The Russian Community Casts a Menacing Shadow Over Putin’s Russia

Executive Summary:

• The nationalist, ultraconservative Russian Community has grown in popularity in recent months, with reports that the paramilitary group is coordinating closely with the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Federal Security Service (FSB), and other state structures.
• The organization differs from similar formations in that it is quite public with its activities, boasts a sprawling network across Russia, and enjoys powerful connections to Russian elites and the state.
• The Russian Community has begun coordinating with other groups, including the Sorok Sorokov Movement and the Northern Man, to intimidate ethnically non-Russian citizens and migrant workers.
• The FSB’s “pet project” may be developing a mind of its own in operating more independently and building ties with the Russian Orthodox Church, which means the Kremlin could lose control of the paramilitary group in the near future.

On July 20, the nationalist Russian Community (Russkaya obshchina, Русская община) posted a video of black-clad men harassing migrant merchants in the Siberian city of Novosibirsk (Telegram/RusObshinaNSK, July 20; Al-Jazeera, July 26). Such “patrols” by the paramilitary group have become more commonplace in recent months. The Russian Community has grown in popularity over the past few years in its mission to fight for ethnic Russians in Russia. The transformation of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine into a protracted war of attrition has triggered the spread of both paramilitarization and radicalization in Russian society (see EDM, January 29, March 20, 27, 2024; see Jamestown Perspectives, February 3). The Kremlin’s cult of militarism mixed with raging ethnic hatred has rapidly transformed into pervasive xenophobia that has only skyrocketed following the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in March 2024 (see EDM, March 26, 28, 2024).

The heated environment has resulted in the further growth and development of Russia’s paramilitary and private military landscape. Alongside traditional formations such as the Wagner Group, the paramilitary space has become “enriched” with groups that propel virulent ideas of ethnic and racial hatred to a new level. Such formations include the Española nationalist group, which grew out of soccer hooliganism; the Russian Imperial Movement; and the “Rusich” neo-Nazi formation (see EDM, March 20, 27, 2024).

Menacing as they may appear, none of these groups seems to have any real potential to outgrow their current status (i.e., marginal militants) and transform into self-sufficient actors capable of gaining mass public support. The Russian Community, however, has flown under the radar until recent months. Depending on the trajectory of Moscow’s war and future internal conditions, the Russian Community presents quite promising potential for more widespread support and militancy that may further threaten the Kremlin’s monopoly over violence (see EDM, May 27).

The Russian Community’s roots date back to 2020 during the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. At the time, Evgeny Chesnokov, a notorious anti-vaccination voice, Andrey Tkachuk, former deputy speaker of the Omsk City Council, and Andrey Afanasyev, a former journalist from the ultra-conservative television channels Spas and Tsargrad TV, decided to create a grassroots project with the initial goals to oppose COVID-19 vaccination and abortions (Rosbalt.ru, May 7). Soon, this agenda was supplemented with strong anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric. Deeds eventually matched words, and members of the Russian Community started carrying out their first organized provocations against migrant workers in Russian cities (Meduza, May 5; Kavkaz Realii, July 16).

In parallel, the Russian Community started to actively partner with other nationalist groups. These have included the Sorok Sorokov Movement, founded in 2013 and closely associated with notorious war criminal Igor Strelkov (Girkin), and the Northern Man, a far-right, nationalist, Islamophobic, and anti-immigrant political organization founded in 2022 (Russkai Vesna, September 14, 2014; SOVA Research Center, September 9, 2024). These partnerships have resulted in a growing number of coordinated anti-immigrant actions and provocations (BBC News Russian, June 7, 2024; Lenta.ru, May 19). In addition to noxious anti-Muslim sentiments, the Russian Community has also assumed an apparent anti-Western stance. In September 2024, Tkachuk accused the United Kingdom of “pitting small-numbered [ethnically non-Russian] peoples in Russia against ethnically Russian people” (Islamnews.ru, September 26, 2024).

