Official Nationality Lives On in Putin’s Russia
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Executive Summary:
- The nationality line in Russian passports, which Moscow exploited to oppress minorities in Soviet times, no longer exists, but official nationality as a legal category still exists in Russia, forcing many to turn to the courts to defend their interests.
- Unless they can reclaim their original nationalities, which were often previously changed by officials, some do not have the chance to emigrate or claim benefits available to particular groups.
- The number of Russian Federation residents actually seeking change via the courts is still small, but the continuing existence of official nationality has the potential to revive an old form of repression as well as to exacerbate growing ethnic tensions.
One of the most notorious aspects of the Soviet system during its final decades was the maintenance of the nationality line in passports. Known as “the fifth paragraph,” “the fifth point,” or “the fifth record,” it was used in a variety of ways against a variety of groups—most horrifically against the Jewish community, whose members, if they were listed as Jewish in this line, often found themselves excluded from educational and professional opportunities and subjected to other forms of discrimination. That prompted many to seek emigration, as can be seen in historian Leo Pevsner’s 2019 book, The Fifth Record, which discusses this emigration (Pevsner, The Fifth Record, August 2, 2019). After the fall of the Soviet Union, Moscow abolished the fifth line and even enshrined its abolition in the 1993 constitution, a move that human rights defenders around the world welcomed, pleasing many, but far from all, Russians and non-Russians.
The significance of the issue of official nationality lies in how the Soviets defined the nationality of their subjects based on generational succession rather than on the individuals’ self-identification. If both parents of an individual registering for an internal passport at 18 are members of the same nationality, then that individual must declare the same nationality. If the parents included representatives of two nationalities, then the registrant could choose one or the other—and very rarely, according to some reports, a third. The only regular exception to this pattern was a Soviet policy that allowed officers in the Soviet army at the rank of colonel or above to change their nationality from Ukrainian to Russian. Unsurprisingly, many younger people wanted to declare their nationality not on the basis of their ancestry, but on the basis of their own feelings. Many assumed the dropping of the nationality line in the passport would open the way to that, but that has not happened. Instead, Moscow has retained the Soviet model for official purposes, such as registering marriages or births, even though it has allowed residents to declare their preferred nationality on other occasions, for example, in censuses.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime has not restored this line in the Russian Federation passports. It has, however, maintained references to official nationality in other, less high-profile documents and then used them against non-Russian minorities in much the same way Soviet leaders used the passport line against Jews. Because of this, the issue of official nationality remains very much alive (Window on Eurasia, June 3, 2024). In response to and reflecting rights they did not have in Soviet times, some non-Russians have been going to court to try to have their official nationality as listed changed so that they can emigrate, gain the benefits that such status gives them, and/or protect their national identities (Verstka, October 22). The numbers doing so, while still small, have increased dramatically since Putin came to power and especially since he launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Both of these cases, along with the underlying tensions they highlight, have sparked new calls for the restoration of the nationality line in passports. These come from both Russian nationalists and non-Russian activists who say its absence threatens their communities. The Kremlin says it remains opposed to this move, likely because it can achieve the same goal without taking a step that is more likely to provoke a reaction in the West. (For a discussion of some of these cases over the last three decades, see Window on Eurasia, February 5, 2019; and for the continuing debate about the possibility of restoring the nationality line in passports, see Gazeta.ru, March 2, 2022; Natsional’niy Aktsent, May 28, 2024.)
Unsurprisingly, given the Putin regime’s continued defense of official nationality in all documents except passports, reporting on this issue has been relatively scarce. Stories about individual cases occasionally appear, but surveys of the problem are rare. A new investigation by the independent Verstka news portal reveals more than 200 recent court cases in which appellants have sought to change their nationality to gain the benefits of a different identity than the one assigned to them by the government or previously accepted (Verstka, October 22). Among its most important findings are that since the start of Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the number of such cases has increased sharply, and “most often,” these are being brought by people who earlier had listed themselves as ethnic Russians but now have changed their minds. Perhaps even more striking is the news agency’s discovery that the number of those seeking to change from a non-Russian nationality to Russian is “a great rarity.” It is certainly possible that this may reflect the far greater willingness of officials outside the court system to accept such a request for that kind of change without involving the courts—even though Russian law specifies that only a court can approve such a change.
According to Verstka, the largest group of Russian Federation citizens seeking to change their official nationality consists of ethnic Germans who were previously listed as Russians but now wish to emigrate and can do so only if they are listed as Germans. The second largest are those who are members of the numerically small nationalities of the Russian North and Far East, who benefit from such identities but were earlier reidentified as ethnic Russians. Moscow continues to work hard to reduce their numbers, most recently by seeking to create a list of individuals who are members of these groups. This act of intimidation allows the Russian authorities to challenge anyone claiming some nationalities, reject their self-identifications, and force them to seek to regain their identities in courts, all actions that are reverberating through these groups and others as well (Siber.Realii, September 3, 2021; Window on Eurasia, December 17, 2021; Natsional’niy Aktsent, June 24). Perhaps most significant is the Verska research’s discovery that most individuals who go to court to change their nationality in government documents are currently successful. This might prompt the Kremlin to try to close off this avenue of relief and reduce the number of such cases and stories about them.
Galina Sidorova, a Russian commentator, believes that both residents of the Russian Federation and members of the international community need to focus on these dangers rather than being reassured by Putin’s continued assertions that he does not support reinstating the nationality line on Russian passports. That is because, she suggests, he does not have to. By using the listing of nationality in other government documents, the current Kremlin leader can achieve his repressive goals while avoiding criticism from Russians and the West alike (Radio Svoboda, November 4, 2023).
To date, Putin has succeeded mainly in persuading even the most passionate human rights advocates in Russia and the West, who routinely point to the continued absence of a nationality line in Russian passports as a significant achievement. They are half right. Removing references to ethnic nationality in passports was and is an enormous step forward. In this case, however, as in so many others, Putin has undercut that positive step by maintaining less obvious references to what constitutes official nationality that his regime can and does use in precisely the same way. While the Kremlin is not held to account, a burgeoning human rights disaster is growing into a political one larger than something that can be contained by support for emigration alone.
