Russia Future Watch – III. Buryats Rediscover Their National Identity
By:
Buryats Rediscover Their National Identity by Marina Khankhalain and members of Tusgaar Buryad, the movement for Buryatia’s independence, is the third article in a series of analyses as part of “Promethean Liberation: Russia’s Emerging National and Regional Movements,” a project from Jamestown Senior Fellow Janusz Bugajski.
Some coauthors reside in Russia and could not disclose their names for security reasons.
Executive Summary
- Heavy battlefield losses in Ukraine, police brutality at home, and corrupt local governance have sparked mass protests and produced a new wave of Buryat organizations that are coordinating with Buryat diasporas and indigenous movements across Russia to push for independence.
- The Russian conquest in the 17th century and the Stalin-era purges in the 20th century caused the Buryat homeland to be carved up, its elites and clergy executed, and its language recast. These and other moments of conquest and colonialization have created the historical grievances that undergird the current political landscape in Buryatia.
- Moscow has removed the Buryat language from core school curricula, restricted its use in official paperwork, closed academic centers, and harassed Buryat language activists. These actions have pushed cultural revival efforts onto independent online platforms and into the diaspora.
- The Soviet industrial collapse, crackdowns on Buryat businesses, and the out-migration of Slavs have all turned Buryatia into a region dependent on Moscow subsidies, which treats the resource-rich republic as a colony to fill the Kremlin’s coffers.
- Nevertheless, demographic changes over the past two decades mean that Buryats are once again nearing a majority in their homeland. This has enabled a new wave of Buryat activists to better coordinate their efforts internationally and have their voices heard in the European Union, United Nations, and various foreign ministries.
History of Conquest and Colonization
The Buryats are an indigenous Mongolic people of Siberia and the Russian Far East. Historically, they have lived in today’s Republic of Buryatia, Irkutsk Oblast, and Zabaikalsky Krai in the Russian Federation, as well as in Mongolia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).[1] Modern diasporas exist in European countries, the United States, and South Korea.
In the 17th century, Cossacks and other military contingents of Muscovite Russia began pushing eastward into the Lake Baikal region. Violence, plunder, forced attempts at Christianization, and crude interference in local life led to what historians call the “wars with the Bratsk people.”[2] These events are described in Vladimir Khamutaev’s book Bloody Russian Conquista, in which he calls the events a “patriotic war” against Russian invaders that lasted 138 years.
The Mongol khans had long regarded these lands as their own. Civil strife, however, had broken out within Mongolia around the same time. Under these circumstances, the northern Mongolian territories could not fully defend themselves. As a result, the Cossacks captured large parts of Trans-Baikalia. These gains were formalized by the 1727 Burin Treaty between the Russian Empire and the Qing Dynasty of China. Neither the Buryats nor the Mongols were party to the treaty, and their views were not considered.
The appearance of a state border cut the Buryats off from the possibility of continuing their nomadism deeper into Mongolia. The legal status of Buryats was extremely restricted. Forced baptisms, regular levies, and abuses by the colonial authorities are well documented. By the mid-19th century, the first secular Buryat intelligentsia had begun to emerge. Pyotr Stolypin’s reforms triggered a major land redistribution, with many Buryat holdings confiscated. Specifically, his resettlement program of 1906–1914 moved masses of peasants from western Russia into Siberia.[3] The Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917 spurred the Russian peasantry in Buryatia to conduct pogroms and looting of the Buryats.[4] These pogroms led to a mass emigration of Buryats to Mongolia and Inner Mongolia in China. These migrants became the nucleus of the first major Buryat diaspora.
In April 1917, the first Buryat state body, the Buryat National Committee (Burnatskom), was created. The body proclaimed the state of Buryad-Mongol Uls (Buryat-Mongolia) and formed a Buryat army, the ulaan tsagda. While the Burnatskom sided neither with the Communists nor with the Whites during the Russian Civil War, by 1923, a communist regime had been imposed. The Buryat-Mongol Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) became part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.
In 1937, the entire Buryat-Mongol leadership was arrested. Many officials, including the first party secretary, were executed. Several districts were detached from Buryat-Mongolia, and the republic was renamed the Buryat ASSR. More than 20,000 people were convicted as “enemies of the people” and shot.