The ideological premise of the Russian Community centers on four fundamental pillars. First, xenophobia is a cornerstone of the organization’s ideology. Anti-immigrant rhetoric seemingly laid the bedrock for more effective coordination among members. Between 2022 and early 2024, the Russian Community’s actions looked rather sporadic (Istories.media, August 8, 2024). Starting from early 2025, however, the organization’s leaders started following a much more systematic approach. One such example occurred in June, when the organization began establishing regular “patrols” in Moscow to allegedly “protect” locals from immigrants (Gazeta.ru, June 7). Initially, these grassroots vigilante activities were not appreciated by the Russian authorities. More recently, however, evidence has grown that the Russian Community is taking orders from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Federal Security Service (FSB) (Meduza, June 24).

Second, Islamophobia and racism drive much of the Russian Community’s rhetoric and activities. While anti-immigrant actions clearly have an Islamophobic undertone, it would be erroneous to assume that such sentiments are only aimed at migrant workers from Central Asia (Current Time TV, August 9, 2024). Russian Community members have been involved in conflicts with ethnically non-Russian groups throughout Russia, including Chechens, Tatars, Bashkirs, Nogais, and Buryats (Fontanka.ru, December 6, 2024; Absatz.media, April 22; Ura.news, June 13; Lenta.ru, June 19; Moskvichmag.ru, June 27). The organization has even gone so far as to send regular patrols throughout the North Caucasus to harass and intimidate the non-Russian nations (Kavkaz Realii, July 16).

Third, the Russian Community is anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western. Organization members fully support the Kremlin’s ongoing military aggression against Ukraine and provide financial and other support to the Russian Armed Forces (Russkaya-obschina.ru, June 8). Russian Community leaders view Moscow’s war as a continuation of the cultural clash between Russia and the West that supposedly dates all the way back to the Livonian War (1558–1583). The organization asserts that at the time, the “international community” tried to drag Russia into a protracted war to demolish its sovereignty and statehood. According to an article on the Russian Community’s website, the West failed to achieve its goals. Russia’s ultimate defeat came not from failures on the battlefield but rather from Moscow’s decision to establish a temporary truce with the West, which allowed Russia’s adversaries to regroup (Russkaya-obschina.ru, October 23, 2024). This view is fundamental to understanding the Russian Community’s wider designs—namely, the expansion of the war against Ukraine to include the “collective West” as a means of rectifying the mistakes of the past.

Fourth, the Russian Community touts a commitment to what it deems as “traditional values.” These include adherence to Russian Orthodoxy, collectivism, and community support, as well as an emphasis on large, almost exclusively ethnic Russian families (Russkaya-obschina.ru, accessed July 23).

These four pillars are quite common for many other Russian nationalist and ultra-conservative organizations. Yet, three factors make the Russian Community a unique formation:   

1. A growing presence in public spaces, which was never a typical feature of other organizations and movements, as they usually operate in the shadows.   
2. A sprawling network of members and branches in Russia, with reportedly over 150 units throughout most, if not all, of the country’s regions.
3. Active collaboration and joint actions with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, FSB, and other state structures that form the siloviki (силовики) (Meduza, June 24).

In Putin’s Russia, it seems unimaginable that an organization like the Russian Community could act on its own. Increasingly, evidence from open sources points to the existence of high-level supporters of the organization, including prominent members of the Russian elite (see EDM, October 15, 2024, May 28).

The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) represents one of these alleged “benefactors”(see EDM, May 27). In April 2025, Patriarch Kirill spoke publicly about the “rapid spreading of neo-paganism and overwhelming numbers of [ethnically non-Russian immigrants] that are swarming Russia.” He suggested that only working with “youth organizations” that share the ideology of Russian Orthodoxy could be a solution to the current challenges. Many Russia watchers and experts saw this as a clear allusion to the Russian Community (Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine, April 14; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 15; see EDM, May 27, 28). An earlier example of this possible link was the September 2024 procession in St. Petersburg that marked the transfer of the relics of Alexander Nevsky. During the event, members of the Russian Community and the Northern Man were seen walking hand in hand with the ROC procession (Fontanka.ru, September 12, 2024).

