Beijing’s Soft Power Push with African Nations

Executive Summary:

• The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has successfully used its hosting of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation to burnish its soft power and its credentials to be seen as the leader of the Global South.
• Close political alignment on core issues, including African states affirming support for the PRC’s positions on Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet, and unification with Taiwan are indicative of the PRC’s diplomatic gains.
• Politics was central to the event, with the promotion of exchanges and cooperation announced between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and African political parties, between the PRC’s Supreme People’s Court and the Court of Justice of the African Union, and between the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and regional organizations, alongside numerous training programs in various domains.
• Africa joined a “community of common destiny,” which entails a rejection of the Western approach to modernization. The West in general and the United States explicitly were heavily criticized throughout the forum.

The ninth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was held in Beijing on September 4–6 (FMPRC, September 5). The theme of the event was “joining hands to advance modernization and together building a high level China-Africa community of common destiny (携手推进现代化，共筑高水平中非命运共同体)” (FMPRC, September 5). The triennial event was co-chaired by Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and President Faye of the Republic of Senegal. Heads of states, governments, and delegations from 53 African countries traveled to Beijing for the Summit and the Ministerial Conference, as did the Chairperson of the African Union Commission. Xi met with at least 40 leaders (Tracking People’s Daily, September 7).

Politics was front and center at this year’s FOCAC. Marquee announcements were made of financial assistance and business investment totaling Renminbi 360 billion ($51 billion) and project funding has increased for the first time in seven years, but these were secondary to the political implications that the summit symbolized (The China in Africa Podcast, August 29). The most notable was the “elevation of relations with all African countries with whom the PRC has established diplomatic relations to the “strategic” level and the framing of overall relations as an “all-weather China-Africa community of common destiny for the new era (新时代全天候中非命运共同体)” (FMPRC, September 5). [1] Other significant moments include the deepening of ties with President Cyril Ramaphosa’s South Africa and the signing of a memorandum of understanding on the revitalization of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority railway (Global Times, September 4). Beneath these headline announcements were myriad other projects and areas of engagement and a decisive expansion of political alignment.

Three key documents give a clear sense of the PRC’s consolidation as a leading country of the Global South, and particularly in Africa. These are Xi’s keynote address at FOCAC’s opening ceremony, titled “Joining Hands to Advance Modernization and Build a Community of Common Destiny (携手推进现代化，共筑命运共同体)” (FMPRC, September 5); the Beijing Declaration on Jointly Building an All-Weather China-Africa Community with a Shared Future for the New Era (关于共筑新时代全天候中非命运共同体的北京宣言) (FMPRC, September 5); and the Beijing Action Plan of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (中非合作论坛—北京行动计划) (2025-2027) (FMPRC, September 5).

PRC Advances Soft Power

The PRC is not known for its prowess in deploying soft power around the world, but FOCAC indicated that this perception may be outdated. The warmth of feeling on show toward the PRC’s African partners was ubiquitous, and apparently well-received. The PRC foreign minister’s first visit every year for 34 consecutive years has been to Africa (FMPRC, September 5). This is nothing new, even if it indicates the sustained importance that the PRC has placed on cultivating good relations on the continent. Xi personally has been heavily invested in Africa and has visited five times since 2013 (People’s Daily, September 2). In his speech, he reiterated the “principles of sincerity, real results, affinity, and good faith (真实亲诚理念)” that he first articulated in 2013 to describe the relationship (China Diplomacy, accessed September 19). His toast at the opening banquet of the forum began, “no matter if true friends are far or near, they always feel close to each other (相知无远近，万里尚为邻),” while his keynote speech opened with a poetic reference to the profits of friendship: “Blossoms in spring turn into fruits in the Fall (春华秋实)” (FMPRC, September 5).

There is much that African countries admire in the PRC’s development trajectory, its economic growth, and its poverty reduction programs. A desire to learn more about these aspects of the PRC’s “model” likely underline the exchanges and cooperation announced between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and African political parties, between the PRC’s Supreme People’s Court and the Court of Justice of the African Union, and between the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and other African countries and regional organizations (FMPRC, September 5).

Part of this soft power push involves accentuating ideological and political alignment between African countries and the PRC. The latter still maintains that it is a developing country, in part to emphasize this alignment. For instance, the Action Plan articulates the belief of both sides that “changes in the world, in the times, and in history are unfolding in an unprecedented manner. The “Global South” represented by the PRC and Africa is thriving and profoundly influencing the course of world history (世界之变、时代之变、历史之变正以前所未有的方式展开. 以中国和非洲为代表的 “全球南方” 蓬勃发展，深刻影响世界历史进程)” (FMPRC, September 5). There is a firm commitment to the future strength of the relationship, avowing that “the logic of the twists and turns of world historical progress will not change (世界历史曲折前进的大逻辑不会改变),” and “the macro trend of the international community’s common destiny will not change (国际社会命运与共的大趋势不会改变).” The PRC side even states that it “would be pleased to see Africa become the world’s third-largest economy and the largest manufacturing hub by 2063 (乐见非洲在2063年前成为世界第三大经济体和最大制造中心).”