The Buryats who had fled Tsarist and communist oppression to Mongolia also faced repression. By 1934, more than 34,000 Buryats lived in Mongolia, with over a third being repressed in some way or executed.[5] The deaths of many Buryat men led to a large number of mixed marriages and assimilation. In the 1930s, the writing system was changed from classical Mongolian script to Latin and then Cyrillic, separating new generations of Buryats from their pre-revolutionary cultural heritage.[6]
The crises of the Buryat nation were shaped during this period: language loss, an imposed colonial history, and a lack of access to the riches of their own culture. Under Soviet rule, a major influx of Slavic peoples came to the Buryats’ historical lands. By 1959, Russians made up 74 percent of Buryatia’s population. By the end of Soviet times, Russians numbered about 69 percent of the republic’s population.[7]
Buryatia’s Fight for Independence
The Republic of Buryatia did not gain independence during the breakup of the Soviet Union for several reasons. To begin with, the weakness and small size of the Buryat political elite after the Soviet purges and the low proportion of ethnic Buryats in the republic, 24 percent by 1989, hurt the nation’s ability to advocate for itself. Scant Buryat representation in government and an economy dominated by agriculture (up to 40 percent) further complicated independence.[8] The collapse of the Soviet economic system and the transition to a market economy caused factory closures and population outflows, while destruction of collective farms led to the mass urbanization of Buryats.[9]
Around this time, several organizations were created to advance Buryat statehood. These included the Congress of the Buryat People, led by Vladimir Khamutaev; the All-Buryat Association for the Development of Culture (VARK); and the Buryat-Mongolian People’s Party (BMNP) based on the Geser society.[10] These organizations and activists worked to revive Buryat culture and sought the reintegration of regions cut off from the republic.
Russian nationalist organizations actively opposed the Buryat movement. In November 1991, the Orthodox-patriotic group “Salvation,” Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Circle, and Bichura Old-Believer community founded the Trans-Baikal Union of the Russian People (TZRN).[11] The main goal of the organization was the “comprehensive defense of the rights and interests of the Russian people.” The TZRN advocated for abolishing the national republics and autonomies, arguing that non-Russian nations only need cultural autonomy. Instead of the Republic of Buryatia, union leaders proposed restoring the Trans-Baikal Cossack Host as part of a larger Cossack revival. A 1994 psycholinguistic analysis of Buryat press materials concluded that, although tension “comes from both sides … aggressive attitudes are more characteristic of the Russian community.”
Buryat national organizations also cooperated with some Russian democratic movements. In May 1991, during the founding of the regional branch of “Democratic Russia,” the BMNP joined alongside local branches of the Democratic Party of Russia (DPR), Social Democratic Party, and Republican Party. Later, the BMNP and the local DPR branch created the “National Accord” bloc, and in 1993, the civic association “Civil Concord of Buryatia” was founded, advocating for ethnic, religious, and social harmony.[12] A major cultural event was the Dalai Lama’s visit to Buryatia in 1991.[13] Renewed freedom of religion allowed thousands of Buryats to reconnect with the Buddhist tradition that had been suppressed during Soviet times.
Between December 1993 and June 1994, one political system came to an end in Buryatia.[14] Voters elected deputies to the Federal Assembly in two rounds, expressed their views on Russia’s constitution, chose the first president of Buryatia, and elected the People’s Khural (parliament). Resistance by Russian nationalists combined with the lack of a Buryat media and scant power representation, however, caused several political goals of the Buryat people, including independence, to fail. Despite changes to the administrative structures, the former Soviet bureaucracy remained strong.[15] The old elite retained organizational strength, strong levers of influence, and media access.
In the 1990s, Buryatia’s economy suffered a serious crisis, though some enterprises were successful in adapting to the new market.[16] The Agin-Buryat Autonomous Okrug gained a special tax-zone status and attracted private capital, poverty fell from 97 to 36 percent in five years, and the tourism and agriculture sectors developed nicely.[17]
In the early 2000s, Russian President Vladimir Putin began preparations to enlarge the federal regions, effectively abolishing the Buryat autonomies. By then, Buryat political organizations were in crisis and absent from power. The BMNP had dissolved, and the Congress of the Buryat People lost its most authoritative figure, Vladimir Saganov, who died in 1999.[18] In 2005, the Congress was liquidated by federal order.[19] VARK also faced a crisis as few members were motivated by Buryat interests. Nevertheless, its head, Bata Bayartuyev, spoke firmly against abolishing Buryat autonomies. He faced serious pressure from Russian law enforcement and frequent media attacks. Likely as a result of the immense stress, he died of a heart attack in the winter of 2006.[20]
Moscow appointed Vyacheslav Nagovitsyn as governor of Buryatia in 2007 without elections. He represented a nondemocratic leader who had never lived in the republic.[21] In 2008, two Buryat autonomous okrugs were liquidated. The Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous Okrug ceased to exist as a federal subject and was merged with Irkutsk Oblast, and the Aga Buryat Autonomous Okrug was merged with Chita Oblast to form the Zabaikal Krai.
