Secrecy and Solidarity: PRC Internal Security Partnerships with Socialist States

Executive Summary:

• The People’s Republic of China (PRC) engages in extensive security cooperation with other single-party socialist states. This includes deploying the People’s Armed Police (PAP) to train paramilitary and police forces in these countries, offering cybersecurity support, and assisting with online information control.
• Policymakers and academics in the PRC see their country as the leading single-party socialist state to its junior partners—Vietnam, Cuba, Laos, and North Korea—in a “Community of Common Destiny for Socialist Countries,” helping sustain these states’ regimes and thereby buttressing its own claims to legitimacy.
• The PRC promotes the concept of the Community internally, but exercises caution by rarely mentioning it in its general external discourse to avoid international reputational costs. This is in contrast to other multilateral groupings that the PRC spearheads, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS.

In May 2024, state media in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) reported that the PRC and Vietnam had conducted their 27th joint coast guard patrol in the Beibu Gulf of the South China Sea to “maintain the security and stability in the waters and build the two countries into a community with a shared future that bears strategic significance” (China Daily, May 1). This constituted part of the PRC’s wider military diplomacy, which has intensified following the end of the Covid-19 pandemic. Alongside an increase in military engagement, new conceptual frameworks such as the Global Security Initiative (GSI; 全球安全倡议) have emerged to support this activity. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation on internal security is a burgeoning part of these efforts, particularly with ideologically aligned single-party Leninist states. These relationships are characterized by a high degree of opacity. Unlike the PRC’s interactions with democratic nations, where more information is available, the PRC and its single-party state counterparts have a preference for maintaining a high level of secrecy. In the PRC’s policy lexicon, these relationships are categorized under the “Community of Common Destiny for Socialist Countries,” (hereafter “the Community”). Recently, this has been translated by PRC state media as the “Community of Shared Future for Socialist Countries (社会主义国家命运共同体)” to mitigate unfavorable perceptions associated with expansionist ideologies.

Cooperation within the Community is critical to enhancing the legitimacy of the PRC’s single-party system and extending its influence over neighboring countries (Vietnam, Laos, North Korea) and in strategic regions further afield (Cuba). For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), maintaining regime stability is central to both domestic governance and foreign policy, mirroring the priorities of other authoritarian states. Whilst the PRC promotes the concept of the Community internally to reinforce regime legitimacy and coordinate policy priorities with other socialist states, it exercises caution by rarely mentioning the concept in its general external discourse to avoid international reputational costs. The opacity of these states and the PRC’s deliberate ambiguity regarding internal security cooperation has meant that it has largely flown under the radar, particularly in comparison to other international groupings that the PRC spearheads, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or the BRICS countries. It is nevertheless an important part of the PRC’s diplomatic engagement.

Organizational Structure

The “Community of Common Destiny for Socialist Countries” is primarily a conceptual framework for Chinese academics and policymakers whose scope comprises authoritarian states with a socialist or communist leading party. Membership as outlined in prominent Chinese political science and international security publications includes the PRC, Vietnam, Laos, North Korea, and Cuba. [1] Notably, multi-party states are excluded from this group. The academic Li Zhengang (李珍刚), for instance, emphasizes that member states’ constitutions must mandate the leadership of Marxist political parties and adherence to the socialist road. Chinese authors frequently use the term “similar national system” to highlight this single-party requirement. From an ideological standpoint, Yu Zhonghai (余中海) points out that the leading parties must be the “products of combining Marxism-Leninism with their own national realities.” In other words, states engaged in the indigenization of Marxism to suit local conditions.

In this analytical framework, researchers position the PRC as the leading nation, with other member states viewed as junior partners. Central Party School professor Chang Xinxin (常欣欣) refers to the PRC as the “leading banner for socialist countries around the world,” emphasizing its responsibility to guide other socialist states. [2] Li Zhengang asserts that “no one can crush us … as long as China does not collapse, one-fifth of the world’s population will adhere to socialism.” [3] The overarching goal of this analytical framework is to study and strengthen other socialist regimes, mitigate common perceived threats, and legitimize the PRC’s political system through the unity and resilience of socialist states.

