Ongoing Civil Protests in Georgia Hope to Create New Political Reality

Executive Summary:

• Daily youth-led protests against the Georgian Dream government continue on Tbilisi’s Rustaveli Avenue, with participants calling for new elections, the release of detained protesters, and, in some cases, full-on revolution.
• The lack of substantive results from the demonstrations, as well as an inability for the opposition to coalesce and rally around the protesters, may cause some fatigue and frustration among the oppositional segment of the population.
• Georgian Dream officials have capitalized on these sentiments as well as Western support of the demonstrators to delegitimize the protests and brush them off as a Western-supported operation aimed at regime change.
• The inability of newer political parties to cooperate fully with traditional opposition parties has hurt the protesters’ ability to consolidate widespread public support, foster real change, and the lack of a central charismatic leader for the movement could doom the protests.

The ongoing civilian protests in Georgia demonstrate the previously untapped potential of civic activism, compelling the Georgian authorities to take preventive measures. On July 2, the Georgian Dream government held the final hearing to approve amendments to the administrative code that would allow for the prosecution of citizens who fail to pay protest-related fines (OC Media, July 3). While some grassroots experts question how realistic enforcement may be, this is a clear effort by Tbilisi to quell civil protests and limit the opposition’s ability to challenge Georgian Dream, potentially triggering a change in government.

In recent years, Georgia and the international community have witnessed a novel form of protest in the country, combining aspects of civil disobedience alongside a political dimension (see EDM, April 24, December 6, 10, 2024; Civil Georgia, May 20). Previously lesser-known youth groups have been at the forefront of these protests. The Georgian Dream government, as a result, has sought to tamp down the ongoing protests, discourage future demonstrations, and, in some cases, arrest those leading the public dissent (see EDM, July 10).

For months, the country has witnessed scenes reminiscent of its earlier revolutions, with citizens converging on Tbilisi and other cities in waves of protests. The ruling Georgian Dream party’s decision to suspend negotiations on EU accession until 2028 has become the primary catalyst for the daily protests (Civil Georgia, November 28, 2024; see EDM, December 6, 2024).

The epicenter of the protests has been the central Rustaveli Avenue in Tbilisi (Civil Georgia, June 30). The demonstrations have gone through two primary phases. The first phase was quite violent. Both law enforcement and protesters were injured, and about 50 activists were arrested. The second phase, which is currently underway, has centered on peaceful protest. Each day, the rally culminates with protesters blocking Rustaveli Avenue for several hours. The general profile of the participants in the forefront of the protests is mainly Gen-Z youth groups; nevertheless, other age groups are also present (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 10, 2024). Each group hopes to secure a peaceful, democratic, and European future for Georgia’s children.

The protesters are fully committed to Georgia’s European integration. They strongly believe that after gaining membership in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), all the country’s problems will be resolved. The demonstrators contend that the October 2024 parliamentary elections were rigged and demand new elections (OC Media, February 26). They also characterize Georgian Dream policies as anti-European and see the government’s approach as dragging Georgia back under the Kremlin’s influence. Perhaps most noteworthy, the protesters consider themselves proactive and engaged citizens. Many have participated in different projects, seminars, study courses, and workshops, funded by international donors. They are knowledgeable about methods of civil resistance and hold the necessary toolkit for that. Some observers closely watching the protests argue that the demonstrations have turned into somewhat of a generational conflict (Eurasianet, September 18, 2024).

The emergence of pro-European youth groups in Georgia came from the turbulent events of June 2019 (see EDM, December 3, 2019, January 20, 2020). The 2019 protests clearly showed that despite relatively smooth Russian-Georgian relations under the Georgian Dream government, anti-Russian sentiments in Georgian society, especially among the youth, have been growing. The younger generations are not prepared to forgive Georgian Dream officials for actions that damage Georgia’s European orientation (JAM-News, June 20, 2022). Thereafter, the Georgian public witnessed a series of highly politicized protest “performances” that put pressure on the government and those citizens and officials whom the protesters considered to be anti-Western and pro-Russian.