As head of Buryatia, Nagovitsyn waged a campaign against local businesses.[22] Many profitable enterprises were closed or left the republic. The gold-mining company Buryatzoloto was absorbed into the state conglomerate Nord Gold in 2008.[23] The Evenk community Dylacha, which engaged in traditional crafts, tourism, jade mining, and building materials, was shut down amid alleged legal violations.[24] Law enforcement kidnapped Dylacha employees, and human rights defenders fled Russia.[25] The jade mines were appropriated by the “Russian Jade Company.” Baikalfarm, which had earned billions of rubles in alcohol sales for the republic, went bankrupt in 2013.[26] Nagovitsyn publicly backed federal banks, and Baikalbank, the republic’s largest bank, suffered its first hostile raid in 2006.[27] Nagovitsyn’s government forced a loan of 600 million rubles to the unprofitable Selenginsk Pulp and Cardboard Mill.[28] The bank that had once nurtured Buryatia’s big business was eventually closed in 2016.
Destroying big business made the republic dependent on government subsidies. Most residents became public-sector employees and loyal to the regime as their main employer. All this occurred amid ultranationalist Russian attacks against indigenous peoples outside the republic.[29] Besides killings and assaults of Buryats, routine discrimination spread throughout Russia’s regions and included renting housing only to Slavs and constant identification checks.[30] In 2012, the Buryat language ceased to be a compulsory school subject and was removed altogether from many schools.[31] In 2013, the National Humanities Institute at Buryat State University, which trained Buryat-language teachers, was closed. That same year, right- and left-wing Buryat student clubs appeared on campus.[32]
A renewed Buryat national campaign produced a new generation of activists such as Yevgeny Khamaganov and Radzhana Dugarova from the Erkhe society.[33] The Soviet-era Buryat movement arose among scholars and top bureaucrats—a narrow circle who could not openly declare political views or conduct full-scale agitation and lacked direct channels to society. They did, however, have authority and power to negotiate with the federal center, secure a republican constitution, found the Khural, and fight in elections. The new movement consists of civil activists with no power positions. Yet, with the Internet, they have gained a direct channel to society and continue to propagate the ideas of Buryat nation-building.
In 2015, Moscow appointed Nikolai Moshkin as rector of Buryat State University, bypassing academic self-governance and provoking students as well as professors to stage protests.[34] Besides demanding Moshkin’s removal and actual elections, familiar slogans of the Buryat movement were voiced for the first time in years—namely, expulsion of “Varangians,”[35] restoration of the Buryat language, and revival of the republic. The rallies ended with a wave of dismissals. Language activist Bulat Shagzhin openly clashed with regional officials, criticizing Nagovitsyn’s national policy.[36] Officials tried to open administrative cases, harassed his business, and launched a smear campaign in the media that accused him of pan-Mongolism (i.e., separatism and Mongolic irredentism). Buryat journalist Yevgeny Khamaganov was assaulted, with police abetting the attackers. No criminal case followed, and the badly beaten journalist had to be moved to safety.[37] He was later killed in 2017.[38]
In subsequent years, the frequency of rallies grew, with local rights defenders and federal projects such as Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation taking part. In the fall of 2019, the biggest rallies in modern history took place. They initially broke out against rigged mayoral elections and in solidarity with Yakut shaman Aleksandr Gabyshev, who was marching on Moscow to overthrow Putin.[39] Police beatings, prosecution of activists, and anonymous attacks led to more rallies against police violence. A legal, sanctioned rally in Jubilee Park in the Buryat capital of Ulan-Ude in 2019 brought together several thousand people.[40] Mobile livestreams showed that a wide strata of the population were involved as discontent with Putin’s regime grew. In 2020, a wave of regional protests swept Russia’s Far East and national republics.[41]
The official demographic data for Buryats has changed dramatically over the years. In 1989, Russians constituted 70 percent of the republic and, by 2021, only 59 percent. the Kremlin then moved to classify such data in 2025. According to the last official census in 2021, which underreported the number of non-Russians, Buryats formed a third of the republic’s population with almost 300,000 people.[42] The 2021 census understates the demographic shift and fails to show that Buryats are becoming a large national group once again.
War and Society in Buryatia
Buryats see Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine as an attempt to subjugate the Ukrainian nation.[43] The new Moscow-appointed governor Alexei Tsydenov, himself not Buryat, plus the economically destructive COVID-19 pandemic, forced many Buryats into state and military service. Heavy losses of Buryat soldiers in Ukraine quickly became known.[44] Given the disproportionate front-line deaths for the non-Russian nations, the war has increasingly taken on the traditional tropes of Russian imperialism, which not only threatens the very existence of the Ukrainian nation but also harms the Buryats and other indigenous peoples.
Moscow’s neo-imperialism prompted the Buryats to form the first antiwar national movement, the Free Buryatia Foundation, in March 2022.[45] Besides antiwar activism, it has criticized discrimination against Buryats in Russia. The organization was created abroad by Buryat political émigrés, and its initial public faces were Viktoria Maladaeva, Aleksandra Garmazhapova, Maria Vyushkova, and Alexey Kim. The movement has gained broad support inside the republic, and it still receives and disseminates on-the-ground updates from volunteers there.
