
Moscow’s Policies Increasingly Agitate Local Elites
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 22 Issue: 113
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Executive Summary:
- The Kremlin has increased its suppression of regional self-government since the beginning of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, fearing any manifestation of independence.
- In several regions, however, the local population has opposed such suppression, and the people’s mood aligns closer with the wishes of regional elites.
- In turn, the remaining regional elites are finding increasingly unconventional ways to defy the center and maintain a degree of autonomy.
Russian political analyst Aleksandr Kynev noted that since the first half of 2024, the Kremlin has gradually sharpened its regional policies. For the first year after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the rotations of governors dropped, but it soon returned to a noteworthy 32 percent, and since July 2024, 13 governors have already been replaced. There is also a tendency for “participants of the [Special Military Operation (SVO)]”—career military personnel or managers who have worked in the “new territories”—to infiltrate the regional administrative elites (Re-Russia, July 9).
Kynev points out that the regional elite has already been replaced by an “administrative elite,” that is, officials lacking personal power and ties with their new region. In 2024, however, beyond just a change of governor, a wholesale shift of the entire nomenklatura has begun. In many regions, this involves the active participation of external personnel, and often follows the arrests of previous managers. The practice of coordinating appointments to executive positions in parliament with central authorities is also growing (Re-Russia, July 9).
In some regions, special deputy governors (government chairmen) have been named to look after the restoration of the “sponsored territories” in Eastern Ukraine. In others, regional and federal officials working in the administrations of the “new territories” are returning with promotions to governorships or vice-governorships. Among them are the governor of Chukotka, Vladislav Kuznetsov, formerly first deputy chairman of the “Donetsk People’s Republic’s” (DPR) government; the leader of the Omsk oblast, former chairman of the “DPR” government Vladislav Khotsenko; and the governor of the Orenburg oblast Yevgeniy Solntsev, the former deputy chairman of the “DPR” government and the former head of the operational headquarters for the restoration of the republic (RIA Novosti, March 27).
Since the end of 2024, regional administrations have begun to create special positions for “SVO” participants and other professional military personnel, such as deputies for relations with security forces or curators of patriotic education, sports, and youth policy. These appointees go through the “Time of Heroes” personnel program (see EDM, May 22). In the fall of 2024, such appointments were made in the Kaluga and Lipetsk oblasts, and some of the “SVO heroes” went to the Federation Council (Re-Russia.net, July 9).
The promotion of war participants to regional elite positions goes hand in hand with the destruction of local self-rule (see EDM, April 28). The most prominent example of this can be seen in the Altay Republic, where, as a result of reforms, the two-tier system of local self-government is being eliminated, village councils are being abolished, and the control of governors over enlarged districts is being strengthened. In late June, many rallies were held against these measures, coinciding with a protest against the Moscow-appointed regional governor, Andrey Turchak (Kommersant.ru, June 21).
Independent researchers note that the new model has been met with spontaneous resistance “from below” in many regions. The most effective resistance has been seen in the national republics, where the hierarchical cohesion of the elites was preserved to the greatest extent (Re-Russia.net, July 11). In addition to Altai, these include the republics of Bashkortostan, Khakassia, and Tatarstan, the Ryazan oblast, and the Krasnoyarsk krai, where even politically loyal groups—veterans of the war against Ukraine, Cossacks, municipal officials, and deputies from United Russia—opposed the forced changes (RBC, November 28, 2024; 62.ru, January 18; Ridl.io, May 22; Ksonline.ru, July 2). In the spring of 2024, residents of the Kostroma oblast participating in the war against Ukraine came forward with a request to postpone the conversion of the municipality into a federal okrug (Logos44.ru, April 12, 2024).
The federal government has waged a war against local governments for decades. In 2010, for example, the post of appointed city manager was introduced in Yekaterinburg, taking away many of the local mayor’s previous powers, and leading to widespread unrest (Radio Svoboda, September 25, 2010). The actions of Aleksandr Yakob, the appointed city manager, also caused outbursts of public discontent (URA.ru, June 2, 2014).
The authorities’ next initiative was to cancel the direct election of the mayor of Yekaterinburg and the appointment of the head of the city by decision of the Legislative Assembly of the Sverdlovsk oblast. Then mayor of Yekaterinburg, Yevgeniy Royzman, actively opposed this idea with the support of the majority of the city’s residents, giving rise to huge rallies (RBC, March 20, April 2, 2018). The law on the abolition of elections, nevertheless, was eventually adopted (RBC, April 3, 2018).
The most notable example of popular discontent was the extensive protests in Khabarovsk krai in 2020 in the wake of the arrest of Governor Sergey Furgal (ВВС–Russian Service, October 18, 2020). Although no local protest has as yet presented a serious threat to federal power, independent sociologists note that “this could become a problem if the resources of the federal center are significantly reduced” (Re-Russia.net, July 17, 2024).
The behavior of federal authorities, who closely monitor the situation in the regions, provides indirect confirmation of these conclusions. Telegram channel “Nezgyar,” closely associated with the Kremlin, regularly monitors the situation and provides advice to governors on how to minimize discontent (Telegram/russicaRU, July 15). Its writers also track electoral sentiments, identify the most problematic regions, and do not hesitate to give local officials “political technological” advice (Telegram/russicaRU, July 4, 8). Such a level of control, however, may cause even more discontent among regional elites.
Regional administrations, even without expressing open discontent, often do things that alarm the Kremlin. For example, according to sources close to the Kremlin, local security services are beginning to cooperate with representatives of Russian nationalist groups and involve them in raids (Telegram/russicaRU, July 13; see EDM, July 30). Such a tendency evokes alarm in the presidential administration because it may lead to unforeseen interethnic conflicts and even turn against local elites. Nezgyar analysts note that “despite control, structures with de facto security functions are being formed at the local level where the participation of right-wing radicals is becoming systemic” (Telegram/russicaRU, July 13).
The strengthening of radical structures, especially in alliance with regional elites, frightens the Kremlin much more than liberal protest. Radicals are already demanding serious reforms at the state level, including the rejection of digital development, additional powers for the Russian Orthodox Church, measures against migrants and even Russian citizens of non-Russian nationality, a ban on mandatory vaccinations, and the nationalization of the economy (Katyusha.org, May 7). Implementing even some of these measures would set Russia back greatly, depriving it of the “safety cushion” in the form of a market economy that has allowed Russian President Vladimir Putin to wage war without serious damage to the well-being of the electorate (Katyusha.org, May 7).
Thus far, the government has managed to keep the radicals under control, maintaining the necessary level of an “external threat” and arranging displays of force in the form of internal repression. As the federal center weakens, however, regional discontent may turn against the Kremlin in unpredictable ways.