The protests were led by groups comprising the youth who have grown up in Georgian society over the past two decades. These young people have no emotional, cultural, or other ties to Georgia’s Soviet past and its contemporary relations with Russia. This part of the population, often called the “passionate minority,” attempts to distinguish itself from the “energy-deficient” part of Georgian society (i.e., “passive majority”) still tied to the Soviet era and opposing any real changes. This situation often devolves into widespread social discord, which the Georgian Dream government looks to exploit in its attempts to label adversaries as “foreign agents” (see EDM, April 24, 2024, February 11, April 15, May 19). Most methods of political performance are borrowed from the Western playbook of nonviolent civil resistance intertwined with Georgian national elements (Georgia Today, December 26, 2024). These groups are positioning themselves at the core of a new emerging society in Georgia.

Thus far, attempts to transform these “performances” into meaningful political outcomes have been largely unsuccessful.  The demonstrators have failed to win over at least part of the “passive majority” and engage them in more active forms of protest. Furthermore, the Georgian public’s experience with civil protest has shown that such acts remain nonviolent until a certain point, at which they almost always devolve into aggressive actions. Critical and suspicious attitudes toward the youth-led “performances” only grow when clandestine political actors become increasingly visible behind these protests (For.ge, July 19, 2019; Eurasianet, September 18, 2024; Ijab.de, March 29).

The protests on Rustaveli Avenue have led certain experts to proclaim the rise of a new form of civil society (Mozaikanews, January 9). For example, the Social Justice Center, a Tbilisi-based nongovernmental organization, argues:

Distrust of the political class and a special social crisis have intensified citizens’ sense of responsibility and faith in their own strength … The bottom-up construction of democracy has appeared symbolically and spatially on Rustaveli. Here, urban public space and political public space coincide (Social Justice Center, June 2).

Others in Georgian society have added their voices to the growing wave of dissent (Georgia Today, December 1, 2024). Notably, some archbishops of the Georgian Orthodox Church, typically recognized for their pro-government stances, have expressed their support for the protesters (On.ge, January 6). They argue that Russia is leveraging monotheism as a primary tool of political influence over Georgian believers, rendering them particularly susceptible to Kremlin propaganda.

One tangible result from the protests has been the emergence of new political parties founded by some activists. For example, the left-wing “Movement for Social Democracy” was founded in February to fight the “deliberate plunder of our people, nature, and Soviet infrastructure” (Civil Georgia, February 18). In March, Levan Tsutskiridze, executive director of the Eastern European Centre for Multiparty Democracy, transformed the “Freedom Square” political movement into an official party to influence Georgian politics more independently (Civil Georgia, July 1, 2024, March 9). Another party, “Sartuli (Floor) – Power of the New Generation,” was founded by students and young people actively participating in pro-European protests. During the first official press conference in April, party leader Vado Machavariani declared:

We are calling on those who understand that both European and, most importantly, national forces are necessary. We seek individuals who are weary of the old political corruption, who are tired of seeing the present sacrificed for personal interests, and who are dismayed by our future slipping away while people leave the country (1tv.ge, April 10).

Whether these newly founded political entities will succeed in becoming an effective political arm of the youth-led protests, winning over the electorate of mainstream opposition parties, and establishing themselves as self-sustained parties remains to be seen.

Differences between the traditional conservative majority and the new civic activists and their parties hinder efforts aimed at embracing a sizeable part of Georgian society. The recent calls to overthrow the government through revolution, accompanied by torchlight processions reminiscent of Ukraine’s Euromaidan, only deepen this divergence (Rustavi 2, June 16, 30). Even with a shared disdain for the Georgian Dream government, a sizeable part of the protest electorate fears that a revolution, especially one involving violent means, would only sow more chaos and destabilization. Moreover, the lack of substantive progress in achieving the stated goals—new parliamentary elections under new rules and the release of imprisoned protesters—has led to some fatigue and frustration among certain segments of the oppositional electorate. This is reflected in the steady decline of the number of participants in the protests (Eurasianet, January 6).

