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Putin Says Moscow to Exploit New Oil Field in Antarctic, Undermining Key Treaty
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 19 Issue: 122
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Executive Summary:
- In the spring, Russia reported the discovery of an enormous new oil field in Antarctica. Moscow told Western governments it had no plans to develop the field, even as Western observers warned that exploitation of the new deposits could threaten the Antarctic treaty regime.
- Now, Russian President Vladimir Putin has approved a program to do precisely that, a move Russia would likely find difficult to do on its own but might be more successful if it can involve some BRICS partners in the effort.
- This threat to stability in the Antarctic as a place free from economic and even military conflict could now come to a head quickly, as the southern polar region is entering its warmest season when outside powers tend to step up their activities.
Earlier this year, a Russian expedition found oil reserves in the Antarctic that experts say amount to 511 billion barrels. The find represents the largest oil discovery in recent years, amounting to more than ten times the oil that has been discovered in the Arctic region over the past five decades. The discovery set off alarm bells in Western capitals, leading to a hearing in the UK House of Commons in May. Experts testified that Moscow might very well violate the ban on economic development of Antarctica, which has been in place since the 1959 treaty, along with the succeeding agreements of the 1980s and 1990s. Some commentators suggested that this could bring Russia a windfall in profits that would upend the international energy market and give Moscow a competitive advantage for years to come. The British Foreign Ministry, however, told the meeting that Russian representatives had reassured London that Moscow would not develop the field and would continue to observe the provisions of the Antarctic treaty regime (The Telegraph, May 11; The Maritime Executive, May 12; Neftegaz.ru, May 13; Gazetametro.ru, May 15; Sila-rf.ru, July 21).
Such reassurances convinced many that Moscow was not about to try to develop the oil field anytime soon and that the Antarctic treaty regime was not under any immediate threat. These convictions were further strengthened by Moscow and the West’s focus on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine and the embarrassing difficulties the Kremlin has had in developing and supporting even its scientific outpost in Antarctica (Window on Eurasia, December 18, 2020). Nevertheless, in July, Putin called all such assumptions into question when he approved plans for the development of the newly discovered oil field, directly contradicting what the Foreign Ministry had said only two months earlier. The shift in official rhetoric is another reflection of the continuing deterioration of relations between Moscow and the West (Glavny.tv, July 21). Shortly after the Kremlin leader made his remarks, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov reinforced the change in plans. Speaking more generally on Navy Day in St. Petersburg, Belousov opened a memorial to Russian exploration in Antarctica and declared that Russia had a long history of interest in exploiting the resources of the Antarctic and in projecting military power there to make such actions possible (Interfax, July 28).
Putin’s and Belousov’s respective remarks, nevertheless, were overshadowed by developments in Moscow’s war on Ukraine. The intense conflict is increasingly forcing the Kremlin to pull resources from many regions. Thus, some observers have concluded that Moscow is hardly in a position to launch new challenges to the international order. Several compelling reasons, however, point to why such views are unwarranted, especially when it comes to Antarctica. On the one hand, the Arctic and Antarctic have always been closely interrelated in Russian thinking, not only because of the climate and enormous reserves of natural resources but also because they are places where a small shift in the available resources and forces of one side can dramatically change the situation (Svpressa.ru, October 26, 2020; Iarex.ru, July 5, 2022). Now that the West has beefed up its position in the Arctic following the accession of Finland and Sweden to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Kremlin leader, unsurprisingly, is looking to Antarctica in response.
On the other hand, Moscow likely lacks the resources, at least for the time being, to develop the oil field in the Antarctic and thus wreck the Antarctic treaty regime. Even so, the Kremlin now has allies who appear ready to cooperate with development. The four other original members of the BRICS group—Brazil, India, China, and South Africa—are all cooperating with Moscow in one way or another in Antarctica. Russian commentators are celebrating these actions and even suggest that this gives the Kremlin new opportunities to expand its presence in Antarctica (Neftegaz.ru, November 2, 2023; Aari.ru, July 10; Sila-rf.ru, July 21; Osnmedia.ru; RIA Novosti, July 29). These countries’ potential involvement means that Russia is far less isolated on this issue than on others, including on Spitsbergen in the Arctic (see EDM, May 30). As a result, Putin undoubtedly feels confident that he can push forward on the Antarctic, especially as coming into possession of the enormous oil reserves there would change the balance of power significantly in his favor.
Another underlying issue could inflame concerns that Moscow will act and seek to gain access to Antarctic oil and destroy the Antarctic treaty regime. While the COVID-19 pandemic and now the war in Ukraine have obscured this, Moscow has been preparing to challenge the status quo in Antarctica for some time. The Kremlin is confident that the southern polar land is a place where it can achieve great things with relatively small investments, a hallmark of the Putin regime’s foreign policy across the board (see EDM, June 9, 24, 2020). As Moscow State Institute of International Relations scholar Alexey Kuprianov put it five years ago, the Antarctic treaty regime could quickly collapse if even one major power should decide to leave it, something for which Moscow must prepare to advance its own interests (Profile.ru, September 2, 2019).
The Kremlin may very well be on the brink of moving on the Antarctic as global warming makes the exploitation of the polar regions more possible. The United States and the United Kingdom have responded with sanctions on Rosgeologiya and its subsidiaries operating in the Antarctic (Neftegaz.ru, May 13). Those penalties, however, imposed even before the Russian discovery of the Antarctic oil fields, have not slowed Moscow’s ambitions or significantly hampered the Kremlin’s ability to gain allies there. Far more is going to have to be done to counter Russia’s moves and defend the international treaty that has kept Antarctica free of geo-economic and geopolitical competition for more than half a century. This task is essential if the West is to maintain the current international order and prevent Russia from gaining a victory in Antarctica that could further upset that order.