All three documents are shot through with historical grievance—an effective strategy to mobilize support for a shared cause. The Beijing Declaration calls for redress for historical injustices suffered (FMPRC, September 5). A substantial portion of the documents and speeches explicitly and implicitly criticize the United States and the West more broadly. There are references to the PRC and Africa’s similar negative historical encounters (相似的历史遭遇) and the fact that the process of Western-style modernization “has brought deep suffering to a large number of developing countries (曾给广大发展中国家带来了深重苦难).” This includes the theft of historical and cultural artefacts that both sides promote returning to their countries of origin. There are also criticisms of the politicization of human rights issues as a means of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries (将人权问题政治化 … 借人权干涉别国内政) and of drawing lines or constructing exclusive blocs on the basis of ideology. The most explicit critiques focus on the West’s use of sanctions and attempts at unilateral decoupling, which are framed as “unilateral coercive measures taken by some developed countries against developing countries that violate their right to sustainable development (侵害其可持续发展权利的单边强制性措施).” The Declaration demands that “the United States and the West put an end to the prolonged sanctions and unjust treatment (要求美西方结束 …长期制裁和不公正待遇)” of Eritrea, South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.

PRC Bids to Cement Leadership of the Global South

Chinese-style modernization is in part predicated on the rejection of what the PRC calls Western-style modernization (see China Brief, May 10). The community of common destiny appears to be reserved for those countries that align with this framing. That most African countries have signed on to this, both bilaterally and in the FOCAC Action Plan therefore entails agreeing to support the PRC’s core interests.

The Action Plan makes clear the both the PRC and Africa are content to see the PRC as the leader of the Global South, irrespective of talk about an “equal” and orderly multipolar world. This is evident in the language. The word “appreciate (赞赏)” appears 46 times throughout. In 16 instances, the agent of the verb is “both sides (双方),” in a further six the PRC is the agent, but the remaining 24 uses are in the context of the African side voicing appreciation for the PRC’s benevolence. This is on account of the PRC’s support during the Covid-19 pandemic, its sharing of scientific and technological achievements, or for getting the African Union into the G20. There is one instance in the text of “a high level of appreciation (高度赞赏).” This is reserved for the African side’s admiration of Xi Jinping’s speech at the opening ceremony. A similar dynamic is seen with the use of the word “thanks (感谢),” which appears nine times. In one instance, the PRC thanks Africa for supporting its pandemic policies. The other eight involve the African side or the African Union expressing gratitude for PRC assistance. This overt display of gratitude and appreciation is perhaps what Xi believes constitutes “telling a good story of China-Africa friendship and showing the fruitful results of China-Africa cooperation (讲好中非友好故事，展现中非合作的丰硕成果)” (FMPRC, September 5).

The three documents also detail all of the PRC’s political priorities for which it seeks support from the wider world. Beyond those already mentioned, these include the One Belt One Road project, the three global initiatives, the promotion of an equal and orderly multipolar world, a new type of international relations, new quality productive forces, inclusive economic globalization, the expansion of Renminbi-denominated settlements, and many more. African countries also reiterate their “firm commitment to the one-China principle” in the Declaration. This includes an unusually lengthy description of what this entails, namely reaffirming that “there is only one China in the world, that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory, that the Government of the PRC is the sole lawful Government representing the whole of China, and that [the African side] firmly supports the PRC Government in all its efforts to realize national reunification (非方重申坚定奉行一个中国原则，重申世界上只有一个中国，台湾是中国领土不可分割的一部分，中华人民共和国政府是代表全中国的唯一合法政府，坚定支持中国政府为实现国家统一所作的一切努力).” To this is appended, “in accordance with international law and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, the affairs of Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet are the PRC’s internal affairs (按照国际法和不干涉内政原则，香港、新疆、西藏事务是中国内政).”

Conclusion

The Action Plan, the Declaration, and Xi Jinping’s speech at the opening ceremony all suggest that the PRC is cementing its bid to the leadership of Africa and, by extension, the wider Global South. The readiness of over 50 countries to voice strong support for the PRC’s interests and view of the world is more than just rhetoric. The documents consistently reference the United Nations and other international bodies that are the core of the current global order. As the PRC continues to deepen its engagement with Africa, so it will continue its march through the institutions in its bid to reshape the world in its image.

Notes

[1] With the exception of Eswatini, which does not maintain diplomatic relations with the PRC.