Russia’s Costly 2024 Offensive and Lessons for Ukraine

Executive Summary:

• Russia’s 2024 offensive has made some small gains while enduring heavy manpower and equipment losses. This approach reflects the Kremlin’s shift from carrying out a “special military operation” in Ukraine to digging in for a “long war” of attrition.
• Ukrainian defenses have been hampered by a lack of sufficient engineers to fully fortify defensive lines across the front, allowing Russian units to probe Ukraine’s lines in search of weak spots.
• Much of Ukraine’s future defensive and offensive potential will rely on quick and decisive Western aid. Another stall in support could mean future losses for Kyiv similar to those suffered around Avdiivka earlier this year.

After over six months of fighting, Russia’s 2024 offensive in Ukraine has made some gains while suffering disproportionately high losses. In an interview on July 24, Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Oleksandr Syrskyi admitted that Russian gains around Avdiivka, Chasiv Yar, and now Pokrovsk were largely due to advantages with heavy equipment in which Russian forces enjoy a “ratio of 1:2 or 1:3 in their favor.” According to Syrskyi, however, these gains have only been “tactical” and have been quite costly, as Russia suffers “three times” higher casualties than the Ukrainian side. He added that Ukrainian forces had successfully halted Russian offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction and were well-prepared to counter any possible operations to the south in Zaporizhzhia oblast (Kyiv Independent, July 24). The stalling of Western aid and problems with mobilization in Ukraine had gifted Moscow a six-month window to regroup and retake the initiative on the battlefield (see EDM, March 4, 25, April 10, 24, June 3, 4). Yet, most of the early success of Russia’s offensive has given way to stalled operations and heavy casualties. As Ukraine looks set to receive a new wave of weapon systems and munitions from its Western partners, a review of the failed Russian offensive provides critical insights that can inform future offensive and defensive Ukrainian operations.  

In 2024, Russian forces initially concentrated offensive efforts in the Avdiivka direction. As of the end of January, 12 separate motorized rifle brigades, 32 regiments, and 20 battalions were engaged in operations. The Russian side enjoyed manpower and equipment advantages that gradually wore down Ukrainian defenses. In mid-February, Skyrskyi officially ended the defense of Avdiivka and ordered a withdrawal from the city, citing severe ammunition shortages (Kyiv Independent, July 24). Russia’s overwhelming numbers allowed for the early success around Avdiivka and displayed the attritional nature of transitioning from the “special military operation” to prosecuting the “long war” (see EDM, October 2, 2023, April 1).

Russia actively uses all modern means for inflicting losses on the Ukrainian side. In some areas, the saturation of manpower and equipment is on such a scale that Ukrainian positions are gradually ground down by, among other means, filling trenches, demolishing dugouts, and decimating Ukraine’s firing positions with artillery strikes (Kyiv Post, January 4; Meduza, July 12). The Russian approach can be broken down sequentially:

1. Russian forces first establish real-time interactions between reconnaissance drones along the front and ground combat vehicles at different altitudes to escort and provide better targeting coordinates (see EDM, June 27).
2. The Russian side then launches a series of “fire raids” to destroy fortifications and troop positions and further weaken defensive lines. Russian engineers, heavy equipment, and other combat personnel jointly conduct these attacks. After three or four raids, Storm-Z and Storm-V assault forces are brought in to take the positions vacated by Ukrainian units and then fortify and hold them (Kyiv Post, November 2, 2023; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 5). So-called “diggers” and other support teams come in to dig trenches, place mines, and properly equip the assault units (The Moscow Times, December 16, 2022). Fire raids then continue on to neighboring Ukrainian positions.
3. Three to four reconnaissance drones observe from the air, with operators conducting artillery fire control and directing vehicle and infantry movements (see EDM, July 3).
4. Artillery fires are concentrated on the base firing positions of all Ukrainian firepower in a particular operating area to provide openings for assault units to advance.
5. A combination of artillery strikes and kamikaze drones are used to “reset” conditions before implementing them again on the next Ukrainian positions.