According to some reports, the Russian Community was reportedly a pet project of the FSB that was supposed to act as a “standard corruption scheme” (Meduza, June 24). Sometime around 2023, however, the “pet project” started gaining strength and demonstrated a much greater level of independence, and, among other actions, became more closely associated with the ROC. Nevertheless, an anonymous FSB source for Meduza stated in June 2025 that despite these developments, the FSB and the Russian Community still maintain close connections (Meduza; Teletype.in, June 24).

The Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation (ICRF) and its head, Alexander Bastrykin, offer at the very least informal support to the Russian Community. Bastrykin is said to be a close associate and informal advisor to Putin and has been particularly vocal against ethnically non-Russian migrant workers. In 2023, he claimed that “migrants have become one of the key factors in growing social tensions in the world and Russia” (Interfax, April 11, 2023). Bastrykin’s incessant criticism of Islam, which he has essentially equated to the roots of terrorism and criminality, caused a public row with Chechen ruler Ramzan Kadyrov (Deutsche-Welle, June 30, 2024). Some Russian experts have argued that Bastrykin could be signaling his (informal) support and interest in collaborating with such organizations as the Russian Community, which would allow the ICRF to exercise anti-immigrant measures without the use of official means (Radio Svoboda, May 10).

The apparent existence of such powerful benefactors has emboldened the Russian Community, and its leadership seemingly has little fear of other powerful groups in Russia. For example, Islamophobic rhetoric and violent provocations at mosques inside the country resulted in an open conflict between Adam Delimkhanov, a long-standing Chechen member of the State Duma and close ally of Kadyrov, and Russian Community leaders. Unlike other instances when the Chechens violently overpowered other groups, this time, however, Delimkhanov abstained from threats and further actions, reducing his rage primarily to posts on Telegram (Gazeta.ru, May 9).

The growing support and all but confirmed official sanction of the Russian Community brings to mind historical parallels with past nationalist paramilitary groups. For example, the Black Hundreds paramilitary movement in 20th-century Imperial Russia enjoyed the support and patronage of the House of Romanov and representatives of Russia’s ruling elite (see EDM, October 15, 2024). The movement itself did not consist of a single party, union, or organization but rather acted as an amalgamation of reactionary, monarchist, and ultra-nationalist groups. The Black Hundreds were known for incitement of pogroms; promotion of nationalist, Orthodox-centric doctrines; and vocal xenophobic beliefs. In the end, the Black Hundreds movement took quite a different trajectory than that of the Russian Community. The movement’s decline and ultimate demise are attributed to the outbreak of World War I, while Moscow’s war against Ukraine has only accelerated the Russian Community’s growing popularity and expanding presence in Russia.

More recently, the Russian state’s relationship with ENOT Corp (“United People’s Communal Partnerships”) looks similar to its apparent coordination with the Russian Community. ENOT Corp was established in 2011 but later disbanded, and its leaders were either imprisoned or assassinated (Novaya Gazeta, February 22, 2019; Novaya Gazeta Europa, February 8, 2023). The organization rose to prominence between 2014 and 2018, taking part in Russia’s hybrid operations against Ukraine and conducting anti-immigrant raids in St. Petersburg (reportedly, under orders from the FSB). It was even involved in “international projects” such as a Russian “patriotic” youth camp in Zlatibor (Serbia) and carried out mercenary work in Syria and Karabakh (see EDM, October 31, 2018; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 23, 2023). Over time, however, the Russian authorities grew weary of the paramilitary structure. Following the assassination of one of its leaders, Igor Mangushev, in 2023, other members were arrested and imprisoned (see EDM, November 15, 2018; News.ru, June 7, 2024).

The Russian Community’s emergence and rapid growth may create an equally menacing precedent for Putin’s Russia. As argued by some Russian experts, the Russian state’s control and direction of the organization could turn out to be a grave mistake (YouTube/@Popularpolitics, October 7, 2024). The already widespread destabilization, radicalization, and criminalization of Russian society will likely increase as Moscow’s war wages on. In this powder keg, groups like the Russian Community could showcase more of a willingness to wrest the monopoly over violence from the state. Given the organization’s powerful connections and large network, the only way Moscow might be able to stop this process is through mass mobilization, which would cause a slew of problems on its own. Either way, the Kremlin may be sowing the seeds of its own demise in empowering the paramilitary group.