In May 2022, a group of Buryat volunteers founded the Buryat Information Center in Mongolia with support from a coalition of Buryat organizations.[46] After Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Buryat residents began relocating to Mongolia or using it as a corridor to flee abroad.[47] From the September 2022 mobilization to December 2022, more than 30,000 Buryatia residents crossed into Mongolia.
When the Free Buryatia Foundation declared its loyalty to federalism and a united Russia, many activists left. The most prominent departures were Maladaeva and Vyushkova.[48] A new organization, Tusgaar Buryad, began to set forth political programs demanding Buryatia’s independence. It has quickly gathered supporters and volunteers and represents Buryat interests at UN forums and in meetings with foreign ministries.[49] Similar appeals have been issued by Dorjo Dugarov’s group, Erkheten. Many independent bloggers such as Anna Zueva and commentators such as Anna Gomboeva and Seseg Jigjitova have also become more active.[50] A major breakthrough was achieved with the creation of an independent media project, the “Asians of Russia.”[51] Instagram, YouTube, and Telegram have allowed the project to broadcast its own information—something earlier movements lacked or only had in limited form.
Another feature of the current Buryat movement is more cooperation between a broader coalition of other national movements, including Ingush, Sakha, and Kalmyk.[52] Extensive public outreach, diverse anti-imperialist content, and growing public support led the Kremlin to label all these organizations as “terrorist.”[53] In January 2024, Buryatia head Tsydenov even created a headquarters to fight separatism and extremism—the first public acknowledgement by officials of such a threat in Buryatia.[54]
Buryatia is critical to Russia’s territorial integrity. Buryatia’s main value lies not only in its abundant mineral and natural resources but in its unique location as a land link to the Far East.[55] The republic’s railways physically link Russia’s western and eastern parts, and the Baikal-Amur Mainline passes right through Buryatia.[56] Losing control of this key region would cut off Moscow from the entire Far East and aid in the future independence of the Sakha Republic—the largest and perhaps most resource-rich region. Road access to Buryatia is sparse and makes major troop deployments to the area tricky; thus, the terrain allows even small forces to offer substantial resistance.[57]
In this way, Buryatia serves as the lynchpin in Moscow’s imperial project. Without it, Putin’s Russia would crumble. Buryatia’s independence, therefore, is crucial for the future decolonization of Russia.
Buryatia’s Future
While current census and demographic data are classified, even before the war against Ukraine, the Buryat share of the republic’s population was rising. In the near future, Buryats almost certainly will once again become a majority in their own land.[58] Putin’s Russia is an imperialist state extracting resources from regions it sees as colonies to maximize profits. Hence, regional living standards will not improve significantly, and discontent with local and federal authorities will likely grow.
Cultural ties with the Buryat diaspora in Mongolia are formal and informal. Official bodies engage in diplomacy and joint projects.[59] The diaspora is a serious political force, backed by regional governments, local businesses, and high-level politicians and media figures. Being full citizens in the countries where they now reside, their status differs radically from that of Buryats in Russia. Informal ties include family contacts, trade, tourism, and cultural events such as music festivals in Mongolia and Buryatia.
Should independence be achieved, Buryats can expect solidarity with their Mongolian brothers and sisters. Buryatia’s closest neighbor is independent Mongolia, where Buryats have repeatedly become presidents and top officials, speak their language, and run corporations. Sanjaasüren Zorig, the ideologue of modern democratic Mongolia, was ethnically Buryat. Compared to their status in Mongolia, Buryats in Russia are seriously disadvantaged. In addition, several million of various Mongolic peoples in the PRC face repression and, if offered citizenship, could migrate to Mongolia.[60] The situation of seven million Mongolic peoples in Inner Mongolia, including Barguts and Buryats, is difficult; over 70 percent of the population is Han, and the Chinese Communist Party state is stronger and more stable than Putin’s Russia.
In Irkutsk Oblast, the Buryats’ ancestral land, and Zabaikalsky Krai, a Buryat has never been governor, and representation in elected bodies is minimal. Outside Buryatia, the treatment of Buryats in Russia is humiliating for half a million people whose land’s wealth sustains western Russia. The demand for a genuine national movement and restoration of rights will only persist.
With minimal funding, Buryat activists have gained increased international recognition. Thanks to the Free Nations of Post-Russia Forum, Marina Khankhalain and members of Tusgaar Buryad have presented their narrative at UN and EU venues, in Germany’s and Japan’s foreign ministries, and on Taiwanese platforms. They have also joined the Northern Eurasian Solidarity Alliance with Ingush, Kalmyk, and Sakha representatives.[61]
The Buryat community abroad has formed an independence committee uniting two political groups and many independent experts.[62] The large Buryat diaspora in South Korea can help financially and may eventually return to Buryatia. The U.S. diaspora is most politically active, with at least three active Buryat political organizations. Many Buryats came to the United States to escape repression. They have established thriving businesses and have the means to financially support the national movement.[63] The European diaspora is smaller but includes the wealthiest Buryats. Children of today’s Buryat elite study in Germany and Austria, and Europe hosts several Buryat political activists.
