NATO States Undertake Security Commitments to Kyiv Under Ukraine Compact (Part Two)

(Part One)

Executive Summary:

• The security agreements under the Ukraine Compact, announced at the recent NATO summit, look considerably weaker and self-deterring when compared with the original blueprint of the 2022 Kyiv Security Compact. The chief merit common to both is the exclusion of Russia from security arrangements involving Ukraine.
• Unlike the recently announced nonbinding commitments, the 2022 blueprint had envisaged a system of guarantees and binding agreements between NATO member states and Ukraine.
• Russia can be expected to insist that any agreements between Ukraine and NATO member states are incompatible with Russia’s core objective to turn Ukraine into a permanently neutral and nonaligned state, with Moscow as a veto-wielding guarantor.

Twenty-three North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states, acting in their own national capacities, have concluded bilateral security agreements with Ukraine under the umbrella of the Ukraine Compact (see Part One, EDM, August 6). This dispensation, however, is considerably weaker compared to the original conception of the 2022 Kyiv Security Compact, which inspired the 2024 bilateral agreements and Ukraine Compact in their watered-down forms.

The 2022 initiative originated with a group of Western experts led by former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and nominally co-chaired by Ukrainian Presidential Office Chief Andriy Yermak. Their initiative ruled out a multilateral treaty of guarantees that Moscow had tried to impose on Ukraine that same year, which would have included a veto-wielding Russia. Recognizing, however, that Moscow’s all-out invasion precluded Ukraine’s access to NATO security guarantees for years to come, Rasmussen’s group launched “The Kyiv Security Compact: International Security Guarantees to Ukraine” as an interim solution. It envisaged NATO member states concluding bilateral agreements with Ukraine and a collective framework agreement on security guarantees, to take effect immediately.

The Kyiv Security Compact introduced a transformative conception of Ukraine’s status and in European security writ large. It excluded Russia from any role in security arrangements concerning Ukraine, instead bringing the country into close political and military association with NATO member states, albeit outside the North Atlantic Treaty. Conceptually at the very least, the Kyiv Compact moved Ukraine from Russia’s sphere of interest–that is, the gray zone between Russia and NATO—directly into the Western sphere for the first time since 1991. Generally, Western chancelleries, including Washington, Berlin, and NATO itself, had consigned Ukraine to the gray zone until Rasmussen’s initiative changed that paradigm, as did the European Union by recognizing Ukraine as a candidate for membership in mid-2022.

That fundamental innovation carries over from the Kyiv Security Compact into the Ukraine Compact and the accompanying bilateral agreements signed two years later (see EDM, July 17, 18). The 2022 document was intended as a blueprint for eventual adoption by NATO. On this score, what NATO’s Washington summit delivered turned out to be another under-fulfilled expectation. Compared with the agreements just signed, the 2022 document was far more promising in its scope, depth, and level of commitment (President.gov.ua, September 13, 2022; see EDM, December 16, 2022).

The 2022 Kyiv blueprint was built on guarantees, rather than commitments or intentions, with a set of binding agreements. Underscoring Ukraine’s goal to join NATO as enshrined in the constitution, the Kyiv Compact outlined an interim solution in the form of guarantees by willing NATO member states. While the implementation had to start as fast as possible, the duration of the guarantees had to be open-ended, helping build Ukraine’s self-defense capacity over the long term.

Recognizing that Ukraine’s self-defense capacities constitute the first and foremost guarantee, the blueprint called for:

• Guaranteeing security assistance to enable Ukraine to defend itself during the ongoing war and deter further aggression by denial or by punishment as necessary;
• Binding bilateral agreements between Ukraine and NATO member states, to be brought together under a joint strategic partnership document co-signed by a core group of guarantor states with Ukraine;
• Codifying the security guarantees to Ukraine as participants would undertake binding commitments to mobilize the necessary military and non-military resources for Ukraine’s defense;
• An agreement or set of agreements between Ukraine and countries producing anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense equipment, enabling Kyiv itself to ensure a closed sky from air attacks;
• Troop training missions and joint exercise programs of Ukrainian forces and partner on Ukrainian soil and NATO soil;
• Enabling Ukraine to develop a robust territorial defense force for all civilians above 18 years old, as well as a reserve force;
• Frequent sharing and processing of intelligence between the signatory NATO states and Ukraine;
• Additional supplies of arms and munitions for swift delivery to Ukraine;
• A joint threat assessment procedure to activate the guarantees following consultation with Ukraine at its request and prompt action without requiring confirmation from third parties;
• Developing a legal framework for seizing Russian sovereign funds and assets of sanctioned Russian entities to repair the war damage inflicted on Ukraine; and
• Such guarantees would apply throughout Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.

The Kyiv Compact further stipulated that security guarantees are prerequisites for millions of Ukrainians displaced by war to return to their country.

These recommendations went far beyond NATO’s collective remit, which was limited to non-lethal assistance to Ukraine. The Kyiv Security Compact’s guarantees were intended to take effect early on, answering to Ukraine’s wartime and foreseeable postwar requirements. For its part, NATO collectively adopted a far more restrained, self-deterring version at its recent Washington summit. The alliance needed almost two years to process the Kyiv Security Compact’s blueprint into a suboptimal Ukraine Compact with accompanying bilateral agreements.

Russia will likely demand Kyiv’s exit from the Ukraine Compact and bilateral agreements under that umbrella, especially if Kyiv finds itself compelled to enter into negotiations with Moscow. The Kremlin’s war aims to force Ukraine into permanent neutrality and nonalignment leave no room for the set of agreements under the Ukraine Compact. This is particularly because the concept emerged in response to Moscow’s own project of security guarantees for Ukraine under Russian de facto oversight, which the Kremlin continues promoting as the basis for any negotiations with Kyiv.