Moscow Using Svalbard to Test NATO’s Readiness and Resolve

Executive Summary:

• Moscow is using drone incursions in Romania and Poland to test the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) readiness and resolve, seeking to highlight divisions over how to respond to this new form of aggression.
• Moscow’s simultaneous moves in Svalbard (Spitzbergen), a Norwegian archipelago with special status under the terms of a 1920 treaty granting Russia and more than 40 other countries economic rights, show that Moscow is engaged in a broader strategy against NATO.
• This broader strategy does not mean that Putin is about to send bombers or tanks into NATO countries, but suggests the Kremlin leader is seeking to sow doubts about NATO mutual defense commitments, weakening Western diplomatic cohesion and military support for Ukraine.

Moscow’s drone incursions into Poland and Romania on September 9 and 13 have attracted enormous attention and concern. Exactly as Russian President Vladimir Putin intends, it has highlighted and exacerbated divisions within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) about how to respond to this new form of aggression featuring a degree of plausible deniability for Putin. The Kremlin leader’s moves in Svalbard (Spitzbergen), a strategically important Norwegian archipelago in the North Atlantic, however, make it clear that the drone incursions are part of a larger Russian move against NATO. Moscow’s actions in Svalbard have been largely ignored in the West outside of Norway because, under the terms of a 1920 treaty giving them to Oslo, Russia and more than 40 other countries have the right to engage in economic and research activities there, and the Norwegian government has limited rights to respond. As a result, many assume that Russia has a legitimate right to its controversial moves on Svalbard and Norway must respond with extreme restraint (see EDM, May 30, 2024, March 31). Moscow is the only treaty signatory aside from Norway that utilizes its commercial rights on Svalbard and is now aggressively pushing the boundaries of its rights there. Neither Russia’s moves against Poland and Romania nor its actions in Svalbard mean that Russia is about to send troops or tanks into any of these places, but they are evidence of a common Russian strategy meant to test mutual defense commitments and weaken diplomatic cohesion among the alliance.

Over the last several years, Moscow has incrementally tested the limits of its rights on Svalbard. No singular action has been sufficient to provoke a strong reaction from Norway, though Russia’s overall posture has frightened Oslo and threatened Norway’s presence in Svalbard (MiraNews, September 10). Last year, Russia announced that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would be cooperating with the Kremlin to expand its research presence in Svalbard, a development that may indicate deepening Beijing–Moscow cooperation in the archipelago (Window on Eurasia, September 13). This past spring, a Russian diplomat in Svalbard commemorated the end of World War II to May 8 instead of May 9, the day Moscow celebrates the anniversary, and led the rapidly growing Russian team at the coal mines now reopening on Svalbard in celebrating it. The following day, the head of the largest Russian state-owned company on Svalbard, Trust Arktikugol, organized a large demonstration memorializing the date. Both events highlighted Russia’s mobilization of “anti-fascist” efforts, promoting Kremlin propaganda amid its war against Ukraine (The Barents Observer, May 9, May 10; Window on Eurasia, May 11).

NATO has not acted against Russia’s actions on Svalbard collectively, other than conducting long-planned naval exercises in the region. Moscow commentators noted, however, that these exercises did not expand or extend despite current tensions (Mira News, September 10; Top War, September 11). In August, the Russian foreign ministry denounced Oslo for seeking to strengthen its defenses on Svalbard, arguing such moves violate the 1920 treaty and suggesting Moscow would take action to defend its interests (RIA Novosti, August 13; Window on Eurasia, August 17).

In the last two weeks, Russia has taken two additional steps that have escalated tensions on Svalbard. Russian officials have brought a vehicle to Svalbard that is “almost identical to police cars in Russia” despite Norway’s criminal code banning  “the use of foreign marks or designs that pretend to be or easily can be confused with a public authority” (The Barents Observer, September 8). Kari Aga Myklepost, a Russian specialist at UiT The Arctic University of Norway, says that the Russian coal company is “deliberately staging a grey zone situation aimed at provoking reactions and testing how Norwegian authorities will handle the situation” (The Barents Observer, September 8). Such actions put Oslo in a “delicate position,” she suggests, because if the Norwegian authorities react with strong statements, Moscow will accuse them of Russophobia and making a mole hill into a mountain, something those inclined not to stand up to Moscow will likely accept (The Barents Observer, September 8). If Oslo allows this encroachment on their authority to pass, however, then Moscow will pocket what they view as a concession and come up with a new test to further push Norway’s limits. Russia’s second recent provocative move indicates that the Kremlin intends to continue to expand its presence in Svalbard. Moscow, which has dramatically cut back international flights since the start of Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, has announced that it will double its number of flights to Svalbard next year (Murmansk RBC, September 2).

Russia’s recent moves to solidify its presence on Svalbard reflect Putin’s desire to gain victories in the North after a series of defeats in the region (see EDM, March 12, 2024, March 31). His efforts reflect the desires of Russian nationalists to expand Russia’s military, economic, and even cartographic presence in the north, with one senior Duma deputy calling for giving Russian names to all the islands in the region (Window on Eurasia, January 16). Russian state media have whipped up nationalist sentiment around Russian military action in the north during Zapad-2025 military drills, showing Russian naval forces landing at Franz Joseph Land, a Russian archipelago in the Arctic Ocean, and conducting mock Kinzhal missile strikes on “enemy” positions over the Barents Sea (The Barents Observer, September 12, September 13).

Most people outside of Norway know little or nothing about Svalbard, with those who do primarily focusing on its glaciers and wildlife rather than its significance to Western security. Those who know more, including many in the security communities of NATO countries and in Moscow, recognize that it could act as a barrier to the Kremlin rapidly flooding the Atlantic with submarines. Svalbard’s strategic location means that NATO must manage Russian efforts to establish greater control over the archipelago. Russia’s actions on Svalbard, drone incursions into NATO, and hybrid warfare along its western borders are all part of a systematic challenge designed to break NATO resolve and cohesion, not a patchwork of unrelated incidents. Svalbard, far more than Poland and Romania, may be the true litmus test of Putin’s immediate intentions and Western readiness and resolve to counter them—regardless of how few people in Western capitals now consider it as such.