The vigorous activity of the political émigré community raises hopes that more countries will rally around and recognize Buryatia’s independence. Some capitals may be enticed by significant natural resources that, once nationalized by the republic, could become a boon for future trade. Buryatia could then become economically independent, attracting Buryats from exile and the historic diasporas. Similar processes in Central Asia saw many Slavs leave; if that happens in Buryatia, Buryats will form an absolute majority.
The region’s long-standing trade partner is the PRC, which could access abundant cheap resources if it helps solve Buryatia’s corridor to Sakha-Yakutia ports and Vladivostok. In the 1990s, many Buryat firms traded with Japan and later South Korea, something that could easily be revived in the near future. Buryats also enjoy good relations with the Mongolian state and NGOs, as well as with most of the Central Asian states.
The reinvigorated national movement includes many Buryats who have state-building experience and highly specialized skillsets. Numerous new civic structures suggest that the republic would likely be democratic, in a similar form to Mongolia. One potential danger to future democracy is that Buryatia’s resource wealth could spawn an oligarchic class that might suppress civil freedoms. Social restructuring and independence could also provoke separatism in Russian-majority districts and stoke acts of terrorism from Russian nationalists. Such threats can be offset by involving the Slavic population directly in state-building and by promoting a new Buryat national ideology that aims to build an integrated civic society regardless of ethnicity.
Serious risks may come from revanchist ideas in Russian regions, against which an independent Buryatia will need to prepare. Russia’s supporters among Buryats are tied to the Muscovite state through colonial bureaucracy, public service, and businesses integrated with the federal market. Russia’s disintegration will help to neutralize them. Meanwhile, as Buryats abroad continue accumulating political capital and a true Buryat middle class not tied to Russia emerges, the Buryat nation will be in a strong position to become a fully independent and internationally recognized country.
[1] Paul Goble, “Buryatia Has Already Entered a Revolutionary Situation,” Commentaries, The Jamestown Foundation, June 4, 2015, https://jamestown.org/buryatia-has-already-entered-a-revolutionary-situation/; and Paul Goble, “Buryats, a Large Nation in Russia, Fear They Are on Verge of Extinction,” Commentaries, September 30, 2015, https://jamestown.org/buryats-a-large-nation-in-russia-fear-they-are-on-verge-of-extinction/.
[2] Cities and Forests of the Siberian Land, “Челобитная служилых людей Верхоленского Братского острожка,” [Petition of service people of the Verkholensky Bratsk prison], April 25, 1646, https://ostrog.ucoz.ru/publikacii/
4_47_33.htm.
[3] Infpol, “Как Бурятия оказалась разделенной на несколько частей,” [How Buryatia was divided into several parts], June 10, 2017, https://www.infpol.ru/106788-kak-buryatiya-okazalas-razdelennoy-na-neskolko-chastey/.
[4] A. V. Shusko, “Особенности бурято-русских межэтнических конфликтов на почве землепользования в годы революции и Гражданской войны в Сибири,” [Peculiarities of Buryat-Russian interethnic conflicts on the basis of land use during the years of the revolution and the Civil War in Siberia], 63.3, no. 2 (2009): 201–205, https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/osobennosti-buryato-russkih-mezhetnicheskih-konfliktov-na-pochve-zemlepolzovaniya-v-gody-revolyutsii-i-grazhdanskoy-voyny-v-sibiri/viewer.
[5] Infpol, “Как репрессировали бурятских эмигрантов в Монголии,” [How Buryat emigrants were repressed in Mongolia], September 16, 2015, https://www.infpol.ru/163026-kak-repressirovali-buryatskikh-emigrantov-v-mongolii/.
[6] Asia Russia Daily, “Для чего СССР разрушил старомонгольскую письменность?,” [Why did the USSR destroy the old Mongolian script?], November 13, 2015, https://asiarussia.ru/news/9895/.
[7] Demoscope Weekly, “Всесоюзная перепись населения 1959 года. Национальный состав населения по регионам России,” [All-Union Population Census of 1959: National composition of the population by regions of Russia], 1959, https://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_nac_59.php?reg=77.
[8] Timur Muzaev, Этнический сепаратизм в России, [Ethnic separatism in Russia], (Moscow: SOVA Research Center, 1999), https://www.sova-center.ru/files/books/pano-separ-1999.pdf.
[9] Infpol, “Если бы не ошибки 90-х, сейчас рабочие в Бурятии получали по 200 тысяч,” [If it weren’t for the mistakes of the 90s, workers in Buryatia would now be earning 200,000], January 31, 2022 https://www.infpol.ru/
238189-esli-by-ne-oshibki-90-kh-seychas-rabochie-v-buryatii-poluchali-po-200-tysyach/; and Petr Sanzhiev, “Пригород Улан-Удэ стал «резиновым»,” [Ulan-Ude suburbs become “rubber”], Nomer Odin, July 13, 2025, https://gazeta-n1.ru/news/society/150022/.
