New and More Radical Islamist Movement Threatens Russian Control in North Caucasus

Executive Summary:

• A new, more radical, and more deadly threat to Russian control in the North Caucasus is emerging. The new movement is based on Islamist ideas rather than concerns about ethnic hierarchies or anger about corruption and situated primarily in Dagestan rather than Chechnya.
• The combination of carrots and sticks that Moscow used in the past does not work as effectively against this new underground, whose members are less easily intimidated or bought off and far more prepared to die to demonstrate their commitment to Islam.
• Moscow does not yet fully understand the dimensions of this shift. Consequently, it is likely to try to use repression alone to address the new challenge, which will likely intensify the threat in Dagestan and spread it far beyond that republic.   

A new and more radical Islamist underground is emerging in the North Caucasus. The movement is far less secular, far more informed by Islamist ideas in the Middle East, and far more violent than the one Moscow and republic officials thought they had defeated forever a decade ago. Close observers of the situation suggest that this becomes more clear when carefully examining the difference between the attack at the Makhachkala airport in October 2023 and the attacks on synagogues and churches in Derbent and the Dagestani capital in June of this year (see EDM, November 2, 2023, June 25). As Vadim Dubnov, an expert on the North Caucasus at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, points out, the October 2023 attack was a protest against Israeli actions but not against local Mountain Jews. In contrast, this year’s attacks were on all Jews and represented anti-colonial actions against all Christians as representatives of Russian imperialism as such. He stresses that suppressing those so motivated and prepared to die for their beliefs will now be far more difficult for Moscow in the North Caucasus (The Insider, June 23, August 1).

Dubnov draws two additional contrasts between what he calls the old “forest” underground and the new one. On the one hand, the former arose either by the emulation of or participation in the anti-Moscow Chechen wars, while the latter has come into existence because of the growing influence of Islamist ideas. For the new radicals, Chechnya’s past and present matters relatively little. On the other hand, while the old “forest” underground consisted primarily of less well-off portions of the population, the new movement is no longer so much in the woods as in front offices of government and business and with their own families. Such people are well-positioned to undercut Moscow’s efforts and protect themselves, which was not true of the earlier “forest” underground (The Insider, August 1).

This is all the more so because Russian specialists and their bosses do not yet fully recognize the full dimensions of this shift and continue to blame the ethnic complexities of Dagestan or outside actors alone for problems in the North Caucasus (Ukraina.ru, June 24). Perhaps even more seriously, Moscow has been drawing down its forces in the region to support Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine and is now being compelled to use right-wing and Orthodox Christian Russian nationalist paramilitaries to back up republic militias in the region. Many in the region are likely to see these moves as confirmation of Islamist arguments that Putin’s regime is a Russian nationalist one that wants to destroy Islam (Kavkaz-uzel.eu, July 30).

Moscow has long recognized that Dagestan is the most Islamic of the non-Russian republics in the North Caucasus. In recent years, however, it has assumed that the revival of Islam is not the danger some had thought earlier but might help maintain the peace. Sociological studies in the republic say that the Dagestanis most active in religious life are most opposed to shifting away from secularism and building an Islamic state (The Journal of Sociology and Social Anthropology, June 2021). This perspective is especially convincing to many in the Russian capital as many of the new radicals in Dagestan came from the most secular and even atheist parts of the region (Takiedela.ru, July 12).

That self-serving assumption, however, ignores three other factors. First, those interested in Islam are increasingly acquiring their knowledge not from official imams but from underground ones or the Internet (Idel.Realii, May 31). Second, Dagestan is significantly ethnically divided, and no one group holds a majority of the population. As such, many who want to see an independent republic there feel they have no choice but to turn to Islamist projects to achieve it. Thus, Islamism and anti-colonial nationalism are reinforcing one another (Nemoskva.net, November 28, 2023). Third, as such people, who can be found in the supposedly loyal elites and their children, are influenced by Islamists from abroad, they want to act on their own to demonstrate their simultaneous commitment both to their republic and their faith. Informed by both, as the most recent violence shows, these people are prepared to die for those combined causes (Newizv.ru, June 24; see EDM, June 25; Kavkaz.Realii, June 26; Versia.ru, June 30). 

Tragically, Moscow is likely to respond with more repression. Leyla Latypov, a Moscow Times journalist who herself is a Muslim and specializes in the non-Russian portion of the Russian Federation population, says that the attacks in Derbent and Makhachkala will “further marginalize and endanger Russia’s Muslims.” This is especially worrisome, she suggests, because Russian liberals will not stand up for the new victims of Kremlin repression. Thus, the powers that be will assume they have a free hand to act as they wish. Latypov adds, “For some in Russia, Muslims and ethnic minorities are becoming useful scapegoats for channeling frustration and anger fueled by the war in Ukraine, bearing collective responsibility for tragedies that should rather be blamed on the ineffectiveness of the Russian government” (The Moscow Times, June 25).

Her fears are only reinforced by another step the Kremlin has recently taken: Moscow’s increased use in the North Caucasus and elsewhere of right-wing Russian nationalist paramilitaries to help militias there maintain order and especially to suppress popular protests. Vera Alperovich of the SOVA Center of Information and Analysis notes that the willingness of the authorities to use such groups represents a serious change from only a decade ago when law enforcement in the North Caucasus and elsewhere were targeting Russian nationalists (Kavkaz-uzel, July 30). Now, the authorities are funding these groups and using them as adjuncts to regional militias whenever there are mass protests.

Alperovich suggests that these Russian nationalist groups are delighted to be playing that role. These actions, nevertheless, are causing ever more non-Russians, and especially Muslims, to view the Russian authorities in their republics as occupiers, to listen to Islamist arguments about imperialism and Zionism, and to become more hostile to the Russian state as such. In the short term, Moscow is likely to be able to maintain its position in the region by force alone. Due to its use of violence, however, the likelihood that the Kremlin will be able to maintain order over the long haul is declining. Moscow’s failure to focus on what has changed and then act as if little has, coupled with the assumption that it can behave in an even more Russian nationalist and imperialist manner, is bringing a potential day of reckoning ever closer.