Kyiv Set to Expand Support for Non-Russians in Russia

Executive Summary:

• Since Russian President Vladimir Putin seized Crimea in 2014 and even more since he launched his expanded invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Kyiv has sought to develop ties with non-Russian groups in Russia on the principle that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”
• Now, the Ukrainian parliament is set to pass legislation that will dramatically expand this effort far beyond anything seen before, an increase that could play a key role in the outcome of Putin’s war and the survival of the Russian Federation.
• A significant reason for such conclusions is that many non-Russian groups within Russia not only welcome this attention but also see it as essential to their plans for national survival and, ultimately, independence.  

As Ukrainian drones are reaching targets ever deeper inside Russia and the Ukrainian army is seizing villages just inside Russian borders, a third element in Kyiv’s strategy of taking Vladimir Putin’s war back to him is gaining strength and could well become the most important of the three (see EDM, December 21, 2023; April 18, 24, July 29; Meduza, August 7; Kyiv Independent, August 8). This element consists of Kyiv’s outreach to and increasing support for non-Russian nations within the current borders of the Russian Federation on the principle that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” These efforts are designed to dissuade non-Russians from joining the Russian army and encourage some to fight for Ukraine against Moscow. They are also meant to promote independence movements that will weaken and may ultimately destroy the Russian Empire, thus eliminating it as a continuing imperial threat to Ukraine and Europe. While Ukraine has been pursuing this approach piecemeal since Putin’s Anschluss of Crimea in 2014 and even more since his expanded invasion in 2022, the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament) is now set to approve a comprehensive plan to guide Kyiv’s future policies. Unsurprisingly, the response of the non-Russian movements within the Russian Federation has been overwhelmingly positive, giving reason to believe that this will become a growing headache for the Kremlin and yield greater benefits for Ukraine and the West.  

As is now widely recognized, ethnic borders do not coincide with political ones in the post-Soviet space. Russian policy has been based on the fact that portions of eastern Ukraine are predominantly ethnic Russian and even the notion that Ukrainians are not a separate people but part of the Russian nation (Kuzio, “Crimea: Where Russia’s War Started and Where Ukraine Will Win,” July 8). At the same time, Ukrainians have long focused on the existence of areas across the Russian Federation that are predominantly ethnic Ukrainian, the so-called “wedges.” Over the past decade, Ukrainians in general and the Ukrainian government in particular have focused on these areas, much to the Kremlin’s alarm (Window on Eurasia, November 26, 2022; see EDM, January 18, 2023, January 25, July 30). Today, Ukraine and many countries across the world now recognize that even though the Soviet Union came apart, the Russian Federation itself remains an empire, one in which Moscow represses the non-Russians even more harshly than the ethnic Russians.

Among the steps Ukraine has taken based on this recognition is to provide refuge for leaders of national movements from the Russian Federation who have been forced to flee. Kyiv has also offered its support for the anti-colonial movements among them, recruited non-Russians to fight alongside the Ukrainian army, and, more generally, supported the goals of those nations, including their right to self-determination  (Presiden.gov.ua, September 29, 2022; Kavkaz.Realii, December 14, 2022, August 24, 2023; Fortanga.org, February 23; Window on Eurasia, August 2). In 2023, the Ukrainian parliament set up a temporary commission to coordinate these activities (Svoboda; Abn.org.ua, August 24, 2023). 

Now, Ukrainian parliamentarians are set to take the next step and pass a law that will institutionalize this policy of support for the minority nations within the Russian Federation. The new measure seeks to mobilize international support for the decolonization of that last empire and end the threats to its own people and surrounding populations. Among the steps the proposed law calls for are expanding on the efforts Kyiv has taken up to now, broadcasting in the languages of the non-Russian peoples, and providing diplomatic assistance to these nations as they seek to make contact with international organizations and other countries (For the Ukrainian text, see Justice for North Caucasus, July 10; for an informal English translation and a discussion of its provisions, see Window on Eurasia, August 1.) The measure enjoys the broad support of many in the ruling party and is likely to pass in the coming weeks.

Unsurprisingly, many non-Russian activists are enthusiastic, viewing this Ukrainian initiative as something akin to Washington’s non-recognition policy with regard to the Baltic countries during Soviet times. That measure kept hope alive there and elsewhere that peoples under Moscow’s yoke would eventually gain their freedom. The most prominent and active of these have been the Circassians, both the half million still in the North Caucasus and the more than seven million in the diaspora. Given Kyiv’s support for other non-Russians inside the Russian Federation and the presentation of the new draft law, the Circassians have intensified their effort to secure Ukrainian recognition of the expulsion of their ancestors from their homeland in 1864 as an act of genocide. They view this recognition as an act of historical justice and a precondition for national survival and the restoration of their country in its historical homeland (Holodomor Museum, May 10; Besacenter.org, July 22). 

The Circassian effort builds on the work carried out during the 2014 Sochi Olympics. Moscow’s decision to stage the games on the site where the expulsion took place 150 years earlier gave the Circassian nation the opportunity to bring this crime to a broader international audience. Now, with Ukraine’s help, the Circassians hope to move even closer to their goal. There are several compelling reasons to believe that they will and that Kyiv will see supporting the Circassian cause as also helping Ukraine. First, the Circassians are the largest non-Russian diaspora and far and away the most active. If Kyiv backs them, they will become important spokespeople worldwide for Ukraine (Window on Eurasia, August 8, 2023). Second, in contrast to many others, the Circassians have worked closely with other nations. Thus, through support for them, Kyiv will not only gain the support of the Circassians but also of the other national movements within the Russian Federation and their diasporas (Caucasusfree.com, accessed August 8). Third, Circassian leaders have organized public meetings in Washington, Brussels, Kyiv, and Geneva to press their case. These events have given the Circassians the opportunity to meet with Verkhovna Rada deputies and solidify these ties, thus serving as a model for other nations as well (Window on Eurasia, August 2).   

If, as seems likely, the Verkhovna Rada does pass the new law, and Kyiv declares that Russia committed an act of genocide against the Circassians, other countries around the world are likely to follow suit. Being the first to take such steps is always the most difficult. A wider international response would not only help Ukraine defeat the Russian invasion and energize other non-Russians to follow in the wake of the Circassians. It would also bring closer the day when the Russian Empire will be at risk of disintegration and thus be less able to repress its own peoples and attack others.