 All this is carried out on positions that are 2–3 meters deep and held by, at best, 15–20 men without armored vehicles. In response to these tactics, Ukrainian commanders have been advised to have a mobile anti-tank reserve and electronic warfare specialists in their ranks to suppress Russian broadband and prevent Russian units from destroying troop positions by direct fire from tank gunners and BMPs (Euromaidan Press, November 16, 2023).

Improved intelligence-gathering on the Ukrainian side has helped prevent similar defeats along other areas of the frontlines (Kyiv Independent, July 19). The Russian High Command usually prepares well in advance for offensive operations. Using data from reconnaissance drones and satellites, Ukrainian units can pick up on the movement of Russian troops and equipment early on. That movement is then analyzed, and more reconnaissance is conducted of those areas likely to be threatened. Additional reserves are brought up, and artillery is transferred to those targets deemed to be closest to the next Russian assault.

The Ukrainian response requires careful coordination between headquarters and management in planning operations at all levels (T.me/z4lpr, December 20, 2023). In preparing and holding defensive lines, engineering support for all branches of the Ukrainian Armed Forces usually falls under the jurisdiction of a brigade or battalion assigned to a particular defensive area. According to Ukrainian combat manuals, the depth of defense for a mechanized brigade is approximately 12 kilometers along a 25-kilometer portion of the front. A battalion generally consists of three to four mechanized (motorized infantry and rifle) companies, a mortar battery, a fire support company, separate platoons, and medical units. Its depth of defense is up to 3 kilometers along a 5-kilometer part of the front. Overall, this organization and posturing can be adjusted according to conditions on the ground.

On average, one engineer platoon is responsible for fortifications, including mines and non-explosive barriers, for 3-kilometer defensive positions on the front that are 3 kilometers deep. One platoon, however, is critically insufficient for such an expansive area. Engineer platoons are constantly checking blast routes and the condition of mines and barriers. As a result, they simply may not have enough time to fortify the larger areas assigned to them adequately. In some cases, poor leadership leads soldiers to “forget” to carry out their duties (T.me/DeepStateUA, March 11).

As a rule, a brigade generally has an engineer company with support from other battalions. Brigades are meant to have significant resources, including necessary vehicles and technology to expand the engineer company’s operational capabilities. However, under current circumstances, many brigades do not have a full company or even sufficient supplies as engineers from different companies are urgently sent from one “dangerous” area along the front to another, leaving fortifications fragmented. For example, defensive fortifications in the Kharkiv region have been inconsistent and disjointed—some areas are well-fortified, while others are relatively weak (Svoboda, May 13).

The main problems lie in the organization and mismanagement of the engineering support system. As operational, strategic, and tactical groupings of forces are responsible for engineering support, the inability to properly staff and equip engineering teams will likely continue. Brigades would presumably be more effective in “digging” fortification themselves, so long as engineers remain “attached” to their companies (T.me/DeepStateUA, June 10). Many of Ukraine’s defensive lines along the front will need to be refortified and resupplied before engaging in offensive operations.

As the Russian offensive breaks down, it remains unclear when Ukraine will be able to launch its next counteroffensive. Incoming Western aid will largely serve to shore up weak defensive positions that may not translate into offensive firepower (though future support might) (see EDM, June 20, July 3). Mobilization has picked up with the new law, but some of those currently being mobilized are not joining with the same zeal as previous recruits (see EDM, April 10, 24). If the intensity at the front continues, by fall, Kyiv will likely have to grapple with manpower shortages once again. Building and fortifying defensive lines is also quite costly. One platoon stronghold costs more than 2 million hryvnias ($48,500), and there are hundreds if not thousands of them (T.me/growler_party, May 17).

In the current environment, every decision that Kyiv’s Western partners make will be critical to determining the next six months along the front. Another period of stalled aid would hamper any Ukrainian preparations for a counteroffensive and could result in losses similar to those given up around Avdiivka, even if Russia lost over 16,000 soldiers in that operation (T.me/wehearfromyanina, February 19). Kyiv’s ability to use long-range systems and munitions without restriction would significantly improve Ukrainian forces’ ability to deter Russian attacks and retake the initiative on the battlefield (see EDM, June 4).