Belarus’s Political Prisoner Problem Attracting Renewed International Attention

Executive Summary:

• The first phone call between U.S. President Trump and Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka in August, followed by high-level meetings in Minsk, marked a surprising shift after 15 years of estrangement between the two countries. 
• The issue of political prisoners has become the central focus of U.S. policy toward Belarus, and with over 1,300 people jailed on political grounds since 2020, Lukashenka uses their release as a bargaining tool.
• The United States now plays the leading role, while Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) remain critical external actors, and Poland’s transit blockade in 2024 forced partial prisoner releases, highlighting Warsaw’s outsized influence.
• Lukashenka seeks sanctions relief, room to maneuver beyond Moscow, and international legitimacy. Without a comprehensive release of prisoners and genuine reforms, however, any U.S.–Belarus rapprochement will remain fragile and limited.

On August 15, U.S. President Donald Trump held his first telephone conversation with Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka (President of Belarus, August 15). The call marked an unexpected turning point in the relations between the two countries, which had been in a state of political estrangement for more than 15 years. The renewed initiative emerged almost spontaneously. Just two hours before the call, the White House received a letter from the organization Belarus Democratic Forum requesting assistance in securing the release of more than 1,300 political prisoners in Belarus (Sota, August 15).

On September 5, Trump called Lukashenka a “very respected” person and a “strong leader,” praising him for releasing 16 hostages. On September 11, a public meeting took place in Minsk between Lukashenka and U.S. Deputy Special Envoy to Ukraine, John Coale. The central topic of their talks was the fate of political prisoners, demonstrating the importance of human rights and political repression in bilateral discussions (Belta, September 11).

Amid growing external pressure and worsening domestic conditions, Lukashenka has found himself in a situation where the release of prisoners has become not only a humanitarian task but also a strategic tool for building new foreign policy ties and ensuring his own political survival.

According to human rights organizations, Belarus currently holds more than 1,300 political prisoners (Dissidentby, September 15). The number has remained almost unchanged in the face of continued repression. Many citizens have been imprisoned since 2020, when, after contested presidential elections and mass protests, the authorities launched a sweeping campaign of repression (see EDM, August 9).

The category of political prisoners encompasses a wide range of individuals, including journalists from independent media, human rights defenders, students, activists, and even ordinary citizens who have left critical comments on social media. Numerous cases of torture, abuse, and inhumane treatment have been documented. Families of prisoners face pressure, while lawyers are stripped of their licenses (Dissidentby, accessed September 28). For Lukashenka, these individuals have become a reserve of political capital. He uses their fate as a bargaining chip with the outside world. Domestically, the existence of prisoners helps maintain an atmosphere of fear, stifling the development of business and civil society alike.

Trump’s direct involvement radically altered the dynamics of U.S.–Belarus relations. Trump’s referring to Lukashenka as a “strong leader” sparked mixed reactions, but served as an opening for negotiations (Belta, September 6).

On September 12, another U.S. delegation met with Lukashenka in Minsk. Shortly afterward, Washington lifted sanctions on the airline Belavia. In response, Minsk released 52 prisoners, who were sent to Lithuania (Charter97.org, September 11). One of the prisoners, opposition figure Mikalai Statkevich, refused to leave the country, however, and was most likely returned to prison (Charter97, September 11). Minsk is willing to bargain with human lives but remains unwilling to undertake systemic changes. Lukashenka and his inner circle fear opponents and view the forced exile of ideological adversaries as the only acceptable option.

For Lukashenka, such negotiations offer a double benefit. They allow him to demonstrate to domestic audiences his international recognition, while also opening the door to potential economic concessions from the international community.