The protest actions have coincided with tougher Western sanctions on Georgian Dream officials and strongly worded resolutions condemning the country’s democratic backsliding (see EDM, January 23, June 2, 16; Congress.gov, May 6; 1tv.ge, June 19). Many Western officials have also expressed political and moral support for the protesters (Business Media, July 9). The outspoken support serves as another argument for the government and its supporters to present the demonstrations as a Western-supported scheme to overthrow the government through another “color revolution.” Georgian Dream officials consistently attempt to portray protesters as merely paid “performers” who receive funds from Western donors. Tbilisi also dismisses them as marginal gangs of hoodlums who are fighting against the country’s conservative cultural traditions (EUvsDisInfo, March 2). Moscow has proactively endorsed these narratives in pursuing its own geopolitical interests—namely, preventing anti-Russian forces from coming to power in Georgia (International Affairs Journal, March 25; TASS, June 5). 

These narratives have influenced a significant portion of the population, contributing to the growth of Euroskeptic sentiments. The latest data from the Eurobarometer 2025 survey partially confirms this reality. The results reveal that between the fall of 2024 and spring of 2025, Georgian citizens’ trust in the European Union dropped from 58 to 49 percent (European Union, March/April 2025; Civil Georgia, June 4). Nevertheless, in contrast, a more recent poll from the Tbilisi-based Institute for Social Research and Analysis shows that the pro-European mood in society remains high, and most of those polled believe that under Georgian Dream policies, Georgia is moving in the wrong direction. The survey also reflects that most of those polled, to some extent, support the continuation of the ongoing rallies (Ekho Kavkaza, June 16).

Despite the polling data, the number of individuals engaging in protest activities has markedly declined. At present, it is primarily the most committed youth groups that continue to protest. Expectations that former President Salome Zourabichvili’s initiative, the “Platform of Resistance,” would revitalize the rallies have not yet materialized, despite several youth organizations involved in the protests joining the platform (Ekho Kavkaza, April 4). Former President Mikheil Saakashvili’s party, the United National Movement, has renewed its criticism of Zourabichvili for misreading the situation (1tv.ge July 10). Other parties, such as Gakharia For Georgia, have diminished their participation. As a result, the platform’s ability to serve as a new catalyst for protests has been notably weakened. Additionally, Zourabichvili’s waning popularity has hurt the platform’s appeal.

In April, parents and relatives of those detained for protesting launched an effort to boost the demonstrations. Having previously participated in opposition rallies, these family members have come together to form a new public movement, gearing up to devise new methods of protest (Ekho Kavkaza, April 4). Nevertheless, their fervent trips throughout Georgia’s regions and the dissemination of specially printed newspapers containing letters from imprisoned activists have yet to rally more of the general public to join the demonstrations.

Apparently inspired by the European Parliament’s latest and especially stringent resolution about Georgia, eight opposition parties and street protest participants announced a new protest march on July 19 to reaffirm their refusal to participate in the self-government “elections,” which they labeled as a “Russian special operation” (Business Media, July 7).

At times, understanding the rationale behind protesters’ actions can be challenging. They urge opposition leaders, public figures, students, and all advocates of the pro-European agenda to come together, yet simultaneously express a reluctance to include party leaders in their daily demonstrations. Georgian Dream is exerting every effort to delegitimize the youth-driven street protests as a Western-backed operation, thus hoping to diminish the protests’ impact. Consequently, those at the forefront of the rallies will be required to function within an increasingly adversarial legislative framework, which seeks to significantly restrict the activities of civil organizations and opposition groups as well as their funding sources (Transparency International, April 4; European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, June 17; Interpressnews, July 1). Despite demands for the non-participation of pro-Western opposition parties in upcoming local elections, Lelo-Strong Georgia and Gakharia-For Georgia agreed to cooperate in the elections (Netgazeti.ge, July 7; Civil Georgia, July 14). The long-desired, but still unfulfilled, unity of the pro-Western opposition groups is at serious risk.

It remains to be seen how long the youth-led movements will be able to sustain the daily protests. The disorganization and inconsistency of the protesters’ communication strategies, an overestimation of their own capabilities and influence, and inflated expectations regarding Western support could hurt the demonstrators’ ability to bring about new elections. Additionally, a reluctance to collaborate with traditional opposition parties, as well as the absence of charismatic and credible leaders, could prevent the rallies from fostering real change. If these issues are not addressed, this increased youth civic engagement risks becoming merely a case study, devoid of any significant outcomes.