Organizational Goals

The prevailing worldview in PRC scholarship reveals Beijing’s strategic aims within the multilateral policy concept. Li Zhengang emphasizes the importance of socialist countries seizing the opportunities presented by the increasingly multipolar nature, or “democratization,” of international relations, suggesting the need for cooperation amid the perceived decline of the United States. Despite the opportunities identified by Chinese academics, however, substantial challenges remain, particularly regarding national security, social stability, regime stability, and external infiltration. Li Zhengang argues that the “Community of Shared Future for Socialist Countries” is essential not only for promoting mutual development but also for collectively preventing and resolving these risks.

Coup-proofing stands as a paramount objective in the dominant scholarship. Yu Zhonghai underscores the strategic vulnerability of socialist states to revolutions orchestrated by capitalist nations. [4] Separately, Huang Chao (黄超) writes that “Western countries continuously export Western values, enticing the people of socialist countries to abandon their communist ideals and beliefs.” [5] This process, according to Yu, involves the insidious cultivation of internal dissent through financial support and media influence, aiming to destabilize political, economic, and cultural life. As a result, Beijing expects deepening cooperation among states in the Community. Li Zhengang writes, “When the political power of socialist countries is threatened, mutual cooperation and support can be used to help socialist countries overcome difficulties” and “promote the sustainable development of the socialist cause.” Yu concurs, asserting that “if governments are unable to effectively contain opposition forces, assistance and support from other socialist countries should be sought to jointly combat them.”

PRC Tailors its Outreach with Each Party-State

The PRC has taken specific measures with each member of the Community to ensure internal political security. During his recent visit to Vietnam, Xi Jinping declared that “both sides should deepen mutual trust on security. The two sides must prioritize national political security, ensure the red flag of socialism is not changed, and spare no effort to prevent, defuse, and contain all kinds of political and security risks” (Xinhua, December 13, 2023). Beijing foresees the People’s Armed Police (PAP) as a key instrument in this regard. In November 2023, Vietnam’s Minister of Public Security General To Lam met with senior PAP officials to “study and support the organization of training courses for officers in areas, including counterterrorism, anti-protest, and anti-riot” (Vietnam+, 2023). On the cyber front, the PRC’s Baise Executive Leadership Academy (百色干部学院) trains Vietnamese and Laotian officials to guide public opinion online (South China Morning Post [SCMP], July 14, 2018). Private companies like Meiya Pico affiliated with the PRC Ministry of Public Security instruct Vietnamese on surveillance and censorship technology (Open Technology Fund, 2019, p.42).

PRC-Laos internal security cooperation is extensively documented. In 2013, the two countries signed an intelligence gathering and sharing agreement, which mandates coordination to combat the “peaceful evolution of hostile forces,” a phrase implicitly referring to perceived United States-directed coup attempts. [6] PRC telecoms giant Huawei supplies censorship technology, facial recognition cameras, and encryption technology for government communications to Laos and North Korea (Open Technology Fund, 2019, p.42). The two countries have also held consistent joint military exercises under the auspices of the Community, including Friendship Shield 2023 which focused on law enforcement and anti-terrorism work (Xinhua, May 12, 2023).

North Korea has received political security support from the PRC for decades. Cheng Long (成龙) at the PLA Information Engineering University writes that China Unicom opened up the first land-based optical fiber cable system from Beijing to North Korea in 2005. [7] More recently, the PRC has supplied “pervasive” digital tracking technology to prevent North Koreans from escaping the country (SCMP, May 12). It has also played a critical role in the construction of North Korea’s cyber infrastructure and intranet systems. Cheng notes that North Korean government and military offices have “their own local intranets” such as the “shield network” and the “fortress network” which are “separately managed and operated by various departments (SCMP, May 12).” Kan Daoyan (阚道远), who at the time was a PhD student at Renmin University and a lecturer in the State Administration of Tax Affairs’ Party School (国家税务总局党校), argued that government organizations can use these local networks to “issue administrative orders and production information, promote [interagency] information sharing, and improve work efficiency.” [8]

PRC-Cuba relations have also featured political security coordination in recent years (CGTN, September 20, 2023). In 2023, the PRC invested $100 million to support Cuban cybersecurity, following a bilateral cybersecurity agreement designed to prevent political subversion (14ymedio, April 4, 2023). It has also operated an intelligence installation in the Caribbean country since 2019 (The New York Times, June 10, 2023). The two states are reportedly negotiating the establishment of a new joint military training facility on the island (Reuters, June 20, 2023).

