Moscow Writer Says West Making Gotland ‘Target Number One’ for Russian Missiles

Executive Summary:

• After Sweden joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in March, Moscow sharply criticized Stockholm and others in the alliance for plans to improve the defenses of Gotland and other islands in the Baltic Sea. This criticism was clearly intended to dissuade them from taking such steps.
• This failed, and Moscow is again presenting Western actions concerning these islands as threats to Kaliningrad in particular and Russia in general. The Kremlin is also issuing not-so-thinly-veiled warnings about possible retaliation.
• This change is worrisome because the shift from warnings and intimidation may reflect that at least some in Moscow view these islands as threats and want to take offensive actions.

After Sweden formally joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in March, Moscow sharply criticized Stockholm and the West for plans to increase the defenses of Sweden’s Gotland Island in the Baltic Sea. Russian officials even suggested that such moves would inevitably force Moscow to respond militarily (see EDM, May 23, June 11). That attempt at intimidation failed, as Sweden and NATO have quickly expanded their military presence on Gotland (Jfcbs.nato.int, April 25; Rossiyskaya Gazeta, May 22; Joint-forces.com, June 24). Surprisingly, while the Kremlin continued to track these developments in the following months, Moscow largely dropped the criticism and threatening language it had initially used. Now, however, that has changed. A Moscow commentator with close ties to Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), itself notorious for its calls for a more offensive Russian approach to the West, has raised the issue again in even more dramatic language than before. He has warned that Sweden and the West’s actions could make Stockholm’s Gotland Island “the number one target of Russian nuclear missiles” (Fondsk.ru, August 13; for comparison, see Svpressa.ru, May 31). This assertion may signal that some hawks in Moscow are pressing for offensive actions on Gotland and the surrounding islands. They are perhaps confident that the complexities of these islands, their small size, and the absence of Western attention make them easy pickings in much the same way that some have suggested Moscow views the Spitsbergen archipelago (see EDM, May 30).

Vladimir Prokhvatilov denounces the West for unnecessarily escalating tensions in the Baltic Sea. In his new article, provocatively titled “Gotland, Once a Resort, but Now Becoming a Military Base and Target for Russian Rockets,” Prokhvatilov argues Sweden and NATO have no reason to be doing what they are doing on Gotland, as Russia has no intention of attacking the island or Sweden (Fondsk.ru, August 13). However, he then pointedly asserts that the island has “strategic importance” for all Baltic littoral states—including Russia—because the country that controls Gotland can “easily control both air and sea movement” into the Baltic Sea and could be used to threaten Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg. The Moscow commentator recounts that one Russian tsar called Gotland “the key to Europe” and that the Russian state took temporary control over it during the Napoleonic Wars. Prokhvatilov also says that another confirmation of Gotland’s importance internationally is that, in the past, it has been fought over by Swedes, Danes, and Germans.

Sweden kept approximately 25,000 troops on the island up through the 1990s, he writes, until Stockholm “demilitarized” Gotland in 2005. In 2015, however, following the deterioration of relations after the Crimean Anschluss but before joining NATO, Sweden began to station more troops on Gotland, a process that has expanded dramatically since becoming a NATO member. Moreover, he says, Stockholm has agreed to the basing of NATO troops and military equipment on the island, all of which could be used against Russia. As a result, Gotland is now seen as a threat to Kaliningrad and Russian shipping in the Baltic, though Prokhvatilov suggests the Russian military can defend Moscow’s interests in the region without having to occupy Gotland (Fondsk.ru, August 13). However, if Sweden and the West continue on their current course, then the situation could change and change quickly. Due to Gotland’s small size—only about 3,000 square kilometers and with a population of just over 60,000—Sweden would likely struggle to defeat any Russian move there.

Gotland is not the only island in the Baltic Sea that Russian security analysts are focusing on. They are also closely watching Bornholm, a Danish island, and the Aaland Islands, an archipelago that belongs to Finland. As the Western presence on Bornholm is so large and longstanding, Russian observers typically mention it only in passing or in connection with other issues such as the Nord Stream pipelines or medium-range missiles (Pnp.ru, June 28). Finland’s Aaland Islands are a much livelier issue in Russia not only because of recent events but also because of the archipelago’s more complicated history, which some in Moscow have tried to exploit and believe they can do so again.

The Aaland archipelago consists of 6,700 small islands with a total area of 1,580 square kilometers. Its population is just over 30,000. The island chain is Finnish territory but enjoys broad autonomy because its population is overwhelmingly Swedish in language and culture. The archipelago has been a demilitarized area since 1856, a status that was confirmed in 1921 when the League of Nations made Finland the sovereign power but granted the Aalanders much of the autonomy they currently enjoy. This arrangement was reinforced by a 1940 agreement between Finland and the Soviet Union that gave Moscow the right to maintain a consulate in Marienhamn, the capital of the Aaland Islands. The consulate still exists and has sparked controversy over the past decade, with many Finns viewing it as a stalking horse for Russian aggression and demanding that it be closed (Euractiv, June 7, 2023; Ritmeurasia.org, June 13; on Russian moves that have sparked these suspicions and demands, see Window on Eurasia, October 16, 2014).

Finland’s membership in NATO and the deterioration of relations due to Putin’s expanded invasion of Ukraine have caused an increasing number of Finns to call for Helsinki to unilaterally end the demilitarized status of the Aaland Islands and station its own troops and those of NATO countries on them to defend against a possible Russian move. Among them is Tomi Lounema, a Finnish defense analyst who says that the absence of Finnish and Western troops on the Aaland Islands has created “a security vacuum” that Moscow could exploit (Verkkouutiset.fi, August 8, translated into Russian at Inosmi.ru, August 8; Iltalehti.fi, July 9, translated into Russian at Inosmi.ru, July 16).

Thus far, Helsinki has resisted doing so. On August 13, during a visit to Marienhamn, Finnish President Alexander Stubb said that he did not see any reason to change the demilitarized status of the islands. Moscow will undoubtedly welcome his position, but it is unlikely to quiet calls from Finns like Lounema to end the island’s demilitarized status and base Finnish troops there (TASS, August 13). Such critics are likely to continue to raise the alarm, especially if the East-West divide deepens because of Putin’s war or if Moscow tries to use its consulate in the Åland Islands for undiplomatic purposes. Under such circumstances, Helsinki could change its position. Nevertheless, however that may play out, the Aaland archipelago, along with Gotland, already seem set to become international flashpoints. This could very well be because of the fact that up until now, they have attracted far less attention in the West generally than they have—and continue to—in Moscow.