profil, January 16). The shortage of police, cases where police members join criminal groups, and the connection between land disputes and Islamist causes may transform what appear to be simple land disputes into triggers of new wars in the North Caucasus (Kavkazskiy Uzel, July 7, July 10). If the conflict continues to escalate, Moscow will face a serious challenge to its authority as its North Caucasian troops return home from Ukraine (Vestnik Kavkaza, December 20, 2011; Fortanga, July 9, 2021).