Non-Russians Increasing Their Share of Russia’s Population

Executive Summary:

• Non-Russians in the Russian Federation are increasing their share of the country’s population despite decreasing in absolute numbers because the decline in the number of ethnic Russians is far greater.
• This proportional increase reflects higher fertility rates among non-Russians than among ethnic Russians and is exacerbated by the influx of non-Russian immigrants at a time when ethnic Russian immigration has dropped to almost zero.
• The Kremlin has tried to reverse this trend by promoting a pro-natalist policy, Russifying non-Russians, and reducing immigration. Moscow hopes to conceal the issue by ending the publication of key demographic data, but these steps have been ineffective or counterproductive.

The total population of the Russian Federation is declining fast. Even the Russian government admits it, and some experts are suggesting that Russia will lose as much as almost half of its current population by the end of this century as a result (The Moscow Times, January 31; Carnegie Politika, September 19; Meduza, September 29). Neither Russian officials nor independent demographers, however, have focused on what may become the most critical aspect of this decline. The percentage of ethnic Russians in the country’s population will almost certainly decline while that of non-Russians will continue to increase. This is the product of much lower fertility rates among the former than the latter and the changed nature of immigration from one dominated by ethnic Russians in the 1990s to one now overwhelmingly dominated by non-Russians from Central Asia and the Caucasus (Carnegie Politika, September 19). Moscow has sought to counter this by launching campaigns to Russify non-Russians, boost birthrates—which have unintentionally sparked greater rises among non-Russians than among ethnic Russians—make it easier for remaining ethnic Russians abroad to come to Russia, and impose increased restrictions on non-Russian immigration. The Russian government is covering up its population decline by stopping the publication of demographic data that would allow analysts and others to track the issue (see EDM, May 15, 2024; Millyard Tatar, June 10; Yesli byt’ tochnym, August 6; Krizis Kopilka, September 27;  MariUver, October 1).

These efforts have been far less successful than the Kremlin suggests. Demographers mine indirect data sources and the policies of the Russian government, which in many cases, prove openly counterproductive and subject to criticism (Window on Eurasia, January 26, 2024; see EDM, October 22, 2024). Moreover, many ethnic Russians can see from what is going on around them that their position in the population is slipping, however much Putin suggests otherwise with his talk of an ethnic “Russian world” (Bereg, July 10). The experience of many Russians, especially in major cities, has sparked popular demands for restrictions on immigrants far more radical than the Russian government wants and the Russian economy can tolerate. This has also caused the formation of far-right Russian nationalist groups such as the Russian Community to drive out immigrants and rein in indigenous non-Russians (see EDM, November 9, 2021, October 15, 2024, July 30, September 18). Some in the Kremlin are supporting these groups, which may help Moscow tactically, but may also pose a strategic threat to Russia, both in economic and political terms. This support only prompts non-Russians to take countermeasures and potentially think about pursuing independence (see EDM, April 30, 2024).

The Kremlin continues to insist, and most observers in Russia and the West continue to repeat, that ethnic Russians form roughly 80 percent of the total population of the Russian Federation. That figure is no longer true, however, and will be even less so in the coming decades. That figure does not include the more than seven million Central Asian and Caucasian immigrants now living in the country or reflect how a large swath of the Russian population was not counted in the 2020–2021 census, but rather estimated based on projections, which detailed studies have suggested were extremely inaccurate (see EDM, June 7, 2022; Window on Eurasia, July 17, August 11, 2023; Yesli byt’ tochnym, March 24, 2024). That, in turn, means the percentage of ethnic Russians actually resident in the Russian Federation is now likely to be closer to 70 percent than to the 80 percent Moscow claims. This number will continue to fall, given that fertility rates in Russian cities already approach 1.0 children per woman per lifetime, far below the 2.2 needed to maintain a constant population. Such rates are also below replacement levels in predominantly ethnic Russian oblasts, while, in non-Russian areas, these rates remain close to or, in some cases, far above replacement levels (RG.ru, February 2, 2020). That pattern does not mean that the Russian Federation, over the course of the rest of this century, will have a population evenly divided between ethnic Russians and non-Russians as was the case in the Soviet Union in 1991. Nor does it mean that its economy will collapse, or its military be forced to contract because of a shortage of men. It does almost certainly mean, however, that the share of ethnic Russians will be far lower than it is now.

Many in the Kremlin refuse to believe this because they remain trapped in a paradigm that is no longer true—or at least not as true as it once was—and assume that the current declines will be reversed in the next decade or so. Since World War II, Russia has experienced a series of demographic “waves” triggered by the huge losses in that conflict. As a result of those losses, the number of women in prime child-bearing age groups has declined every 20 to 25 years. This has meant that the number of children they give birth to has declined, but then recovered at least slightly as more of those children become parents. That pattern held until the end of Soviet times, but plunging fertility rates in the cities has changed that. This almost certainly means that there will not be the bounce a decade or so from now that Russia experienced in the past and that Russian officials continue to count on (Meduza, September 29). Additionally, as these same observers have pointed out, there simply are not enough ethnic Russians abroad who might come back and cover losses, as was the case in the first post-Soviet decade, and urban Russians are not going to have more children unless housing becomes more affordable and their incomes rise dramatically.

This demographic trend is already impacting ethnic Russians and non-Russians alike. Ethnic Russians are becoming even more nationalistic and hostile to non-Russians, indigenous as well as immigrants. This will raise the ethnic temperature within the country while simultaneously leading them to question Kremlin efforts to continue to rely on immigration or expand the borders of the Russian Federation. This is a step that would, as the case of Ukraine, inevitably add an even greater share of non-Russians to the total and even recreate much sooner some of the same demographic forces that contributed to the demise of the Soviet Union (Window on Eurasia, March 17, 2022, February 28, 2024). At the same time, many non-Russians are already encouraged by their increasing share in the population, but discouraged by their falling numbers. They are likely to become increasingly radicalized, especially if the Kremlin responds, as seems likely, with greater repression.

Demography is not destiny, except in the long term. Governments can and do change their policies. The aging Russian President Vladimir Putin leadership, however, seems disinclined to do so in this area. That almost certainly means that, in the coming decades, demography will be a central issue in Russian life, one that could easily explode if the Kremlin does not change course (Window on Eurasia, April 21, 2024).