Vilnius Downgrades Tsikhanouskaya’s Protection

Executive Summary:

• After fleeing Belarus in 2020, opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya received unprecedented support from Lithuania and Western partners, including head-of-state-level security and diplomatic privileges.
• In October, Lithuania downgraded Tsikhanouskaya’s security, citing reduced threats and financial concerns. Public backlash led Lithuania to temporarily reinstate Tsikhanouskaya’s previous security level while reassessing long-term arrangements amid waning Western focus on Belarus.
• The Belarusian opposition depends on external funding and its sustainability hinges on the changeable priorities of the international democratic community.

After the presidential elections in Belarus in August 2020, marred by mass falsifications, violence, and arrests, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya—the main opponent of Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka—faced a choice between imprisonment and emigration (see Strategic Snapshot, August 9). Tsikhanouskaya was accompanied by a representative of the Belarusian security services and crossed the border into Lithuania, where the government provided her with the highest level of security.

Soon after, Tsikhanouskaya and her allies established the “Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya” in Vilnius, positioning themselves as the political and organizational center of the Belarusian opposition in exile (Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, accessed October 23). Several structures emerged around the office, including the “United Transitional Cabinet” and the “Coordination Council” (Office of Tsikhanouskaya, accessed October 23 [1], [2]). These entities negotiate with Western partners, participate in the allocation of international financial support, and maintain contacts with the governments of the European Union and the United States. In the absence of on-the-record, direct dialogue with Minsk following the August 2020 election and Belarus’ facilitation of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Western countries used diplomatic relations with Tsikhanouskaya as a symbolic alternative to Lukashenka.

For several years, Lithuania provided Tsikhanouskaya with security at the level of a diplomatic guest, provided by the Dignitary Protection Service, including around the clock protection, secure housing, airport escorts, and diplomatic privileges. Annual costs were approximately one million euros ($1,159,450). As of October 1, however, Vilnius transferred her security to the Criminal Police Bureau, a lower level of protection, and required her to vacate her state-provided protected residence within a few weeks (The Baltic Times, October 7). Official statements cited a reduced threat level as justification, claiming the previous level of protection was no longer warranted (LRT, October 8). Lithuania’s Prime Minister Inga Ruginiene says that protection would continue but had “been adjusted according to the level of threat” in line with financial considerations (TVP World, October 18). According to Vytenis Adriukaitis, honorary chairman of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, “Tsikhanouskaya is unlikely to have a serious impact on public opinion within Belarus today. The situation has changed, and she is no longer perceived as a threat” to Lukashenka (LRT, October 9; The Kyiv Independent, October 18).

This decision also likely reflects changes in the international political climate. European and U.S. attention to Belarusian issues has declined in favor of issues such as Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and domestic economic challenges. Lithuanian criticism of the transparency and accountability of organizations affiliated with Tsikhanouskaya has also grown (LRT, July 17). Some Lithuanian politicians believe the revised security arrangements reflect their government’s desire to balance relations with Minsk and avoid open confrontation (LRT, October 9; The Kyiv Independent, October 18). Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda said, “It is unfortunate that all sorts of far-reaching political conclusions have been drawn from this, apparently in an attempt to dramatize the issue” (The Baltic Times, October 14).

Following Lithuania’s decision to downgrade Tsikhanouskaya’s protective service, her office in Vilnius temporarily suspended operations, citing the need to adapt to new conditions (DW, October 8). On October 17, Dzianis Kuchynski, Tsikhanouskaya’s diplomatic advisor, stated that Lithuania reinstated the old security measures while making a final decision on an updated protection system, likely in response to the public outcry from some in Lithuania, EU politicians, and the Belarusian opposition (TVP World, October 18). Tsikhanouskaya’s office has since resumed its activities (TVP World, October 18).

Tsikhanouskaya is the most prominent figure representing opposition to Lukashenka outside Belarus. Amid a fractured opposition in exile, some Belarusian activists claim that she has little influence on internal Belarusian political processes and has overly focused on symbolic activities since 2020 (Bolkunets.org, January 16, 2024; Belarus Partisan, accessed October 22). According to Veronika Tsepkalo, another member of the Belarusian opposition in exile, she and some others who opposed Lukashenka during the 2020 elections feel sidelined from involvement in the mainstream opposition in exile  (Radio Svaboda, August 2, 2023; Bolkunets.org, January 16, 2024). Some Belarusian critics claim that the Tsikhanouskaya Office has not achieved concrete successes in ending repression or securing the release of political prisoners in Belarus (Bolkunets.org, January 16, 2024).

According to Thomas Tomilinas, vice-chairman of the Committee on European Affairs of the Seimas of Lithuania, about $58 million has passed through Tsikhanouskaya-affiliated organizations registered in Lithuania (Zerkalo, October 13). These funds bring Lithuania income tax, value-added tax, and events. Tomilinas claims that Lithuania does not “feed [Tikhanovskaya]. She feeds us,” and if she moves to Warsaw, so too will financial flows allocated to support the Belarusian opposition (Zerkalo, October 13).

Another reason Lithuania may have changed its stance on Tsikhanouskaya’s protection is the resumption of communications between Lukashenka and the United States, during which Minsk may have asked the U.S. to end international support for the Tsikhanouskaya Office and other Belarusian opposition organizations (Belta, October 14). If the United States ceases supporting Tsikhanouskaya’s Office, certain EU countries might continue sustaining it, though the extent remains uncertain.

In a broader context, this development reflects a shift in priorities. European capitals are focusing more on the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine, energy security, and migration issues, with Belarus moving to the periphery (DW, October 17). Western media largely views Tsikhanouskaya as a leader of a popular uprising. Belarusian society, however, is increasingly removed from the 2020 election and subsequent protests. If Western funding ends, Tsikhanouskaya’s organizations will be in jeopardy. Lithuania’s decision to take more time to establish an updated security protocol in response to backlash within and outside Lithuania, however, demonstrates that Tsikhanouskaya has at least a degree of enduring influence (TVP World, October 18).

The Belarusian opposition in exile depends on external funding, which shapes a unique power dynamic. The Tsikhanouskaya organizations exemplify how international support can create its own administrative and financial cycle, where donor priorities sometimes influence strategy. This mechanism fosters the development of formalized procedures, bureaucracy, and competition for funding among different groups within the opposition community (Sota, February 11).

Lithuania’s decision to change Tsikhanouskaya’s security detail illustrates a broader problem for the Belarusian opposition in exile. High external support and symbolic significance do not guarantee strategic effectiveness or long-term sustainability. Tsikhanouskaya’s office in exile also highlights how hosting her has benefited Lithuania. Over several years, Lithuania invested significant resources into Tsikhanouskaya’s organizations, which were also primarily funded by the United States and the European Union (LRT, July 17). This support positioned Lithuania as a key intermediary in the Belarusian opposition’s activities abroad. The country gained the ability to influence the distribution of international aid to the Belarusian opposition, enhancing its soft power in regional politics. By hosting the office, Lithuania became a hub for networking, information exchange, and visibility within European political circles. Tsikhanouskaya’s organizations allow Western countries to communicate with Belarusian society and exert pressure on the Lukashenka regime. The Tsikhanouskaya office depends on the financial and diplomatic support of individual countries and external organizations, making it highly sensitive to shifts in international support for the Belarusian opposition in exile. Any agreement between major players can quickly change the office’s status and put its existence at risk.