Russia Becoming a Gas Station Without Gasoline

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(Source: RIA Novosti)

Executive Summary:

  • Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has led to a domestic fuel crisis, as Ukraine’s repeated drone strikes on oil facilities, as well as international sanctions, have constrained Russia’s largest industry.
  • In September, Russia’s gasoline production fell by almost a quarter, forcing the Kremlin to impose a ban on gasoline exports until 2026, and to seek to import gasoline from the People’s Republic of China and Belarus.
  • Since 2022, Ukraine has dramatically reshaped its military production industry and become a world leader in drone technology, enabling it to mass-produce drones at a significantly lower cost than Russia can repair its domestic infrastructure.

On November 3, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine struck the Saratov oil refinery for the third time this fall. The General Staff also reported strikes on multiple Russian military logistics sites the same night (Telegram/GeneralStaffZSU; The Kyiv Independent, November 3). This is just one of the latest Ukrainian strikes on critical energy infrastructure in Russia. In 2014, former U.S. Senator John McCain referred to Russia as a “gas station masquerading as a country” (Voice of America, March 27, 2014). Since the early 2000s, Moscow has actively promoted the idea of Russia as an “energy superpower,” emphasizing that the oil and gas fields left over from the Soviet era could ensure economic prosperity. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime, however, greatly damaged that notion with its 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The full-scale war led to international sanctions aimed at constraining the Russian economy’s ability to support the war effort, with a particular focus on targeting oil and gas companies (Radio Svoboda, October 24).

Russia’s energy sector is under pressure from Ukraine’s improving offensive capabilities. Since 2022, Ukraine has transformed its defense technology sector and is now able to target Russian oil refineries with massive drone attacks (see EDM, October 16, 2024, October 8). Since January of this year, Ukrainian drones have hit 21 of Russia’s 38 major oil refineries, as of October 11 (BBC Russian Service, October 11). In September alone, Ukraine carried out 40 strikes on Russian oil and gas infrastructure. As a result, Russian gasoline production has fallen by almost a quarter (Re-Russia.net, October 8).

The geography of these strikes is also expanding significantly. Russia’s vast territory no longer offers a safety net with the realities of modern drone warfare. Ukrainian drones, for example, are reaching major oil refineries in Bashkortostan, approximately 1,500 kilometers (about 932 miles) away from the border, and even refineries in Siberia. A gasoline crisis has emerged in many regions of Russia, characterized by a sharp shortage and significant price increases (Siber.Realii, October 9).

Unlike Russian strikes on Ukraine, which often target residential buildings, Ukraine is responding with strikes specifically against Russia’s fuel infrastructure. For Russia’s militarized economy, such attacks are proving extremely painful, as they undermine the Russian military’s offensive potential and disrupt supply logistics. Authorities are now forced to deploy army reservists to protect refineries from drones (DW, October 22).

As a result of the Ukrainian strikes, the Russian government imposed a ban on gasoline exports until the end of 2025 (RBC, September 30). Furthermore, Russia is now examining projects to import gasoline from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Newizv.ru, October 2). This is somewhat paradoxical, as the PRC is a major buyer of Russian oil itself. The disruption of many Russian oil refineries by Ukrainian drones, however, is forcing Russia to take this unconventional step to meet the needs of Siberia and the Far East. Domestic gasoline production in these regions is insufficient, and refineries in the European part of Russia are already struggling to supply even the major capital cities (The Moscow Times, October 25).

In addition to the PRC, Russia is considering a similar model of cooperation with Belarus. Under this model, Russia would export its unrefined oil to Belarus and import gasoline in return, as Belarusian refineries are not at risk of Ukrainian drone attacks. Nevertheless, Russian officials continue to declare that the situation is completely under control (Federal Press, October 1). Experts close to the government claim that the war is not the primary cause of the fuel crisis. Instead, they attribute it to technical and seasonal issues (Federal Press, October 6). Russian Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev even blames consumers themselves for rising gasoline prices (The Moscow Times, October 27). This is typical behavior for the Russian government, which never admits wrongdoing.

This rather powerful and, to many, unexpected series of Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries could lead to a growing energy crisis in Russia, forcing the Kremlin to shift from military expansionism to addressing socioeconomic problems. For reasons of “information security,” the Russian Ministry of Energy stopped publishing statistics on the amount of gasoline produced in Russia back in 2024 (RBC, May 29, 2024).

Despite being one of the world’s largest oil exporters, Russia’s domestic market primarily requires refined products, such as gasoline and other fuels, rather than crude oil. Russia’s production is currently seriously disrupted, requiring a lengthy recovery period. Additionally, Russia’s air defense systems have been unable to provide adequate output during this recovery period. For example, the Ryazan Oil Refinery was attacked three times in 2025 (Kyiv Post, October 23). Fuel objects in the Krasnodar krai and Volga regions have also been repeatedly hit, diminishing Russia’s ability to repair these facilities adequately (United24 Media, October 29; The Moscow Times, November 4). In addition to hitting refineries, Ukraine is also carrying out strikes against Russia’s oil transportation infrastructure. Ukrainian drones have struck numerous oil pumping stations, as well as several maritime transshipment facilities, including oil loading terminals in the Black Sea and two tankers belonging to the Russian “shadow fleet” in the Baltic (United24 Media, September 13; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 27).

The drone strike strategy is causing a systemic crisis in Russia’s oil production industry, affecting the supply, refining, and storage chains. Since 2022, Ukraine has significantly transformed its drone production industry, emerging as a global leader in drone technology (see EDM, October 16, 2024, October 5). This allows Ukraine to mass-produce drones at a significantly cheaper cost than Russia can repair its domestic infrastructure.

Ukraine’s series of attacks on Russia’s energy facilities is a logical response to the full-scale Russian invasion, which has now lasted nearly four years. Judging by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s recent statement that a ceasefire in Ukraine would leave it under “Nazi” control, moreover, Russia has no intention of ending this war any time soon (RIA Novosti, October 21). The combination of Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian oil refineries and the recently adopted major international sanctions against Russian oil companies has the potential to force the Kremlin to make peace (Meduza, October 23).