[10] Asia Russia Dialogue, “‘Конгресс бурятского народа’ прекратил свое существование,” [“The Congress of the Buryat People” has ceased to exist], September 9, 2020, https://asiarussia.ru/news/25290/; Infpol, “Почему ВАРК превратился в «отстойник» экс-чиновников?,” [Why has VARK become a “sedimentation tank” for former officials?], October 19, 2019, https://www.infpol.ru/206730-pochemu-vark-prevratilsya-v-otstoynik-eks-chinovnikov/; and Muzaev, Этнический сепаратизм в России.
[11] Infopol, “Бурятия переболела партийной лихорадкой,” [Buryatia has recovered from party fever], March 6, 2012, https://www.infpol.ru/137955-buryatiya-perebolela-partiynoy-likhoradkoy/.
[12] Muzaev, Этнический сепаратизм в России.
[13] Arsalan Dobchinov, “Тридцать лет назад в Аге побывал Далай-лама XIV,” [Thirty years ago, the 14th Dalai Lama visited Aga], Aginsk Pravda, July 31, 2021, http://www.aginsk-pravda.ru/news/tridcat_let_nazad_v_age
_pobyval_dalaj_lama_xiv/2021-07-31-10031.
[14] Jorunn Brandvoll, “Regime Consolidation in Buryatia,” in From Apparatchik to President – From Businessman to Khan: Regime Transition and Consolidation in the Russian Republics of Buryatia and Kalmykia, November 1, 2002, 55–68, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep08081.9?seq=1.
[15] L. L. Abaeva and B. P. Kryanev, “Социально-политологический анализ выборов в Республике Бурятия,” [Socio-political analysis of elections in the Republic of Buryatia], Research in Applied and Emergency Ethnology, no. 69 (1994): 5–11, https://static.iea.ras.ru/neotlozhka/69-Abaeva.pdf.
[16] Infpol, “Если бы не ошибки 90-х, сейчас рабочие в Бурятии получали по 200 тысяч.”
[17] Buryaad Ünen, “Агинский флаг удачи,” [Aginsky flag of luck], March 15, 2017, https://burunen.ru/blogs/
50867-aginskiy-flag-udachi/.
[18] Arnold Tulokhonov, “Аграрий, дипломат, политик, патриот: Памяти Владимира Саганова,” [Agrarian, diplomat, politician, patriot: In memory of Vladimir Saganov], Asia Russia Dialogue, September 5, 2024, https://asiarussia.ru/news/42247/.
[19] Asia Russia Dialogue, “Что обсудили глава Бурятии и активисты Конгресса бурятского народа за закрытыми дверями?,” [What did the head of Buryatia and activists of the Congress of the Buryat People discuss behind closed doors?], February 19, 2016, https://asiarussia.ru/news/11264/.
[20] Yevgeny Khamagaunov, “Пока в Усть-Орде стоит хоть одно обоо – это наша земля,” [As long as there is at least one obo in Ust-Orda, it is our land], Asia Russia Dialogue, February 5, 2016, https://asiarussia.ru/persons/
11091/.
[21] TASS, “Наговицын, Вячеслав Владимирович,” [Nagovitsyn, Vyacheslav Vladimirovich], accessed July 28, 2025, https://tass.ru/encyclopedia/person/nagovicyn-vyacheslav-vladimirovich.
[22] Tatyana Yakovleva, “Наговицын о давлении налоговой на бизнес: Убедительно прошу, прекращайте!,” [Nagovitsyn on tax pressure on business: I kindly ask you to stop!], December 21, 2015, https://www.baikal-daily.ru/news/19/185434/.
[23] NordGold Buryatzoloto, accessed July 28, 2025, https://web.archive.org/web/20161127061817/http:/
buryatzoloto.ru/.
[24] Novaya Buryatiya, “Прокуратура Бурятии требует закрыть общину эвенков «Дылача»,” [The Buryatia Prosecutor’s Office demands the closure of the Evenki community “Dylacha”], February 4, 2013, https://newbur.
ru/newsdetail/prokuratura_buryatii_trebuet_zakryt_obshchinu_evenkov_dylacha/.
[25] Infpol, “Конфликт вокруг «Дылачи» вышел на федеральный уровень,” [The conflict around “Dylachi” has reached the federal level], August 10, 2012, https://www.infpol.ru/140429-konflikt-vokrug-dylachi-vyshel-na-federalnyy-uroven/.
[26] Baikal Daily, “«Байкалфарм» стал банкротом, но Бурятия хочет его реанимировать,” [Baikalpharm went bankrupt, but Buryatia wants to revive it], December 12, 2014, https://www.baikal-daily.ru/news/15/102441/.