At the strategic level, Lukashenka pursues several goals:

• Sanctions relief: The most painful restrictions for Minsk remain the ban on potash exports and limitations on the financial sector, and their removal is seen as a primary objective.
• Balancing Russia: Since 2020, Belarus has become increasingly dependent on Moscow—both militarily and financially. Opening a communication channel with Washington offers Lukashenka a chance to partially restore room for maneuver.
• Image and legitimacy: Hosting meetings with U.S. representatives bolsters Lukashenka’s image as a leader with whom world powers engage in negotiations.

Nobel Prize winners have played a notable role in maintaining international attention on Belarus. In total, 75 laureates have signed four appeals demanding the release of political prisoners. In August 2024, a group of 24 laureates sent a letter to Trump, thanking him for his attention to the issue and urging other world leaders to join efforts to free prisoners (Bolkunets.org, August 19). Such initiatives are largely symbolic, but they amplify pressure on political decision-makers.

Despite signs of a “thaw,” the prospects for an immediate improvement in relations remain uncertain. Currently, there is an absence of diplomats on both sides. Since 2008, Belarus and the United States have not filled their respective ambassador positions (U.S. Embassy in Belarus, accessed September 26). A full restoration of diplomatic relations will likely only be possible after the release of all political prisoners. Additionally, Russia sees Belarus as part of its sphere of influence and has no interest in its rapprochement with the West. Any independent steps by Minsk toward Washington could trigger a harsh reaction from the Kremlin. Past experience shows that Lukashenka has released prisoners cyclically, when convenient, but has never embarked on systemic reforms. It remains unclear whether current moves will lead to lasting change. Finally, Lukashenka is keen to maintain his image as the sole source of authority and decision-making. Making concessions too rapidly could be perceived as weakness, undermining his authority within the system.

Poland played a particularly important role in the past in securing the release of political prisoners. In July 2024, Warsaw took an unprecedented step by effectively freezing the transit of goods from Belarus to the European Union by rail and road. The conditions for reopening the border were the end of the hybrid migration crisis and the release of political prisoners (RMF24, July 8, 2024).

This move exerted enormous pressure. Within just 48 hours, the transit of goods from Belarus, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was brought to a standstill (RMF24, July 4, 2024). Within hours, Lukashenka began releasing some prisoners and dismissed Belarus’s foreign minister (Belta, June 27, July 2, 2024). Moreover, a crisis erupted in relations with the PRC, which is vitally dependent on stable transit through the Belarusian corridor into the European Union. As a result, hundreds of prisoners were released over the following months (The Insider, September 18). The process was deliberately protracted, however, as Lukashenka wanted to demonstrate that decisions stemmed solely from him and not from outside pressure.

From September 12 to 25, Poland fully closed its border with Belarus, officially citing joint Belarusian-Russian military exercises (DW, September 25). In response, Minsk detained 1,453 Polish trucks (Belta, September 17). The Belarusian rail corridor remains a vital land route connecting the PRC and the European Union, handling 25 billion euros (about $29 billion) in goods in 2024 (Zerkalo, September 18). Over 130 PRC–Europe freight trains were stranded following the closure, and potash exports faced delays (Pozirk, September 22; PAP, September 25). 

The situation became a key issue at a September 15 meeting between the foreign ministers of Poland and the PRC in Warsaw, which ended without concrete results (Belsat, September 18). On September 22, Lukashenko met in Minsk with Li Si, a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee, criticizing Poland’s actions as unfriendly and a “springboard for other states” (Belta, September 22).

The issue of political prisoners in Belarus has become a point of intersection for the interests of Minsk, Washington, Moscow, Warsaw, and Beijing. For Lukashenka, it presents an opportunity to break free from total dependence on the Kremlin and reopen channels of communication with the West. For the United States, it is an opportunity to promote a humanitarian agenda while simultaneously curbing Russian influence. For Poland, it is confirmation of its role as a key regional actor. For the PRC, Belarus remains a crucial transit zone requiring guarantees of stability. Despite Lukashenka still seeking to control the process and exploit it for his own interests, pressure from the United States, Poland, the PRC, and the wider international community has created a unique window of opportunity for real progress.