Russia’s New Maritime Collegium Inaugurated in Renewed Focus on Arctic Policy

Executive Summary:

• The Kremlin has established the Maritime Collegium of the Russian Federation, which will focus on the preservation of Russia’s naval power, specifically in the Arctic and along the Northern Sea Route.
• International cooperation in the Arctic and China’s central role are significant components of this new collegium, as Russia seeks to strengthen defense and military partnerships to form a “polycentric world.”
• Nikolai Patrushev’s appointment as head of the collegium and the continued stagnation of the Russian economy might result in Moscow’s willingness to grant Beijing greater access to the Russian part of the Arctic.

On August 13, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree inaugurating the Maritime Collegium of the Russian Federation. Under the collegium’s umbrella, three additional bodies—the Council for Strategic Development of the Navy, Council for Defense of the National Interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic, and Council for Development and Securing of Maritime Activities—were established (Kremlin.ru, August 13). The new entity will be directly subordinated to the Russian president and headed by former Secretary of the Security Council and long-term Putin ally Nikolai Patrushev, who is currently in charge of national maritime policy (Vzglyad, August 13). The creation of this new collegium will likely bring a renewed focus to Russia’s policies in the Arctic, given the document’s visible pivot to the region. In addition to continuing militarization, Russia may be expected to strengthen its defense and military partnerships with China in the Arctic.

According to the official decree, the collegium’s main task is to “elaborate on measures aimed at preserving the status of a great naval power.” This broad task includes several specific measures that will be monitored and coordinated by the new body. These include the following: 

• The development of Russia’s naval potential, including fixing problems in the shipbuilding industry and the drastic renewal of domestic naval research and development by attracting scientists and research institutions to best implement national maritime policy and the protection of Russian national interests;
• The defense of Russian national interests in terms of the exploration, exploitation, and protection of natural resources in the World’s Ocean, as well as the Arctic and Antarctic regions;
• The development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as a “national transportation communication” artery to secure Russia’s guaranteed access to global transit via the World’s Ocean; and
• The development of mutually beneficial partnerships and relations in naval activity, given the conditions for “forming a polycentric world,” entailing a multipolar approach to Russian international relations in the maritime sphere (Kremlin.ru, August 13).  

Patrushev’s appointment and the new institution’s structure indicate that Russia will likely prioritize further decreasing its willingness to cooperate with the West in the Arctic. Increased attention and continued investment will go to the re-militarization of the region. Notably, Patrushev’s first statement about the collegium and his vision of the Arctic highlighted these aspects. Specifically, he stated that “growing threats from the West prompt us to raise our combat readiness and the technical status of our fleet, as well as to pay special attention to peculiarities in the shipbuilding industry, development and production of new types of military equipment for the Navy, and training of navy personnel.” Commenting on new collegium, the Russian official noted that the new body would “analyze the legislative basis related to maritime activities and update several documents to meet our country’s national development goals … and neutralize external threats” (TASS, August 15).

Regarding the NSR, Patrushev highlighted two tasks that Russia must fulfill: ensuring the route’s security and complete control over the transportation artery as well as transforming the route into Russia’s “gateway to the global markets.” He noted that to secure the year-round navigability of the NSR, Russia must invest more in the development of its icebreaker fleet (see EDM, January 31, 2022, July 25; RIA Novosti, August 19).

Given its structure and composition, the collegium seems to have been conceived as a multidimensional body to provide comprehensive, in-depth expertise on maritime affairs, with a special emphasis on the Arctic. The collegium consists of 52 members. These include various government ministers; the governors of the littoral regions; the heads of the Border Guard Service, Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff (GRU), Federal Security Service (FSB); as well as the CEOs of major shipbuilding companies and Russia’s largest corporations (e.g., Rosatom and Novatek).

The emphasis on the Arctic and the NSR is additionally evidenced by the inclusion of its three key functionaries: Yuri Trutnev, presidential plenipotentiary envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District; Sergey Vakhrukov, head of the Presidential Directorate for National Maritime Policy; and Igor Levitin, the former minister of transportation (RBC, August 13). According to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID), based on the composition of the collegium and the quality of its hierarchical structure, its recommendations will be a top priority, and their implementation will hold more weight as the collegium is now subordinated to the president rather than just under the Russian government (Mid.ru, August 19).

International cooperation in the Arctic and China’s central role are also significant components of the new collegium. One key task will be the development of partnerships with other actors based on the principle of multipolarity. In Russian parlance, this means strengthening ties with so-called “friendly countries” and Moscow’s partners from BRICS (a loose political-economic grouping originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), with a special place for China. Earlier this year, Moscow and Beijing released a joint statement on the Arctic, which clearly stated the priority of both countries to “develop constructive dialogue and mutually beneficial partnership [in the Arctic]” (RIA Novosti, May 16). This statement would not have been valuable on its own had it not been for another factor. Namely, rumors are circulating about the possibility of Russia allowing Chinese military vessels to patrol parts of the NSR. The talks have progressed so much that Nikolay Korchunov, ambassador-at-large for Arctic cooperation at the MID and special envoy, made a public statement on the matter, assuring that Russia is “fully capable of singlehandedly protecting the security of the NSR and its infrastructure” (RIA Novosti, September 17, 2023).

The inauguration of the new collegium could mean that the political climate in the Arctic will further deteriorate. Russia is likely to take an even more aggressive anti-Western approach and elevate its partnerships with Beijing. Patrushev’s appointment and the continued stagnation of the Russian economy may result in Moscow’s willingness to grant China greater access to the Russian part of the Arctic.