[27] Arigus TV, “Attack on Baikalbank,” https://arigus.tv/news/bez-razdela/112488-situatsiyu-slozhivshuyusya-vokrug-baykalbanka-prokommentirovali-deputaty-narodnogo-khurala-i-chleny/.
[28] Nomer Odin, “Три года без «БайкалБанка»,” [Three years without BaikalBank], August 16, 2019, https://gazeta-n1.ru/news/business/77728/.
[29] SOVA Research Center, “Нападение на спортсменов-лучников в Орле,” [Attack on archers in Orel], March 30, 2004, https://www.sova-center.ru/en/racism-xenophobia/news/racism-nationalism/2004/03/d3461/.
[30] Danilo Trivaylo, “«Только славянам»: как снять жилье, если вам никто не рад,” [“Only for Slavs”: How to Rent a House If No One is Welcome to You], Vc.ru, June 7, 2021, https://vc.ru/opinions/254336-tolko-slavyanam-kak-snyat-zhile-esli-vam-nikto-ne-rad; and Public Television of Russia, “В Петербурге тувинец судится за свою национальность,” [In St. Petersburg, a Tuvan is suing for his nationality], August 1, 2013, https://otr-online.ru/news/v-peterburge-tuvinec-suditsya-za-svoyu-nacional-nost-6490.html.
[31] Rajana Dugarova, “Страна, где убивают языки,” [The country where languages are killed], Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 10, 2018, https://www.sibreal.org/a/28944422.html.
[32] Tatyana Khandazhapova, “Осуждены улан-удэнские вандалы, протестовавшие против «контроля чиновников»,” [Ulan-Ude vandals who protested against “control by officials” sentenced], Baikal Daily, December 10, 2013, https://www.baikal-daily.ru/news/20/80611/.
[33] Rajana Dugarova, “Прости, что не уберегли…,” [Sorry we didn’t save you…], Asia Russia Dialogue, March 22, 2018, https://asiarussia.ru/persons/19237/.
[34] Tatyana Rodionova, “Митинг в поддержку БГУ перерос в акцию против главы Бурятии,” [Rally in support of BSU turned into action against the head of Buryatia], Infpol, July 2, 2015, https://www.infpol.ru/157468-miting-v-podderzhku-bgu-pereros-v-aktsiyu-protiv-glavy-buryatii/.
[35] A term for the original Kyivan Rus rulers. It is meant to be a derogatory term for outsiders.
[36] Bulat Shaggin, “Не отступать и не сдаваться,” [No retreat, no surrender], Asia Russia Foundation, April 16, 2015, https://asiarussia.ru/articles/6977/.
[37] Radio Svoboda, “В Улан-Удэ неизвестные избили оппозиционного журналиста,” [Unknown assailants beat up opposition journalist in Ulan-Ude], July 13, 2015, https://www.svoboda.org/a/27125242.html.
[38] Ikramutdin Khan, “В Бурятии убили главного оппозиционера,” [Main opposition figure killed in Buryatia], GolosIslama.RU, March 16, 2017, https://golosislama.com/news.php?id=31437.
[39] OVD-info, “Протесты в Бурятии в сентябре 2019 года,” [Protests in Buryatia in September 2019], September 2019–November 2020, https://ovd.info/story/protesty-v-buryatii-v-sentyabre-2019-goda.
[40] Alina Andreeva, “В Улан-Удэ прошел самый крупный митинг за последние годы. Фоторепортаж,” [The largest rally in recent years took place in Ulan-Ude. Photo report], Infpol, September 15, 2019, https://www.infpol.ru
/204883-v-ulan-ude-proshel-samyy-krupnyy-miting-za-poslednie-gody/.
[41] Anastasia Golubeva, “Сто дней протестов в Хабаровске: чем запомнились митинги и что с ними будет,” [One Hundred Days of Protests in Khabarovsk: What the Rallies Were Memorable and What Will Happen to Them], BBC News Russian, October 16, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-54575059; and Zona.media, “Защита Куштау,” [Defense of Kushtau], 2020, https://zona.media/theme/kushtau.
[42] Sanzhiev, “Пригород Улан-Удэ стал «резиновым»”; and Novaya Buryatiya, “Росстат опубликовал предварительные итоги переписи населения в Бурятии,” [Rosstat has published preliminary results of the population census in Buryatia], June 6, 2022, https://newbur.ru/newsdetail/rosstat_opublikoval_predvaritelnye_
itogi_perepisi_naseleniya_v_buryatii/.
[43] Verstka, “«Цели СВО»: как Кремль менял их на протяжении трёх лет войны?,” [“The Goals of the SVO”: How Did the Kremlin Change Them Over the Three Years of War?], May 24, 2025, https://verstka.media/czeli-svo-kak-kreml-menyal-ih-na-protyazhenii-tryoh-let-vojny.