Conclusion

PRC military diplomacy, which includes internal security cooperation on censorship, cybersecurity, intelligence, and anti-riot training, is designed to advance the country’s broader foreign policy objectives. Conceptual frameworks like the “Community of Shared Future for Socialist Countries” not only support existing cooperation but also guide future activities, shape policy agendas, and set strategic goals. The prevailing discourse on this Community also reveals the worldview of PRC academics and policymakers, illustrating their understanding of the country’s role as the leading socialist country with a responsibility to assist other socialist states in maintaining their internal security. The rhetoric and policy surrounding the Community of Shared Future for Socialist Countries indicate that the PRC views the political security of single-party Leninist states as integral to its own political stability, and it will remain a key component of military engagement with other countries in the years to come.

The rhetoric and policy surrounding the Community of Shared Future for Socialist Countries indicate that the PRC views the political security of single-party Leninist states as integral to its own political stability and that it will remain a key component of military engagement with other countries in the years to come. In domestic politics, the strength and stability of socialist states enhance the CCP’s legitimacy, where regime stability is foundational to both its governance and foreign policy strategies. Externally, cooperation within the Community facilitates the PRC’s projection of influence over neighboring states such as Vietnam, Laos, and North Korea, as well as strategically vital countries like Cuba.

Future research on this important subject should focus on the internal security missions and interagency competition among all the PLA services, most notably the PAP. Chinese analysts should also examine how internal security cooperation could lead to a more permanent security presence in other states. Finally, experts should observe how socialist countries, especially Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, balance internal security cooperation with the PRC against more frequent requests for US external security assistance against Chinese expansionism.

Notes

[1] Zhengang Li, “Regarding Collective Governance of the Community with a Shared Future of Socialist Countries [论社会主义国家命运共同体的公共治理],” Tribune of Study, no. 10 (2018); Zhonghai Yu, “Feasibility Analysis of Deepening Cooperation Among Socialist Countries [当前社会主义国家深化合作的可行性分析],” Journal of Liaoning Administration College, no. 6 (2014), https://www.doc88.com/p-2478208454242.html.

[2] Chang Xinxin and Zhang Zijian, “Development of Socialist Countries in the World: New Trends, New Characteristics and New Challenges—Taking Vietnam, Laos, North Korea, and Cuba in 2016 as an Example [世界社会主义国家发展:新动态·新特点·新新挑战—以 2016 年越南、老挝、朝鲜、古巴为例],” The Journal of Yunnan Provincial Committee School of CPC 18, no. 4 (2017). 154.

[3] Zhengang Li, 2018.

[4] Zhonghai Yu, 2014.

[5] Chao, Huang, “The Collapse of the Soviet Union has Several Implications for Today’s Socialist Countries,” [苏联解体对当今社会主义国家的几点启示],” The Era of Intellectual Wealth 3, no. 2 (2017).  https://wenku.baidu.com/view/06430609f4335a8102d276a20029bd64783e628a?fr=xueshu

[6] Lao Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 60 Years of Laos-China Diplomatic Relations 25/4/1961–25/4/2021 (Vientiane, Laos: State Printing House, 2021), p. 82.

[7] Cheng Long, “An Analysis of DPRK Cyberspace Development.” International Data Information, no. 8 (2021), 24-31. https://caod.oriprobe.com/articles/61756349/chao_xian_wang_luo_kong_jian_fa_zhan_fen_xi_.htm

[8] Daoyan Kan, “An Analysis of the DPRK’s Internet Development and Political Impacts [朝鲜互联网发展现状及其政治影响评析],” Contemporary International Relations, no. 2 (2014), 45-64, https://www.aisixiang.com/data/81183.html.