Putin and Aliyev Meet in Dushanbe

Executive Summary:

• The October 10 meeting between Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Russian President Vladimir Putin marked a cautious re-engagement following a period of tension in Azerbaijan–Russia relations.
• Baku reaffirmed its strategy of pragmatic, balanced diplomacy—engaging Moscow without compromising independence, reflecting growing confidence and the pursuit of multivector diplomacy centered on autonomy and practical cooperation.
• The meeting signaled continuity in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy diversification through partnerships with Türkiye, the European Union, and the United States rather than a strategic realignment toward Moscow.

 Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Russian President Vladimir Putin met on October 10 in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, amid a deep crisis in bilateral relations between their two countries (President of Azerbaijan, October 10). The previous year has seen an avalanche of tensions in the diplomatic, informational, and political spheres that tested what had long been perceived as a pragmatic and effective relationship (see EDM, May 20, July 7, September 9; Azemedia, August 1). The Dushanbe summit, however, revealed a controlled readjustment, not a reset. It was an indicator of pragmatic moderation rather than a fresh partnership (Azernews, October 15). Baku reaffirmed the guiding principle of its foreign policy—engagement without subordination—by reestablishing contacts with Moscow without giving up independence.

The roots of the rift date back to the end of 2024, when a Russian missile defense system shot down an Azerbaijani civilian commercial aircraft near the Russian border, resulting in the plane crashing in Aktau, Kazakhstan (see EDM, January 15; Caspiannews, August 9). The incident shocked Azerbaijani society and triggered a tidal wave of diplomatic protests. Baku suspended several joint projects and refrained from top-level visits for several months. According to most commentators, Azerbaijan–Russia relations have reached an all-time low since the beginning of the 1990s (Azemedia, July 26). Putin took responsibility on Russia’s behalf for the shoot down and professed regret (Meduza, October 9). Aliyev publicly took up Putin’s acknowledgment of error. The episode demonstrated Baku’s ability to extract diplomatic advantage from challenging circumstances, a capacity that is increasingly central to its geopolitical strategy (Azertag, October 10).

The October Dushanbe meeting was less about sensational breakthroughs than about tone and timing. Azerbaijani media reported the meeting as “constructive.” The meeting emphasized trade, transportation links, and local stability, topics that diplomatically avoided more sensitive political issues, such as Russian media interference or the treatment of Azerbaijanis in Russia (Azernews, October 15). The symbolism was deliberate. Baku signaled openness to dialogue, but only on its terms, by downplaying contentious topics and stressing practical cooperation (Azerbaijan Today, October 11).

The Dushanbe summit brought Azerbaijan’s general strategy of multivector diplomacy into the limelight—a balance between competing centers of power with the greatest possible freedom of action (Azemedia, May 2). Baku will need to strike a balance between caution, negotiation, and cautious cooperation in response to Moscow’s weight in the region (Topchubashov Center, August 23). While Azerbaijan has maintained good relations with Russia, working to strengthen energy and security cooperation with Türkiye, fostering partnerships with the European Union, and maintaining robust dialogue with the United States (Topchubashov Center, April 2022; AIR Center, July 11, 2024). The Dushanbe meeting precisely aligns with this trajectory of re-engagement with Russia to maintain peace, albeit without any commitment or ideological connotations (Caspianpost, October 10).

Azerbaijan reaffirmed its sovereignty in the relationship by focusing on economic issues instead of defense or integration. Baku will negotiate, exchange, and coordinate, but does not appear to be willing to be involved in any military bloc at this juncture (Bakuws, October 11). This strategy reflects Azerbaijan’s growing confidence in the region. Azerbaijan’s position among regional nations and its role on the Middle Corridor transport corridor provide Azerbaijan with negotiating leverage vis-à-vis Moscow. The meeting in Dushanbe demonstrated that Baku could negotiate pragmatically with Russia without losing initiative (Caliber.az, September 26).

For Russia, the Dushanbe meeting was for other reasons. Under pressure from sanctions and overextension in Ukraine, Moscow had to demonstrate that it was still a player in the South Caucasus. Attracting Azerbaijan, one of the few post-Soviet nations to retain its balance, was a necessary diplomatic step (Caspianpost, October 10). Russia, however, came with weak arms. Its economic power to offer incentives has weakened, and security dependence, its traditional shield, has diminished since the end of the Second Karabakh War and the subsequent Russian pullout of peacekeepers from the region in May 2024 (BBC, October 9).

The Dushanbe summit was more symbolism than substance. No new strategic partnerships were signed, nor were any collaborative projects announced. Even symbolism, however, is better than nothing. For Moscow, it confirmed that dialogue remains an option. For Baku, it reaffirmed its position as a sovereign player able to act without needing to compromise (Azertag, October 13).

Even though pragmatic diplomacy works to ensure stability, it is also at risk. Presenting Dushanbe as a technical, rather than a political, meeting reduces the risk. Baku maintained the session within the context of functional cooperation, rather than through geopolitical identification (TRT Russian, October 16). At the same time, Azerbaijan is also strengthening its cooperation with Türkiye under the Shusha Declaration, with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies through peacekeeping and training efforts, and with the European Union through diversification of energy initiatives such as the Southern Gas Corridor (President of Azerbaijan, June 16, 2021; Caspiannews, April 8). Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is not drifting toward Moscow, but rather strengthening difficult relationships (AIR Center, July 11, 2024).

For Moscow, this limited re-engagement is better than exclusion. For Baku, it is an insurance policy, keeping doors open while maintaining flexibility in line. There remain, however, lasting uncertainties. Russia’s capacity to influence processes in the South Caucasus with political, media, or economic instruments remains high. Azerbaijan will have to reconcile with prudence (Geopolitical Monitor, August 19). Dushanbe was a pause, not a pivot. It reopened communication after a year of separation, but did nothing to change the bedrock of the relationship. Baku remains wary of Moscow’s reliability, and Moscow is aware that its influence in the region has diminished. The summit reaffirmed that Azerbaijan’s foreign policy rests on pragmatism, flexibility, and sovereignty (Azemedia, August 1).

In Eurasia’s shifting geopolitics, Azerbaijan’s policy may serve as an example for policymakers (Caliber.az, October 15). Facing great powers whose desire to lead often exceeds their ability, small and medium-sized states increasingly pursue “strategic equilibrium,” an approach founded on autonomy, wise engagement, and continuous adaptation (Azerbaijan.az, October 9). The meeting demonstrated that distance is not incompatible with diplomacy, and that a measured approach can accomplish more than a zealous breakdown, as evidenced by the meeting with Putin in Dushanbe. In a world where alignment has a tacit cost, pragmatism remains Azerbaijan’s best bet for success (Azernews, October 15).