[44] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “‘Так и выкосят весь народ.’ Как Бурятия стала одним из символов этой войны,” [“They’ll Mow Down the Entire Nation.” How Buryatia Became One of the Symbols of This War], February 28, 2023, https://www.sibreal.org/a/kak-buryatiya-stala-odnim-iz-simvolov-etoy-voyny/32287795.html.
[45] Free Buryatia Foundation, homepage, accessed July 29, 2025,https://www.freeburyatia.org/?lang=en.
[46] Deutsche Welle, Facebook video, December 18, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/dw.chinese.traditional/videos/
1614506472318507.
[47] Paul Goble, “Influx of Russians Fleeing Mobilization Increasingly Alienating Central Asians,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation, October 11, 2022, https://jamestown.org/program/influx-of-russians-fleeing-mobilization-increasingly-alienating-central-asians/.
[48] Indigenous Russia, homepage, accessed July 29, 2025, https://indigenous-russia.com/.
[49] Tusgaar Buryad, homepage, accessed July 29, 2025, https://tusgaar.org/.
[50] Anna Zueva, YouTube, accessed July 29, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/@anna_zueva.
[51] Asians of Russia, “About Us,” accessed July 29, 2025, https://asiansofrussia.com/about/.
[52] Free Nations of Post-Russia Forum, homepage, accessed July 29, 2025, https://www.freenationsrf.org/ru.
[53] Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, “Единый федеральный список организаций, в том числе иностранных и международных организаций, признанных в соответствии с законодательством Российской Федерации террористическими,” [Unified federal list of organizations, including foreign and international organizations, recognized as terrorist in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation], June 17, 2025, http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/npd/terror.htm.
[54] Buryaad Ünen, “Штаб по предотвращению сепаратизма и экстремизма создан в Бурятии,” [Headquarters for the Prevention of Separatism and Extremism Created in Buryatia], January 3, 2024, https://burunen.ru/news/society/
104011-shtab-po-predotvrashcheniyu-separatizma-i-ekstremizma-sozdan-v-buryatii/.
[55] Republic of Buryatia Official Portal, “Минерально – сырьевые ресурсы,” [Mineral and raw material resources], accessed July 29, 2025, https://egov-buryatia.ru/about_republic/nature-resources/geologiya-i-mineralnye-resursy/mineralno-syrevye-resursy-/.
[56] Maria Malinovskaya, interview with Vyacheslav Rybkin (Head of the Directorate for the Development of Railways of the Eastern Polygon of JSC Russian Railways), May 5, 2015, Eurasian Communications Center, https://web.archive.org/web/20161117174436/http://eurasiancenter.ru/infrastructureexperts/20150505/1004085409.html.
[57] DorInfo, “Атлас автодорог России 2025,” [Atlas of Russian Highways 2025], accessed July 29, 2025, https://dorinfo.ru/road_atlas/; and GoToNature.ru, “Республика Бурятия,” [Republic of Buryatia], accessed July 29, 2025, https://gotonature.ru/1111-respublika-buryatiya.html.
[58] Karina Pronina and Lyudi Baikala, “The Buryats Who Fled Soviet Russia And Now Thrive In Mongolia,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 28, 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/buryats-mongolia-soviet-repressions-russia/32702945.html.
[59] Montsame News Agency, “Международный бурятский фестиваль «Алтаргана» пройдет в аймаке Булган,” [International Buryat festival “Altargana” will be held in Bulgan aimag], April 1, 2023, https://montsame.mn/ru/
read/315905.
[60] Asia Russia Dialogue, “Как скоро могут исчезнуть пастбища местных скотоводов, и почему өвөрмонголы презирают китайцев – об этом, сравнивая с родной Монголией, размышляет в своих заметках автор АРД Сэмүүн,” [How soon the pastures of local cattle breeders may disappear, and why the Ovormongols despise the Chinese – this is what the author of ARD Semuun reflects on in his notes, comparing it with his native Mongolia], accessed July 29, 2025, https://asiarussia.ru/articles/18105/.
[61] Instagram, @tusgaarburyad, accessed July 29, 2025, https://www.instagram.com/tusgaarburyad/.
[62] Andrey Grigoriev, “Минюст РФ опубликовал список организаций, входящих в несуществующее “Антироссийское сепаратистское движение,” [The Russian Ministry of Justice has published a list of organizations that are part of the non-existent “Anti-Russian Separatist Movement”] Idel.Realii, July 26, 2024, https://www.idelreal.org/a/minyust-rf-opublikoval-spisok-organizatsiy-vhodyaschih-v-nesuschestvuyuschee-antirossiyskoe-separatistskoe-dvizhenie-/33051847.html.
[63] AiF Buryatiya, “Бурятская община в Америке провела Сурхарбан в Нью-Йорке,” [Buryat Community in America Held Surkharban in New York], July 23, 2019, https://bur.aif.ru/culture/events/buryatskaya_obshchina_
v_amerike_provela_surharban_v_nyu-yorke.
